Jia Qingguo: a rare opening for steadier China–U.S. relations in 2026

Trump’s second-term China policy is taking shape: tariffs at the centre, sensitive issues skirted, and an explicit offer of cooperation—yet domestic and allied pressures could quickly reopen old rifts

Feb 13, 2026

Tariffs have dominated Trump’s second-term China policy, but the bigger surprise, Jia Qingguo argues, is the administration’s effort to keep other flashpoints off the agenda and its stated willingness to cooperate with China, producing a “fragile stability” in bilateral ties, says Jia Qingguo, member of the Standing Committee of the National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), Professor and Director of the Institute for Global Cooperation and Understanding (IGCU), Peking University. In a recent article, Jia warns that this stability can be easily disrupted by Capitol Hill, U.S. bureaucrats, allies, or Taiwan, and sets out measures to keep tensions from spilling into crisis as the two heads of state prepare for renewed diplomacy in 2026.

The article was published on the afternoon of 4 February on IGCU’s official WeChat blog and reposted by the Centre on Contemporary China and the World (CCCW) at the University of Hong Kong. It appeared before Xi Jinping and Donald Trump’s latest phone call, held on the evening of 4 February 2026.

According to the IGCU post, the article likely first appeared in Global Economic Governance Observations 全球经济治理观察, a publication of the Global Economic Governance 50 Forum (GEG50), a think tank affiliated with Tsinghua University’s PBC School of Finance.

Jia reviewed and revised the following translation before publication.

贾庆国：脆弱的稳定——特朗普第二任期中美关系回顾与展望

Jia Qingguo: Fragile Stability—A Review and Outlook of China-U.S. Relations During Trump’s Second Term

One year into Trump’s second term, China–U.S. relations have been marked by turbulence, repeatedly nearing the brink of confrontation. Yet through sustained efforts on both sides, the two countries not only defused these flashpoints but also held a leaders’ summit. They agreed to suspend the implementation of proposed high tariffs on each other’s goods and reached an understanding on Trump’s planned visit to China in April 2026. How should the current state of China–U.S. relations be assessed? What are the prospects going forward? And what should both countries do to steer ties towards stable, healthy development? These are questions drawing widespread attention.

I. A close call: China–U.S. relations over the past year

Unlike Trump’s first term, his second has seen China–U.S. relations move from turbulence to stabilisation. Soon after taking office, the Trump administration launched an aggressive tariff war against China and other countries. China responded with resolute countermeasures, and the two sides traded blows until they announced tariffs as high as 145% (U.S.) and 125% (China) on each other’s goods. For a time, bilateral economic and trade ties seemed headed for rupture. Yet after the storm, the outlook improved: the two sides opened talks and agreed to suspend the implementation of most proposed tariffs.

The two delegations then held five rounds of talks, each time agreeing to maintain the suspension of most tariffs. They also communicated and consulted on a range of issues, including fentanyl control, TikTok, restrictions on high-tech exports, port call fees, rare earth export controls, and China’s purchases of U.S. agricultural products, reaching intentions to cooperate on some of them. Although no final tariff deal has been reached to date, both sides intend to keep addressing issues through consultation and negotiation.

Beyond economic and trade matters, the relationship has remained relatively stable. President Trump has been cautious on Taiwan, human rights, and other sensitive issues between China and the U.S. When pressed by the media, he declined on several occasions to say how he would respond if conflict were to break out in the Taiwan Strait. He has also emphasised, in different settings, his personal friendship with President Xi, saying that if China and the U.S. cooperate, they can solve any problem in the world, and saying he looks forward to working with China on international issues.

On October 30, 2025, the two heads of state held a successful meeting in South Korea and reached an understanding on President Trump’s intention to pay a state visit to China in April 2026. This created favourable conditions for stability in bilateral relations, while also opening space for imagining an improvement in China–U.S. ties.

II. Characteristics of Trump’s second-term China policy

As Trump’s second-term China policy has come into clearer focus, four broad features stand out.

First, a focus on tariffs: by threatening sharp tariff increases, Trump aimed to press China into trade concessions and secure a deal favourable to the U.S.

