Ge Jianxiong on unity and division in China's history

Leading historian on a model of Chinese unity: what are the essentials to break the legacy of forced unification and sustain long-term national stability

For those who follow China’s foreign policy, the expression “Chinese territory since ancient times" is likely a familiar term. Yesterday, I shared, in The East is Read, part of an essay written 26 years ago by Ge Jianxiong on the subject.

The Fudan University professor, one of China's best-known historians, also shared his thoughts on unity and division in China’s history, as well as their implications for today.

The following text was originally part of 《分久必合，合久必分——统一分裂与中国历史余论》, a 30,000-word article Ge wrote for the 1999 book《学说中国》 by Jiangxi Education Publishing House.

The article is now available in 《统一与分裂—中国历史的启示》 Unity and division - Implications of Chinese history, a book that China’s Commercial Press began publishing in 2013.

四、超越传统，走出轮回

Transcending Tradition, Breaking the Cycle

The history of the world in past eras fully demonstrates that the negative factors and social maladies arising within a unified regime are not inherent to the fact of unity itself—nor to the peace, stability, or economic prosperity that unity brings—but rather to the political system: the system used to achieve unity, the method by which it is attained, and the extent to which it is pursued. Similarly, the positive factors evident in a divided society do not result from division itself, nor from the destruction and violence it causes, but rather from the weakening and disruption of outdated systems—a byproduct of external forces that temporarily or partially disassemble centralized structures.

On the tenth anniversary (1988) of the Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, I wrote that the initial results and promising prospects of China’s reform and opening-up had already confirmed a real possibility: that “on the premise of unity, the influence of centralization and autocracy could be eliminated, and the resulting problems avoided; and that under conditions preventing fragmentation, the vitality and progress brought by decentralization, competition, and autonomy could be achieved.” Scholars at home and abroad have argued that such an outcome is merely an idealistic wish and cannot be realized. Yet on the twentieth anniversary (1998) of that same session, I am even more confident that this possibility exists and can be fully realized.

“After a long period of division, the world will unite; after a long period of unity, it will divide again.” China’s past history indeed confirms this maxim. But is this also a universal law for the future? After China achieves unification, will it inevitably undergo new divisions? Must we repeat the cycle of division–unification–division again?

Some have predicted, based on the examples of the former Yugoslavia and former Soviet Union splitting into several or even dozens of countries, that China too will eventually fragment. This is entirely unfounded.

On the one hand, the formation and development of China differ fundamentally from those of Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union. From Emperor Qin Shihuang’s unification of the six warring states to the Qing dynasty’s territorial peak, China went through more than two thousand years of unification, division, and reunification. Today, nearly all of China’s territory has long been integrated into a single whole, and every frontier region has been affiliated with one or another Central Plains dynasty for extensive periods. Taiwan, although the last to be incorporated, has been part of a mainland regime for over three centuries. Xinjiang was most recently incorporated in the mid-18th century, but its earliest ties to the Central Plains date back to the first century BCE. In contrast, Yugoslavia only became a state after World War II, and most of the Soviet Union’s territory was the product of military expansion from the 17th century onward; some republics were added as late as the 1940s, in part due to collusion with Adolf Hitler.

More importantly, China’s reform and opening-up have laid a solid foundation for national unity and ethnic cohesion. They have also offered realistic and hopeful prospects for improving relations between central and local governments, between ethnic groups, between regions, between border areas and the interior, and between different religions and cultures. The majority of people who demand autonomy, separation, or independence do so in pursuit of democracy, freedom, human rights, and better living standards. If these goals can be achieved within a unified China, why pursue division? Why should the country and its people bear a heavier cost?

True statesmen—those who genuinely care about the long-term interests of their people, regions, or social groups—should focus on whether their goals can be attained, not on what form those goals take. Only those who selfishly aspire to become the “head of a state” would insist on carving out a new country. Therefore, I believe that as long as China continues and expands its reforms, not only will it not fragment, it will further unify—thus escaping the cycle of “unity after division, division after unity.”

However, division is not the same as disintegration. Broadly understood, “division” includes separate governance, autonomy, devolution, and all forms of decentralization. In this sense, unity contains division, and division contains unity; a new unity may follow a period of division, and new divisions will inevitably follow a long-standing unity. In fact, the phrase “after long separation comes reunification, after long union comes division” describes a broader historical pattern. This process of “division” essentially represents political democratization, marketization of the economy, cultural pluralism, and regional (or ethnic minority) autonomy. Given that China’s past two thousand years of unity have produced autocracy, state-controlled economies, monopolistic dominant cultures, and centralized governance, the current historical phase truly demands that “longstanding unity must give way to division.”

