Jia Min: Beijing’s new language for managing competition with the U.S.

Research fellow at the Shanghai Development Research Foundation says China is now more openly incorporating the language of competition after Xi-Trump summit.

Jun 05, 2026

For years, Beijing has searched for a vocabulary that might steady China–U.S. relations. Some of its preferred formulas—a “new model of major-country relations,” “no conflict, no confrontation, mutual respect, and win-win cooperation,” or the idea that the Pacific is large enough for both countries—were often dismissed, misunderstood, or treated with suspicion in Washington.

Only with the latest presidential meeting in Beijing does that pattern appear to have shifted, notes Jia Min, a special research fellow at the Shanghai Development Research Foundation. Washington, at least, has echoed the new formula—“a constructive relationship of strategic stability.”

Beijing’s explanation of the phrase also signals a subtle shift in its own language. Competition, long favoured by Washington as the defining frame, is now acknowledged more openly, though cast as bounded, manageable, and distinct from confrontation.

Jia is also cautious about the phrase “the East is rising and the West is declining.” It captured a specific moment when China’s governance model, social order, and ability to respond to external shocks appeared to show clear advantages, he explains. It was not, he stresses, a permanent verdict on Western decline. Nor does it match Beijing’s current official language, which now says that China’s national rejuvenation and America’s effort to “make America great again” can proceed in parallel, reinforce each other, and benefit the world.

First published on May 21, 2026, on 底线思维, a WeChat blog under Guancha.cn, Jia’s following interview ranges widely from Trump’s visit to China and the new formula of a “constructive relationship of strategic stability” to the limits of older concepts such as “G2” and “spheres of influence,” and the future of America’s alliance system.

美国正站在新的历史周期起点，注定是一个躁动时期

The United States is standing at the threshold of a new historical cycle—one that is bound to be restless

China–U.S. relations this year leave much room for imagination

Guancha.cn: Professor Jia, welcome. Trump has now ended his visit to China and returned to Washington, but the debate triggered by the presidential summit is still unfolding. Since the start of Trump’s second term, the international situation has changed significantly, and in many respects remains unclear. Taking Trump’s visit to China as a major event, we would like to ask you to review, analyse, and look ahead at some of the more structural questions.

To begin with, what is your overall impression of this China–U.S. presidential meeting? What were your expectations for it? Since the China–U.S. talks in Busan last October, the international community has been waiting for “the other shoe to drop.” Trump had repeatedly used terms such as “G2” and “grand bargain,” which led to widespread speculation.

Then, in March, the United States and Israel launched military strikes against Iran. The Strait of Hormuz was blockaded, and the United States found itself unable to disengage. Trump’s China visit was postponed, and when he finally came to Beijing, the visit lasted less than 48 hours. How should we read a meeting arranged at this particular moment? Was it transitional, transactional, or the decisive encounter many had been waiting for? At what level should it be understood?

Jia Min: Let me share a few personal impressions. I would use three phrases to describe the visit.

The first is “highly anticipated.” After the China–U.S. talks in Busan last October, Trump publicly said that he would visit Beijing in April 2026. That meant a presidential meeting in Beijing had already been put on the agenda. It was only natural that global media would follow the story closely.

But it was also clear that the past few months had been marked by repeated geopolitical crises. In January, the United States brazenly escorted Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro to New York to stand trial. In late February, the United States and Israel brazenly launched airstrikes on Iran and eliminated its top leadership. These developments caused prolonged volatility in global energy and financial markets, and China’s national interests were deeply affected as well.

So there was real uncertainty over whether the meeting could take place as scheduled, and whether China and the United States could sit down and talk. Trump did later inform China that the visit would be postponed because of the war in Iran. After several rounds of communication, the two sides finally settled on mid-May. So the second phrase I would use is “full of twists and turns.”

The third phrase is “unexpected.” Once the itinerary was released, it became clear that Trump’s schedule was very tight. He arrived in Beijing on the evening of Wednesday, 13 May, spent all of Thursday there, and continued the conversation in a more informal setting on the morning of 15 May before leaving that afternoon. The whole visit lasted roughly 36 hours.

Given the number of difficult domestic and foreign-policy issues Trump was facing, some observers doubted whether such a short visit could produce effective and substantive interaction with the Chinese side. Yet despite the compact schedule, China did not downgrade the reception in any way. The protocol was solemn and high-level, and it exceeded the expectations of many observers.