Second, putting interests before principles: unlike his predecessors, Trump is less inclined to approach relations with China through an ideological lens in international affairs, and instead places greater emphasis on interests.

Third, the administration has deliberately steered clear of some of the most sensitive issues in the relationship, including Taiwan, Xinjiang, Tibet, and Hong Kong.

Fourth, Trump has publicly highlighted his willingness to cooperate with China, stressing that if the two countries work together, they can solve all the world’s problems; he has even floated the idea of a “G2”. The China-related sections of the recently released U.S. National Security Strategy report also reflect these features.

It is worth noting that although Trump’s approach to China policy fundamentally challenges Washington’s long-established hardline consensus on China, it has so far not met with open questioning or strong resistance within the Republican Party, whether in Congress or among administration hawks. The main reason is the unusual political ecosystem that has emerged within the party in recent years: with roughly 70% of Republican voters behind him, Trump holds substantial sway over the careers of lawmakers and senior officials, discouraging public dissent even where private objections exist.

These circumstances offer a rare opportunity for the stable development and even cooperation of China–U.S. relations.

III. A rare opportunity

First, although economic and trade ties have been hit, they will not be severed. In 2025, after multiple rounds of consultations, the economic and trade teams on both sides achieved positive results, bringing China–U.S. economic and trade relations into a phase of relative stability. Bilateral goods trade statistics show that while the tariff war has pushed China–U.S. trade onto a downward trajectory, China remains the United States’ third-largest export destination and third-largest source of imports, while the United States remains China’s largest goods export destination and third-largest source of imports. In 2025, China’s trade with the United States totalled RMB 4.01 trillion ($574.66 billion), accounting for 8.8% of China’s total foreign trade value. According to U.S. statistics, in the first ten months of 2025, U.S. trade with China totalled $373.64 billion, representing 7.8% of total U.S. foreign trade value.

Second, high-level exchanges between the two countries are expected to continue and expand. Both sides have planned reciprocal head-of-state visits in 2026, and may also meet in multilateral settings such as the G20 and APEC, creating the rare prospect of multiple meetings within a single year.

Third, people-to-people ties are also set to widen. With high-level diplomacy providing momentum, people-to-people and cultural exchanges between China and the United States have rebounded quickly. Tourism has also recovered rapidly, and direct flights between the two countries will increase to 100 per week starting on 31 March 2026. A recent poll released by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs shows that 53% of Americans believe the United States should undertake friendly cooperation and engagement with China. Some media outlets have noted that this is the first time since 2019 that a majority of Americans have preferred a policy of cooperation and engagement with China. This suggests that, despite the twists and turns in China–U.S. relations, rational management of differences by both sides is gradually fostering a more rational understanding of the relationship within American society.

Finally, the two countries may be able to cooperate on certain issues where interests overlap, such as promoting a ceasefire between Russia and Ukraine, strengthening oversight of AI security risks, curbing nuclear proliferation, and combating transnational crime. If handled well, successful cooperation on specific issues could help rebuild a measure of mutual trust and increase the prospects for peaceful coexistence and mutually beneficial outcomes.

IV. Multiple risks

However, the future development of the relationship still faces multiple risks. Trump’s China policy is widely questioned within and beyond the U.S. government and lacks broad backing among U.S. allies. Efforts at home and abroad to disrupt or undercut his approach will continue to arise.

The first challenge comes from anti-China forces within the U.S. government. Many officials favour a tougher line, see Trump’s approach as too soft, and push measures that could sharpen confrontation. For example, in May 2025, the U.S. Secretary of State and the State Department separately issued statements indicating they were prepared to revoke visas for certain Chinese students, including those with connections to the Chinese government or studying in critical fields, and to tighten criteria for future applications from the mainland and Hong Kong. The move was later halted after Trump publicly said he welcomed Chinese students to study in the United States.