From Qin Shihuang onward, every instance of Chinese unification has been centered around a single individual, family, or ruling clique—never around the people themselves. Though some of these rulers advanced the people’s interests or contributed to historical progress, even the wisest and most benevolent among them never treated the people as masters of the country, nor implemented even the most basic democratic principles. Their contributions to history came at a great cost to the people—costs that were entirely avoidable. For example, if the losses from building the Great Wall could be justified as defense-related, the immense human and material resources Qin Shihuang used for his palaces and tombs caused suffering that could easily have been avoided—and those resources surpassed even what was used for the Great Wall.

We cannot forgive these rulers’ cruelty just because later generations labeled their projects “Eight Wonders of the World” (a title with no universally recognized status). When praising the Siku Quanshu (The Complete Library in Four Sections) as a “great cultural achievement,” we should not ignore the thousands of books destroyed for diverging from Emperor Qianlong’s ideology, nor forget the countless victims of literary inquisitions and the intellectuals imprisoned by ideological orthodoxy. From Qin Shihuang to Qianlong, these monarchs relied on the empire’s total manpower and resources—fully subordinated to their personal will. Under such extreme centralization, the people were nothing more than the emperor’s slaves. Even local officials were merely imperial servants, managing territory as if it were the emperor’s private estate. Naturally, such officials could not represent local interests, nor exercise autonomy.

Should such a model of unity not be challenged or even dismantled? Can it really be allowed to persist indefinitely? If China had remained under this kind of autocratic unity, could democracy or freedom have ever emerged?

China, with nearly ten million square kilometers of territory, contains vast differences in natural and human geography. Even with modern transportation, advanced communications, and material wealth, regional disparities in economic and cultural development will persist. Thus, development goals, speeds, and outcomes need not and cannot be completely uniform. The central government, no matter how well-intentioned, cannot fully understand or cater to every locality’s needs. Excessive centralization only fosters autocracy, bureaucracy, and corruption.

Other than defense, foreign affairs, and customs, authority should be reasonably allocated—or rather returned—to local governments, especially at the grassroots level. In addition to institutional reform, administrative divisions need to be restructured. Today’s provinces and autonomous regions are too large—most covering hundreds of thousands of square kilometers and having tens of millions (some over a hundred million) in population. Many of these divisions date back to the Ming and Qing dynasties and retain longstanding systemic issues.

Moreover, although the Constitution of the People’s Republic of China stipulates a two-tier system (province–county), a three-tier system (province–prefecture–county) has emerged in practice. Prefectures, originally provincial outposts, have evolved into a full administrative layer. The real reason for this is that provinces are too large to govern their counties effectively. Another constitutional anomaly is the creation of sub-provincial cities with independent planning status

Since the current two-tier system has been broken in practice, we should seek a comprehensive solution. Simply formalizing the three-tier system would only create more bureaucracy without resolving conflicts between large cities and provincial governments. The ideal approach would be to reduce the size of provinces, preserve the two-tier system, and divide the country into around 50 provinces (including autonomous provinces, under a revised name), each overseeing 40 to 50 counties. Prefectures and sub-provincial cities with independent planning status should be abolished. This was precisely the recommendation made by the late Professor Tan Qixiang, who proposed such a plan at an administrative division conference held by the Ministry of Civil Affairs in December 1989.

In the coming century, China must address three major issues to achieve and maintain national unity: preventing internal division (especially in border areas), resolving territorial disputes with neighboring countries, and achieving reunification with Taiwan.

As noted, internal division can be prevented as long as reform, rule of law, and democracy, and human rights expand. However, for frontier and minority areas, ethnic autonomy and religious freedom must be improved. Autonomy is guaranteed by the Constitution and is a legal right of minorities—but the scope must be clearly defined. Central and local responsibilities should be allocated by law and supervised accordingly. No single leader, party, or department should dictate matters, nor should local officials or ethnic minorities be blindly accommodated.

The government should guarantee citizens the freedom of religious belief, regardless of their ethnic background; at the same time, it must also uphold the principle of separation between religion and state. Religion must not interfere in politics, and every citizen must have the freedom not to believe in any religion. The principle of separation between religion and state also means that the government must not use religious organizations for political purposes, nor interfere in the internal affairs of religious groups.

The territorial disputes between China and its neighboring countries, including maritime boundaries, are mainly historical legacies, with only a few emerging in recent times. Historical experience tells us that the primary basis for resolving territorial disputes is not historical ownership, but current realities. When considering the gains and losses of territory, the focus should be on the long-term national interest. No country is willing to give up benefits it has already acquired, regardless of how those benefits were obtained. Therefore, territorial disputes can only be resolved through rational compromise by both sides. If one side insists on only advancing without retreat or pursuing total victory, it will inevitably sow the seeds of future danger and provoke new conflicts.