For example, Vice President Han Zheng personally went to Beijing Capital International Airport to welcome President Trump. That was a very high level of protocol. In the past, this kind of reception would usually have been handled by officials at the foreign minister level, who hold the rank of deputy state leader. Watching the live broadcast at the time, many Chinese observers like me immediately noticed the significance of that arrangement.

On the morning of 14 May, a grand welcoming ceremony was held outside the East Gate of the Great Hall of the People. In the afternoon, the two presidents visited the Hall of Prayer for Good Harvests at the Temple of Heaven, a site that symbolises important ideas in Chinese civilisation: the unity of heaven and humanity, prayers for peace, and hopes for favourable weather and good harvests.

The event that drew the strongest reaction, and was most widely circulated and interpreted around the world, was of course the banquet on May 14. President Xi and President Trump each delivered remarks that were rich in meaning and warmly phrased. Observers were especially struck by some of the vivid details in Trump’s thank-you remarks. He mentioned, for example, that Benjamin Franklin, one of the Founding Fathers of the United States, was an admirer of Confucius and published the sayings of Confucius in his writings. He also referred to the figure of Confucius carved into the face of the United States Supreme Court. Confucius, representing morality and ethics, stands alongside Moses, representing faith and God, and Solon, representing the people and democracy. Together, Trump said, they form three important sources of American legal culture.

There was another detail. After delivering his thank-you remarks, Trump raised his glass and took a small sip of wine. It is well known that, for family and personal reasons, Trump has long observed a strict rule of not drinking alcohol. Yet in Beijing, he made a small exception. This gesture should not be underestimated. It showed his recognition of China’s hospitality, as well as gratitude and reciprocal goodwill. That natural expression of friendly body language left a deep impression on me.

The American business leaders who accompanied Trump also had the chance not only to meet and exchange greetings with President Xi, but later to be received by Premier Li Qiang. The atmosphere was cordial.

From information gathered through various channels, observers seemed to share one impression: China’s arrangements were thoughtful and well executed. They showed the bearing of a major Eastern power, while also paying close attention to the feelings of the U.S. side. As Professor Wu Xinbo, director of the Center for American Studies at Fudan University, who attended the banquet, remarked with emotion, it had been a long time since people had felt such a cordial and friendly atmosphere in China–U.S. relations. [Check out Prof. Wu’s translated remarks on The East is Read.]

Does this friendly interaction exist only in Beijing in May? I do not think so. China has already announced that President Xi has accepted President Trump’s invitation and will pay a state visit to the United States in late September. That will surely be a major display of American diplomatic protocol.

In the second half of the year, the two presidents are also expected to attend the APEC Economic Leaders’ Meeting, hosted by China, and the G20 Leaders’ Summit, hosted by the United States. There will therefore be many more opportunities for interaction, and more goodwill and surprises may be released gradually.

For China–U.S. relations this year, then, describing them as “leaving much room for imagination” would be both optimistic and forward-looking.

Guancha.cn: Before Trump began his visit, the whole world was speculating about what the two sides would discuss. The Taiwan question, trade and economic issues, Iran, the Russia–Ukraine conflict, AI, and other technology issues were all at the centre of attention. Different people had different expectations. Some thought the two sides would focus on managing differences across various issues, perhaps by setting up guardrails or signing purchase orders and other agreements.

But after reading through all the complicated information, one may feel that perhaps the better approach is to simplify the picture and focus on the larger frame. Apart from specific issues, China–U.S. relations also need to be understood at a higher level: first define the broad framework and set the direction, then deal with specific problems case by case.

This brings us to a point mentioned in both the Chinese and U.S. official announcements: the new description of China–U.S. relations as “a constructive relationship of strategic stability.” Is this China’s proactive attempt to define the next stage of bilateral relations? How do you view this phrase?

Jia Min: Apart from the detailed interactions I mentioned earlier, the most important point was the information and common understandings announced by Foreign Minister Wang Yi after the presidential meeting. According to that briefing, the two presidents agreed to define the relationship as “a constructive China-U.S. relationship of strategic stability,” giving strategic direction to bilateral ties over the next three years and beyond.

China also gave a very specific explanation of what this means: positive stability where cooperation is the mainstay; healthy stability where competition is kept within proper limits; constant stability where differences are manageable; lasting stability where peace is expectable. It is clear that the keyword is “stability.” This is not an empty formula. It has concrete content.