The second challenge comes from the U.S. Congress. Many lawmakers see Trump’s China policy as too soft and have tried to undermine it through China-related bills and amendments. For instance, in February 2025, Republican Representative Wagner, the late Democratic Representative Connolly, and others promoted the “Taiwan Assurance Implementation Act”. It passed the House in May, cleared the Senate on 18 November, and was sent to the president for signature. The bill aims to push beyond the red lines previously set by the U.S. government for engagement with Taiwan’s authorities, requiring the State Department to review the “Guidelines for Engagement with Taiwan” at least once every five years, submit an updated report to Congress within 90 days of the review, and then issue updated guidance to the U.S. executive branch on that basis.

There is also a challenge at the bureaucratic implementation level. With the broad goal of U.S.-China strategic competition unchanged, relevant U.S. departments will continue to advance specific measures aimed at containing China. Such measures are often not the result of direct instructions from senior political leaders or congressional manoeuvring, but rather the product of bureaucratic agencies acting in line with broader strategic goals. Even so, their rollout can pose direct threats and challenges to China–U.S. relations. Examples include the U.S. Department of Commerce’s announcement on 29 September 2025 to extend Entity List restrictions to any firm 50% or more owned by listed parties; the U.S. move on 14 October to levy a USTR Section 301 service fee on Chinese vessels; and the most recent round of U.S.–Taiwan arms sales.

Further challenges come from outside the United States. Most U.S. allies do not endorse Trump’s China policy, viewing it as lacking principle and insufficiently tough. Moreover, driven by their own interests, some may take steps that heighten China–U.S. confrontation to advance their agendas. For example, when Canada sent a warship through the Taiwan Strait last September, its purpose was unlikely to uphold so-called freedom of navigation on the high seas but to provoke an incident that can draw the United States to Canada’s side, thereby easing the pressure Canada had faced earlier over Trump’s tariffs and his remarks about annexing Canada.

Another example is Japan. Not long ago, Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi floated possible Japanese intervention on Taiwan to justify a sharp rise in defence spending, prompting strong Chinese opposition and sanctions. The resulting China–Japan tensions also test Trump’s China policy: Washington typically backs its ally in China-Japan tension, risking friction with Beijing. Trump’s relatively neutral stance averted a clash this time, but it is unclear how the U.S. would react in a repeat scenario.

From a historical perspective, challenges from Taiwan—including pro-independence rhetoric and actions—will also continue to test Trump’s China policy.

Finally, after years of deterioration, China and the United States now lack even a basic level of mutual trust, making it uncertain whether they can cooperate to manage the challenges outlined above. Therefore, while the relationship is showing signs of stabilisation and new opportunities have emerged, its future course still carries much uncertainty and risk.

V. Policy choices

Managing China-U.S. relations well is of great significance to both countries and the world. To this end, both sides should focus on the following areas:

First, both countries must fully recognise that China–U.S. cooperation serves their fundamental interests. Despite the many conflicts and differences between them, the two sides also share extensive interests and common concerns. The relationship is not a zero-sum game; rather, shared interests outweigh areas of conflict. President Xi Jinping has stressed that a sound China-U.S. relationship benefits not only the two countries and their peoples, but also the whole world, and that there are “a thousand reasons to make the China-U.S. relationship work, and no reason to break it.”

Second, given the sensitivity of the Taiwan issue, the two countries need to take appropriate steps to manage it effectively, ensuring that it does not destabilise an already complex and important bilateral relationship—above all by avoiding military confrontation triggered by miscalculation.

Third, given the zero-sum nature of ideological competition, both sides should downplay ideology in managing the relationship and work to prevent it from becoming the defining factor in bilateral ties. With domestic political pressures and deep mistrust, the two countries are prone to unnecessary conflict; there is therefore an urgent need to establish and strengthen mechanisms for crisis prevention and crisis management.

Fourth, given the high level of mutual distrust, official exchanges and communication are not enough. The two sides urgently need to establish an unofficial, leader-level channel to maintain regular contact, clarify issues that could easily be read as deliberate provocation, and explore possible areas for cooperation.

Finally, given the breadth of shared interests, the two countries should deepen cooperation where those interests overlap, rebuild trust through successful collaboration, and strengthen the foundations of the relationship. A starting point could include a Russia–Ukraine ceasefire, nuclear non-proliferation, launching a strategic stability dialogue, and setting rules for the development of artificial intelligence. （Enditem)