Generally speaking, territory that has already been lost is unlikely to be recovered through negotiation. It might be regained through military means, but the cost and long-term consequences often make the result not worth the price. Moreover, territory is always connected to people. When foreign nationals have become the main, or even the only, residents of a certain area, the emotional and political ties between that land and its former country will gradually fade, and the latter must accept this painful reality. When the Soviet Union collapsed, some naively suggested that China now had the opportunity to reclaim its lost territories. But aside from the fact that such an opportunity did not truly exist, one only has to look at who lives north of the Heilongjiang (Amur) River and east of the Ussuri River to know the answer. Would Russians who have lived there for one or two centuries identify with the previous owners of that land? Would they willingly leave land that originally did not belong to Russia?

Therefore, while we affirm the historical fact that Tsarist Russia once seized Chinese territory, this does not prevent us from establishing boundaries with Russia and other neighboring countries based on current borders, thereby laying the foundation for lasting peace and friendly cooperation between neighboring states.

Regarding China’s maritime territorial disputes with neighboring countries, Deng Xiaoping once proposed the policy of 搁置争议，共同开发 “setting aside disputes and pursuing joint development,” which is entirely correct and wise. We must confront the reality that although China was earlier than other countries in developing and utilizing these islands and exercising jurisdiction over them, historical limitations meant that the governments and the public at the time lacked a conscious awareness of territorial sovereignty. They did not establish complete sovereign claims, nor did they regularly and effectively exercise jurisdiction or defend these islands against encroachment.

Some of these islands have long been occupied by foreign countries—some host military forces and bases, some are entirely inhabited by residents of those countries, and others have been incorporated into the administrative divisions of those countries, or have become tourist attractions or industrial bases. The potential wealth of the surrounding maritime areas makes neighboring countries even more eager to compete for any possible claim to rights over them.

Therefore, we should not expect to achieve ideal outcomes without making certain concessions. We must carefully weigh the pros and cons—politically, militarily, and economically; in the short term and the long term; considering both present realities and future potential; and taking into account both local and overall national interests. Only by doing so can we handle the situation properly and strive to exchange relatively minor concessions for long-term peace and opportunities for joint development.

The foundation of cross-Taiwan Strait reunification is one China. Without one China, there would be reunification. However, within this framework, there remains considerable flexibility regarding how, by what means, and to what degree unification may be achieved. It must not repeat history but transcend it—creating a new model of unity.

In history, unification was typically achieved through force, often driven by personal ambition rather than public interest. However, future unification can be peaceful, backed by the majority of people on both sides, and supported by a favorable international environment.

In every historical division, rival governments claimed legitimacy. Yet after reunification, both were usually recognized as legitimate parts of China. For example, the Tang dynasty compiled both History of the Northern Dynasties and History of the Southern Dynasties. The Yuan dynasty also compiled histories of the Liao, Song, and Jin dynasties, acknowledging them all as legitimate predecessors. The same principle can apply to the mainland and Taiwan: history will make its judgment.

China’s status as a permanent member of the UN Security Council is well-established. Thus, Taiwan has no “rejoining” issue. After reunification, however, Taiwan may participate in international affairs appropriately as a region of China.

Most of the divisions in Chinese history were caused by one or both parties involved, with little influence from external forces. However, in modern times, China’s fragmentation and separatist movements have become inseparable from foreign powers—whether their involvement is overt or covert. In today’s world, where power politics still exerts a strong influence, the stance of major powers on China’s reunification undoubtedly carries significant weight. The mainland’s policy of reform and its commitment to peaceful reunification are essential prerequisites for winning the support of these major powers. With that, the push for “Taiwan independence” would lose its international platform.

Yet no one can afford to be complacent or simply allow the status quo to drift. As time goes on, the first and second generations of mainlanders who migrated to Taiwan will inevitably pass away. Their descendants, born and raised outside the mainland, will inevitably lack the same emotional attachment to it. The spiritual bond between Taiwan and the mainland will gradually weaken, and the psychological foundation for unification will be eroded. Even territories that have belonged to China since ancient times may be split off, and people of the same ethnicity and culture can be divided into separate nations.

We must learn from the lessons of history. Time waits for no one. All patriotic Chinese should redouble their efforts and strive for the realization of peaceful reunification.

Ge Jianxiong on "Chinese territory since ancient times"