Take positive stability where cooperation is the mainstay. In the current context of China–U.S. relations, the main channels of cooperation may be people-to-people exchanges and joint law enforcement. Both sides have made efforts in these areas, including commemorating the Ping-Pong Diplomacy and combating transnational drug crimes.

Healthy stability where competition is kept within proper limits is also a major breakthrough. In the past, China was reluctant to use the word “competition” to describe China–U.S. relations, and tended to emphasise cooperation instead. But the objective reality today is that competition is everywhere. The two sides have put “competition” openly on the table.

In the American context, “competition” is a fairly neutral word. Competition exists, explicitly or implicitly, in sports, business, politics, and many other fields. Americans, by temperament, are willing to embrace competition. Competition often unfolds in stages and is oriented toward outcomes. Once the outcome becomes clear, competition can then turn into cooperation.

From the U.S. perspective, China’s strong rise in technology, advanced manufacturing, artificial intelligence, electric vehicles, and other fields means the United States needs to engage in some form of long-term competition with China. But this does not necessarily mean long-term antagonism.

Over years of dealing with the United States, China has gradually come to accept this point. The “competition” in China–U.S. relations refers mainly to technology, the economy, global markets, and similar areas. It does not point to direct conflict. That is why I think “competition” in the official formulation is relatively neutral and constructive. As long as the two sides avoid vicious competition—including measures the United States is especially good at using, such as trade barriers and long-arm jurisdiction—healthy stability where competition is kept within proper limits can be put into practice.

Constant stability where differences are manageable mainly refers to differences between China and the United States over global geopolitical issues, such as the Russia–Ukraine conflict and Iran. There is no need to hide these differences, and in some cases, sharp oppositions. That makes it all the more necessary to create a normal state of relations through controllable and institutionalised negotiation and communication.

Lasting stability where peace is expectable undoubtedly refers to the Taiwan question, which concerns China’s core interests. In the past, people often assumed that whenever China talked about China–U.S. relations, Taiwan would have to come first. However, this time, when discussing “a constructive relationship of strategic stability,” Taiwan was deliberately placed last. In Chinese culture, being placed last does not necessarily mean being least important. On the contrary, it may mean being the most crucial point.

Lasting stability where peace is expectable means that China and the United States need to reach a strategic consensus on the Taiwan question and establish a reliable mutual understanding. During the presidential talks, President Xi devoted a specific passage to Taiwan: “The Taiwan question is the most important issue in China-U.S. relations. If it is handled properly, the bilateral relationship will enjoy overall stability. Otherwise, the two countries will have clashes and even conflicts, putting the entire relationship in great jeopardy. ‘Taiwan independence’ and cross-Strait peace are as irreconcilable as fire and water. Safeguarding cross-Strait peace and stability is the biggest common denominator between China and the United States. The U.S. side must exercise extra caution in handling the Taiwan question.”

China’s proposal of “a constructive China–U.S. relationship of strategic stability” has set a compass for bilateral ties over the next three years and beyond. This is extremely important, and I strongly agree with the concept. The four forms of stability cover four dimensions of China–U.S. relations, from cooperation to competition, and from differences to conflict. They amount to a strategic blueprint—or, one might say, a practical guide—that creates a framework for operational and predictable interaction between the two sides.

Should the United States escape the “AI trap”?

Guancha.cn: After China put forward this agenda, the outside world has also been watching how the U.S. side responds. In an interview with NBC in Beijing, the U.S. secretary of state said that the United States agreed with “constructive strategic stability.” The latest development is that the White House fact sheet on Trump’s China visit also mentioned the phrase. People are now watching to see how the United States will act in practice.

This also applies to the Taiwan question. When Trump was in Beijing, outside observers generally believed that Taiwan must have been discussed, though no one knew how far the discussion had gone. After he left China and began his return journey, related media interviews gradually emerged. Some of the signals are worth noting, but it is still hard to say that they amount to a definite outcome.

One thing is clear, however. In today’s East Asian situation, a concrete policy does not always have to be announced for policy effects to appear. A shift in wording can itself have an effect. In your view, what kind of further alignment or bargaining process will there be between China and the United States?

Jia Min: This is a very large question, and it requires some historical review. For a long time, whenever China proposed a definition or formulation for China–U.S. relations, Americans tended to approach it with arrogance and pickiness. That was the pattern until this presidential meeting in Beijing.

