Henry Huiyao Wang: It’s time for global governance to reflect the new realities

CCG founder in South China Morning Post: Despite international tensions, countries still seek cooperation based on shared interests. Institutions must embrace this trend

The following is the latest piece by Henry Huiyao Wang, founder and President, Center for China and Globalization (CCG), in his South China Morning Post column.

It’s time for global governance to reflect the new realities

Despite international tensions, countries still seek cooperation based on shared interests. Institutions must embrace this trend

The global order has outgrown itself. The 2026 Munich Security Report describes this moment as a period of “wrecking-ball politics”, in which the post-war order constructed in 1945 is “under destruction”.

However, that order was designed for a world shaped by bipolar rivalry and later sustained by American predominance. Today’s global system looks very different: economically diffuse, environmentally constrained and politically fragmented but deeply interconnected by both trade and technology.

Meanwhile, rising populism in Western countries seeks to tear down multilateral structures perceived as holding back national prosperity.

Yet multilateral institutions remain anchored in yesterday’s distribution of power, while today’s challenges – climate change, digital fragmentation, supply-chain insecurity, debt distress and geopolitical rivalry – demand frameworks that reflect contemporary realities. Global governance has struggled to keep pace with these changes.

That old architecture was built for a world of steel, grain and territorial sovereignty. The system now finds itself confronting problems driven by data flows, artificial intelligence, cross-border platforms, atmospheric physics and globally integrated capital markets. Governance remains predominantly state-centric, while value creation and systemic risk increasingly transcend borders and sectors.

The late 20th century was defined by confidence in a rules-based international order that could universalise principles under Western stewardship. It was also built on fading asymmetries of influence and supported by states that wholeheartedly backed these ideas.

Today, economic weight has shifted towards Asia. Emerging economies command a growing share of global growth and trade. Middle powers increasingly assert strategic autonomy. We are witnessing an overdue recalibration amid the final death throes of the unipolar moment.

However, we aren’t returning to rigid Cold War blocs or militarised balance-of-power politics. Instead, we have entered a complex pattern of issue-based cooperation and small alignments – a world in which cooperation varies by domain and no single power can impose universal rules.

A patchwork system of overlapping coalitions, regional frameworks and minilateral operations is emerging where universal consensus is not necessary for cooperation. States may align on semiconductor security while diverging on climate finance or coordinate on maritime security while competing over industrial subsidies.

The erosion of the transatlantic relationship shows this process in motion. The US has threatened the territorial integrity of Greenland, called Canada the 51st state, cast doubt on Nato and arguably forced through a US-EU trade agreement which has been cast aside. Washington’s transatlantic and Indo-Pacific allies are now hedging against risk outside well-established blocs along ideological lines.

The assumption that the US will steward the multilateral system can no longer be taken for granted. As a result, the European Union’s long-standing pursuit of strategic autonomy is moving from rhetoric to practice.

Today we are entering a “Romance of the Three Kingdoms” moment in global politics, with the US, China and the EU anchoring networks of trade, financial flows, technology standards and industrial policy. Influence increasingly flows not through territorial control, but through voluntary and often non-committal engagement in platforms, standards-setting, supply chain integration and capital markets.

Middle powers are shaping affairs with their own agency. These states have awakened to the fact that they cannot just be rule takers. Instead, they increasingly act as brokers and coalition builders in a world where all must adapt.

Trade governance offers a clear illustration of this. The Trans-Pacific Partnership was once to be a US-led instrument of regional economic statecraft. Today it is the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) and is stewarded by middle powers after the US’ withdrawal.

A treaty to which Britain is in the process of acceding, and one that the EU and China seek entry into or engagement with, the CPTPP has evolved. It is shaped less by ideology than by mutual interest and economic standards.

Similarly, the acknowledgement of continued engagement on shared topics of interest in the form of limited coalitions shows a persistent demand for cooperation. As traditional ideologically based blocs decline, problems such as climate change, pandemics, financial contagion and technological disruption ignore geopolitical divides.

Multilateral governance must evolve from making rules to implementing rules. For decades, the primary achievement of global institutions was norm creation – trade liberalisation, financial standards, environmental accords and human rights conventions.

An updated agenda for multilateral governance should proceed on several fronts. The Group of 20, which encompasses both advanced and emerging economies, should be further institutionalised as a steering forum for macroeconomic coordination. Unlike narrower groupings, it reflects a more accurate distribution of global economic weight.

Restoring the functionality of the World Trade Organization remains essential. An interim arrangement to preserve dispute resolution shows that member states still value a rules-based system. Revitalising the WTO’s core mechanisms would help stabilise commercial relations amid geopolitical tension.

Fundamentally, reform of the United Nations remains imperative. The UN serves as the core source of international legitimacy, yet its architecture reflects a 20th-century geopolitical landscape. Expanding representation in key decision-making bodies, increasing the voice of developing countries and modernising agencies to address emerging domains such as digital governance and climate coordination would strengthen the UN.

The transition towards a more adaptive form of multilateral governance will not be frictionless. Strategic competition among major powers persists. Domestic political pressures complicate international compromise.

But multilateral governance 2.0 must reconcile continuity with change, preserving the normative foundations of cooperation while adjusting structures to reflect contemporary power distribution and practical needs. Freer from the bindings of bloc-based diplomacy, resolution of these issues is in sight. We must step forward into the future clear-eyed. (Enditem)