How Zhou Enlai stopped a Chinese diplomatic escalation with Britain in 1962

China's first Premier and Foreign Minister told Hsiung Hsiang-Hui, then Chinese Chargé d'affaires to the UK, "Diplomatic work cannot be driven by emotion" and needs to maintain flexibility.

Just came across a short excerpt from the memoir of Hsiung Hsiang-Hui [Xiong Xianghui, 熊向晖], a former senior Chinese diplomat who passed away in 2005, where he recalled an episode, during his tenure as the Chinese Chargé d'affaires to the UK, with Zhou Enlai, China’s first Premier and Foreign Minister.

The Chinese version of the text can be accessed here.

In August 1962, I arrived in London to serve as the chargé d'affaires to the United Kingdom. In September, the British president of the Board of Trade, Frederick James Erroll, informed me that the British government had invited Vice Minister Lu Xuzhang of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Trade to visit the UK in December of that year. After consulting with authorities back home, I responded to Erroll, stating that the Chinese government appreciated the invitation and that Lu would visit the UK as scheduled. Erroll was very pleased, saying this was a significant event in Sino-British relations. The British government would release the news within three days and hoped that the Chinese government would do the same. I explained that it was not customary for China to announce such visits three months in advance and that the British side should handle it as they saw fit.

The next day, the British government announced the news.

In October, India once again initiated armed conflict on the Sino-Indian border, forcing China to defend itself. Some British politicians and newspapers seized the opportunity to criticize China. The Scotsman newspaper claimed that the British government would reconsider the visit of the Chinese Vice Minister of Foreign Trade. I immediately met with Erroll to ask for clarification. He assured me this was not true and that the British government's invitation to Vice Minister Lu and the scheduled visit date remained unchanged.

A few days later, Erroll urgently requested a meeting with me. He informed me that the British government had decided to indefinitely postpone Lu's visit and would make an official announcement in half an hour. He personally believed that this was not due to political reasons.

I struggled to control my anger and briefly reviewed our previous conversations, pointing out that the British government’s change of stance was surprising. The date of Lu's visit had been proposed by the British government and agreed upon by the Chinese government. Now, without consulting China, the British government had unilaterally decided to postpone the visit indefinitely and was about to announce it immediately. I expressed my personal regret for this abnormal action and stated that I would report to my government and reserve the right to further comment.

Upon returning to the office, I convened a meeting of key diplomats. I stated that the imperialist attitude of the British government should be countered. Based on my opinion, I urgently telegraphed the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Foreign Trade, explaining my conversation with Erroll and my stance, and proposed three suggestions: (1) lodge a strong protest with the British government; (2) proactively announce the cancellation of Lu Xuzhang's visit; (3) reduce imports from the UK.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs responded, agreeing with my expression to Erroll and instructing me to reiterate it on behalf of the Chinese government - but not to mention reserving the right to further comment. The response also indicated that my three suggestions were inappropriate and would not be adopted. I was asked to align with China’s overall foreign policy and approach towards the UK in further consideration and replied. That clearly indicated that my suggestions did not conform to China’s foreign policy and approach towards the UK, prompting me to reflect. I felt I could not accept this. In my response to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, I only stated that my suggestions were merely advice and that I would comply with the ministry’s decision and deepen my understanding of China’s foreign policy and approach towards the UK in future work.

In the spring of 1963, Lu Xuzhang visited the UK upon invitation, and the visit was very successful. That autumn, I returned to China for vacation. The Premier spoke with me and mentioned this matter.

The Premier said, last year, you proposed three suggestions, which the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Foreign Trade initially agreed with, but I stopped them. I asked the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to dampen your enthusiasm and hoped you would reconsider. From your telegram, it seemed you were not convinced; I did not continue the ‘telegram battle’ with you. Now, I ask you, what was your reasoning for proposing those three suggestions at the time?

I said, I initially wanted to protest to Erroll on the spot, but given my limited authority in diplomatic work, I only expressed regret; I felt it was insufficient and that a protest should be lodged in the name of the government. Although Britain has declined, it still exhibits strong imperialist tendencies at times. When they felt it necessary, they couldn’t wait to announce the invitation to Lu Xuzhang to visit the UK; when they deemed it unfavorable, they unilaterally announced the postponement, which felt like summoning at will. We could demonstrate our high stance by proactively canceling Lu’s visit. We mainly rely on self-reliance and have no demands from the UK. The British economy relies significantly on foreign trade; reducing imports from the UK could hurt them and deepen their internal contradictions. We should pull or push the UK as needed. At the time, I felt it necessary to deliver a heavy blow in response to this incident.

The Premier said counteractions should consider the overall situation. The US has blockaded and embargoed us, but the UK invited our Vice Minister of Foreign Trade to visit, showing a distinction and contradiction. This should be seized first. India is an important member of the Commonwealth. With the Sino-Indian armed conflict, if the UK invited Lu Xuzhang as planned, it would be difficult to explain to India. Their flip-flop indicates internal debate; the indefinite postponement decision stemmed from uncertainty about the duration of the Sino-Indian conflict. It was merely a postponement, leaving room for flexibility. Why cancel outright and close the door? Of course, the UK’s approach was not appropriate, and you pointed it out to Erroll and expressed regret, which was good. Reiterating verbally in the name of the government would suffice. Why escalate with a protest? Our construction relies on self-reliance but also requires developing foreign trade based on equality and mutual benefit. This principle was declared at the founding of the country. Imports are needed for our planned economy. Sudden cuts in imports primarily harm us. British businesses trading with us are private enterprises, generally friendly. Reducing orders harms them and gives us a bad reputation for not honoring contracts. Did you consider these points? The matter is past now; I am mentioning it now - what do you think?

I said Lu Xuzhang’s successful visit proved my original thoughts and suggestions were wrong. However, I only knew the “what,” not the “why.” Your analysis from a policy perspective clarified things greatly, which was highly educational for me.

The Premier said I remember you were born in 1919, not young anymore, yet sometimes still so 气盛 ‘assertive.’ Diplomatic work cannot be driven by emotion; it requires a broad perspective and multifaceted considerations. I hope my comments will help you mature, but don’t hesitate to propose suggestions.