Here I would like to raise a point I have made on several occasions. People often say there is AI competition between China and the United States. That is objectively true. But in my view, there is not only AI competition between the two countries; there is also what I call an “AI trap.”

In this “AI trap,” the “A” does not stand for “artificial,” but for “arrogance.” The “I” does not stand for “intelligence,” but for “ignorance.” What I call the “AI trap” is the American prejudice of arrogance and ignorance. It has taken root in the minds of many U.S. elites involved in China-related politics, economics, diplomacy, media, think tanks, government administration, and decision-making. It has become a symptom of America’s paranoid approach to China.

For example, China once proposed building a new model of major-country relations between China and the United States, saying that the vast Pacific Ocean has enough space for the two large countries of China and the United States. In the end, the U.S. side misread and distorted this proposal, claiming that China wanted to be number one, that the United States would have to be number two, and that China intended to lead the United States. Later, China put forward the principles of no conflict, no confrontation, mutual respect, and win-win cooperation, but the United States still did not take them seriously.

By contrast, Americans have often made alarmist claims that China and the United States may fall into the so-called Thucydides Trap. In my view, however, it is the United States that has fallen into what I call the AI trap—the trap of arrogance and ignorance—and has remained trapped there for decades.

Whether today’s American elite can accept a “constructive relationship of strategic stability” is something that still requires time and patient observation.

China hopes the U.S. side can respond positively. At the same time, we must calmly recognise that in today’s world, only by strengthening one’s own development and building internal capabilities can one truly earn the trust of others. In this sense, the ball is now in the U.S. court. We need to see whether Washington can accept this expectation of strategic stability.

Judging from history and experience, this will certainly face criticism within the United States and may even meet considerable resistance. But that resistance is foreseeable. The United States has not yet escaped the AI trap it has set for itself. Part of that trap is arrogance: the belief that China can never surpass the United States, or that China’s technological strength can only ever follow behind America’s. But is that really the case? Reality has already provided the answer.

The other part is ignorance: ignoring China’s development in the economy, society, and people’s livelihood. Today, many Western tourists, including American tourists, come to China and see that China performs better than the United States in many areas and even enjoys comparative advantages. They come away with genuine impressions. Ordinary people, in this respect, are often more grounded than elites and better able to understand China as it is today.

If America’s media and political elites remain unable to move beyond the AI trap, then this closed loop of self-perception will continue. Of course, China does not necessarily have to make them climb out of it. This predicament will simply become a mental burden they cannot shake off.

Guancha.cn: That is a very interesting point. The key question now is whether the Americans will take up this concept, how they will understand it, and how they will respond.

There is also another phenomenon worth mentioning. Sometimes, even when two countries use the same concept and share a sound consensus and stable relationship, they may still understand that concept differently, and their paths to achieving it may also differ. This is understandable to a certain extent. For example, both China and Russia talk about a “multipolar order,” but they do not understand it in exactly the same way. Still, at least there is a consensus. Should we view a possible China–U.S. consensus in the same way?

Jia Min: My view is that there is considerable space between the behaviour of major powers and the concepts they articulate. In other words, there are many tensions, contradictions, and inconsistencies between text and action. Treating the text as the only authority, without examining the timing and context in which it was produced, can easily lead to misreading.

Take the United States as an example. After last year’s national security report was released, reactions were mixed. What is certain, however, is that Trump 2.0 carried out a large-scale restructuring of the architecture of U.S. security decision-making and foreign-policy formulation. The functions and staffing of the National Security Council were sharply reduced, and in some respects stripped away. As a result, the national security report was drafted more through a patchwork process of borrowing and repackaging, and the quality of the report itself declined considerably.

Relying on that report alone would be insufficient for interpreting the Trump administration’s actions and strategy. Some Chinese scholars tend to translate and analyse a U.S. strategic report as soon as it is released, then use it as the basis for predicting Washington’s next moves. In my view, this is more like applying a rigid method to a changing situation.

American politics today is moving towards flexible authoritarianism, pragmatic conservatism, and refined self-interest. The Trump team builds its legitimacy and its narrative of success through actions, events, and cases, rather than starting from texts. There is a gap between strategic reports and government behaviour. The Trump administration’s strategy and policy, therefore, cannot be judged by texts alone. Its past experience and patterns of behaviour matter just as much.

Trump is clearly a leader with a strong personality, and he also carries elements of business and media. Many things that would usually be regarded as long-term strategies are, for him, decisions to be made in the moment. At the same time, those decisions also reflect a certain kind of American business thinking. Judging or predicting Trump’s behaviour, therefore, should not be based only on texts or strategic reports. His own experience, personality, and other personal factors also need to be taken into account, as they may bring unexpected developments and breakthroughs to China–U.S. relations.

Rather than “the East is rising and the West is declining,” I would say the United States is standing at the threshold of a new historical cycle

Guancha.cn: Indeed, U.S. reports, statements, and public remarks come from many places: government departments, major think tanks, research institutions, and members of Trump’s inner circle. Distinguishing among these sources, weighing their significance, and judging the positions behind them all test the analytical capacity of outside observers.

This also applies to the period after Trump’s visit. Trump himself gave an interview to Fox News on his return journey, while Secretary of State Rubio was interviewed by NBC during his stay in Beijing. There were many official statements and formulations that need to be read against actual actions and policies.

This may be like a contest between masters: each side not only knows its own cards, but is also trying to read the other side’s hand. Reading the game is crucial. During Trump’s visit to China, many international media outlets suggested that he had come in an embarrassed position because of the war in Iran and the Strait of Hormuz crisis. Some even suggested that he needed China’s help on these issues, although Trump, Rubio, and others denied this.

Those views reflect a broader judgment about the China–U.S. balance. Some believe that “the East is rising and the West is declining” is accelerating. Some believe the United States is now in hegemonic decline or retreat. Others remain cautious about any shift in the balance of power between China and the United States.

How do you view these different perspectives? Is the transformation of the China–U.S. relationship linear, or does it unfold through turbulence and oscillation? Historically, transfers of power between great powers are often prolonged, chaotic, and highly dangerous. How do you see this process? And what is Trump’s current domestic and international position? What cards does he hold?

Jia Min: In recent years, the phrase “the East is rising and the West is declining” has gained considerable currency, including in the United States and other Western countries. If returned to its original historical context, the phrase can be understood to refer to the performance of China’s governance model, social order, and its ability to respond to external shocks during a specific period. In that context, China did indeed show certain advantages.

But in my view, the phrase points to a specific time frame. It is not a general statement. Some people have now generalised it, as if it means that China has always been rising and the West has always been declining. That does not match some of the views China wants to convey to the outside world.

For example, China has said that “The great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation and making America great again can go hand in hand. We can help each other succeed and advance the well-being of the whole world”; that “China and the United States can achieve mutual success and shared prosperity”; and that “China and the United States should be partners and friends. That is what history has taught us and what reality needs”. If one accepts these formulations, then the phrase “the East is rising and the West is declining” does not really fit this context.

China’s development achievements need no further elaboration from me. But as for whether the United States is in decline, I take a cautious view. I am more inclined to say that the United States is standing at the threshold of a new historical cycle.

My academic background is in American history, so I would like to shift the perspective and look at this through America’s own historical cycles. Counting from 1776, this year marks the 250th anniversary of American independence. Counting instead from 1783, when the War of Independence formally ended, the United States has been on its nation-building journey for more than 240 years. Dividing that history into three periods of just over 80 years each reveals three major stages.

The first stage runs from the founding of the United States to the Civil War. I call it the period of “institutional nation-building.” By this, I mean the series of institutional experiments that followed the approval of the Constitution and the establishment of the federal government, accompanied by continuous expansion across the American continent.

The result of this institutional expansion was territorial enlargement, but also the spread of Southern slavery—the most destructive element in America’s institutional genes. I call it America’s cancer. Eventually, as the United States expanded and its economy developed, these cancer cells erupted, leading to the Civil War. The first 80 years of American nation-building ended with that war.

The second stage was the real formation of a unified national market after the Civil War. From the 1860s to the 1940s, I call this the period of “market nation-building.” This refers first to the construction of the U.S. domestic market. As westward expansion carried the United States from sea to sea, the country built a vast domestic market for production and consumption. At the same time, the United States began to pursue global influence, sell goods around the world, expand its sphere of influence, and seek financial and monetary hegemony. Through foreign wars and the two World Wars, the United States rose, through a torturous process, to the top of the world.

The third stage, from 1940 to 2020, I call America’s period of “ideational nation-building.” The United States became a global power. On the one hand, it needed to maintain its hegemonic position; on the other, it entered the Cold War with the Soviet Union. Whether through the American Dream or liberal democracy, this was a period in which the United States emphasised the construction of ideas and the export of values.

At the same time, its accumulated internal contradictions became increasingly intense. But the United States did not resolve them through a civil war or an external war. Instead, they continued through an endless social and cultural war. Marked by the Capitol riot in 2021, the third cycle of American history came to an end.

So, at the beginning of the 2020s, what historical stage has the United States entered? I would venture to use one term: the period of “AI nation-building.” In other words, new capacities for technological innovation, combined with new forces of social development in the United States, are driving the country into a new historical cycle.

The opening of this new cycle has distinctive features. On the one hand, the United States is going through intense political polarisation and disputes over social issues. Visible and invisible forms of “civil war” remain present. On the other hand, a consensus is also forming around rebuilding American hegemony through technological innovation and making America great again. The most important lever for this is AI. To secure new technological leadership, the United States must be number one in the world in technology and talent. Capital, military power, and hegemonic status can strengthen that position further.

In this new AI-led technological revolution, the United States is going all in. That is precisely why the tension between this American historical cycle and China has reached an almost unparalleled level, like quantum entanglement. It also explains the intensity of the competition and contest between China and the United States. At the same time, it anticipates a future moment when the two sides may halt conflict, ease confrontation, and return to cooperation. This is truly a marathon of great-power destiny, in which the fates of the two countries are bound together.

Whether the United States can become great again is something I cannot predict. What is certain is that the United States in this new cycle shares a common feature with its previous new beginnings: it is entering a restless period, full of both energy and ambition.

China today is in a period of historical ascent and national rejuvenation. Using competition as a metaphor for China–U.S. relations is consistent with reality. One side follows a people-centred development model that emphasises inclusiveness and mutual benefit. The other champions the individual, is driven by the market, and puts interests first. Which model is better? The two sides can test and compare themselves over a much longer period, in a long marathon-style competition.

Only by putting the present in dialogue with history can we understand the moment

Guancha.cn: Your view is illuminating. It offers a way to look at the international balance of power through American history and America’s internal development.

At present, some of the terms and concepts used by media outlets, think tanks, and researchers in China and abroad when discussing China–U.S. relations, geopolitics, or the international order seem to be reaching back into the past. “G2,” “spheres of influence,” a “new Yalta system,” and even the new “corollary to the Monroe doctrine ” invoked by the Trump administration all borrow concepts from international relations since the 18th and 19th centuries. At first glance, they may seem somewhat similar to today’s situation. But when placed in the present context, they do not seem able to describe it accurately.

It is no doubt that the balance of power between China and the United States, and the international order more broadly, is undergoing some kind of transformation. How do you view the information hidden behind these concepts?

Jia Min: Terms such as “spheres of influence” and “Monroe Doctrine” are now widely used, but they belong to the 19th century. They are terms from the age of empires and revolutions. Because we cannot yet describe the present situation completely, precisely, and adequately, we have had to borrow old vocabulary from the past. In fact, this shows that we have not yet broken free from the constraints of existing language and theory, including in how we understand empire and global governance.

This may be acceptable for the time being, but it has to change with the times and in light of new circumstances.

In fact, the United States has not withdrawn from the world. On the contrary, it has become more flexible, more alert, and more expansionary. In the past, transportation made global interaction more convenient. Today, international communication, social media, digital and intelligent media, and artificial intelligence have fundamentally changed our understanding of time and space.

In a certain sense, political developments in Beijing are now synchronised and contemporaneous with political dynamics in Washington and Moscow. Under such conditions, an analysis that overemphasises the spacial while neglecting the temporal dimension risks missing important parts of the picture.

Let me give an example. American politicians today are highly sensitive to timing. Take the U.S.–Israeli war with Iran. The war was brought to a close after 60 days because Congress had authorised the U.S. president to conduct this so-called non-war “military operation” for only that length of time. But did the war really stop simply because the clock ran out? Obviously not. Yet the Trump administration made full use of time as a lever in its dealings with various parties, including in its interactions with China. For the United States today, transactional politics is closely tied to both time and space.

Old concepts alone cannot fully capture the behaviour of today’s U.S. government, let alone the changes unfolding in the international order. That would be unrealistic. The present must be read closely, but always in dialogue with history. Only then can a clearer outline of the current moment begin to emerge.

“Harsh voice and privileged exit”

Guancha.cn: Time and space are an interesting lens through which to observe American politics. Since we have talked about old eras, old vocabulary, and the old order, I would also like to ask about the alliance system—a strategic asset that has long existed within the U.S. hegemonic system. It is now difficult to say whether Trump ultimately sees allies as assets or burdens. How do you understand the Trump administration’s new positioning of the U.S. alliance system?

This is especially relevant to China. The United States has many traditional allies and partners in the Asia-Pacific region, and these relationships have been slowly changing over the past few years. Various nested minilateral frameworks have emerged, such as interactions among Japan, the Philippines, and Australia. NATO also seems interested in making its presence felt in the Indo-Pacific.

Since his first presidency, however, Trump has wanted to change the U.S. alliance system in some way. Is he tightening the system, loosening it, or even abandoning the commitments and obligations behind it? For the current East Asian situation, any such shift would have major implications.

After the Cold War ended, the question of whether NATO should continue to exist was seriously debated. But as European affairs evolved, especially amid the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia and Russia’s political and economic difficulties in the mid-1990s, the West came to see NATO’s continued existence as practically necessary.

The drivers of NATO’s eastward expansion were not limited to the desire to preserve strategic and security advantages in Europe. A group of U.S. diplomatic and political elites with backgrounds in Eastern Europe also played an especially important role in lobbying the Clinton administration. NATO’s eastward expansion in the late 1990s gave some Eastern European countries security guarantees, but it also dispelled Russia’s remaining illusions about the West. Mutual suspicion and the security dilemma continued to deepen. The two Russia–Ukraine conflicts in 2014 and 2022 were both consequences rooted in NATO’s eastward expansion.

The United States has long borne the bulk of NATO’s military costs, and this has been a source of complaint in both American political parties. After the Cold War, Washington became more eager for European allies to shoulder a larger share of the burden. After the 2008 financial crisis, NATO-related military spending became an even heavier fiscal burden.

Even before his first presidential campaign, Trump repeatedly argued that the United States should not be carrying such a large share of the cost. After taking office, he pressured allies to contribute more. By the Trump 2.0 period, he had openly raised the idea of dissolving NATO, and more radical moves cannot be ruled out. There is both substance and theatre in such statements. On the one hand, the United States does have a real interest in dismantling old systems and building new ones. On the other hand, this is also part of Trump’s negotiating techniques and his use of maximum pressure.

The United States does not truly want to abandon its alliance system. Rather, it wants to preserve alliance relationships in which it can continue to lead, while keeping costs controllable and benefits foreseeable. The United States may gradually become more selective, shifting its emphasis from multilateral systems towards bilateral or minilateral frameworks.

In the Indo-Pacific, the United States has clearly directed more resources towards Japan, the Philippines, and Australia, etc. These countries can help constrain China and serve as measurable bargaining chips in U.S. competition and strategic manoeuvring with China.

Here I would again invoke Hirschman’s “exit, voice, and loyalty” framework. In my view, U.S. policy, both at home and abroad, has long shown a preference for what might be called harsh voice and privileged exit. Put simply, the United States has not historically been willing to uphold external commitments over the long term while bearing high costs.

If the United States decides that maintaining an organisation or order no longer brings clear benefits, offers little value to be gained, and still requires additional investment, the likelihood of cutting it loose rises sharply. Cases can be found in America’s long-running disputes with the League of Nations, the Organization of American States, the United Nations, and its affiliated international organisations.

By comparison, bilateral systems are built on shared interests between two sides in the economy, trade, military affairs, and geopolitics. That makes them far more reliable than multilateral relationships.

Today, the United States would rather maintain and develop the Anglo-American special relationship, strengthen the U.S.–Japan alliance, and deliberately support the Philippines than build new multilateral systems. This marks a major difference between the Trump era and previous U.S. administrations. Look at the Biden period: it created a series of multilateral alliances and cooperation platforms and a proliferation of titles. Costs increased, but efficiency did not improve. Washington then had to create more positions and assign more people to keep these mechanisms running.

One might say: did that not create many jobs? It did. But in Trump’s view, bloated staffing, low efficiency, and fragmented decision-making are far inferior to the lean, direct management style he prefers. Direct guidance and personal intervention from the CEO’s office fit Trump’s leadership style much better.