Jinghan Zeng's Memoirs of a Confucius Institute Director

The first insider memoir from a Confucius Institute director during a time of growing global controversy chronicles an award-winning journey facing existential and political challenges

Palgrave Macmillan has recently published Memoirs of a Confucius Institute Director, Volume 1: Challenges, Controversies, and Realities, the first insider memoir from a Confucius Institute director during a time of growing global controversy, by Michael Jinghan ZENG, Professor, Department of Public and International Affairs, City University of Hong Kong.

Prior to joining City University of Hong Kong, Professor Zeng established his academic career in the UK. At 31, he was appointed Professor of China and International Studies at Lancaster University (a top 7 UK University at the time), becoming one of the youngest full professors in Britain.

Simultaneously, he served as Director of its Confucius Institute, leading a team of nearly 30 staff in the university. Under his guidance, the Institute flourished into an award-winning institution, receiving the prestigious Confucius Institute of the Year award from the Confucius Institute Headquarters, as well as Lancaster University’s Outstanding Contribution Award.

During this time, the Institute also overcame unprecedented challenges, including the global pandemic, the sudden dissolution of the Confucius Institute Headquarters, and a political campaign by the then-ruling UK government to close Confucius Institutes. These remarkable experiences are chronicled in his forthcoming three-volume memoir, Memoirs of a Confucius Institute Director, with the first volume released in August 2025.

I am happy to share a 2,000-word excerpt from the book, as authorized by Palgrave Macmillan and Professor Zeng.

As you would imagine, I chose the most sexy part where Zeng addresses the most serious allegations against Confucius Institutes: Espionage and Intelligence Gathering?

Due to the word limit, I have to omit some paragraphs. But you should definitely get a copy - from Palgrave Macmillan or Amazon!

One final warning: British readers should brace for impact.

Espionage and Intelligence Gathering?

Among the many accusations leveled against Confucius Institutes, one of the most extreme is the claim that they serve as tools for espionage.¹ This narrative has been largely shaped by concerns raised by Western intelligence agencies, certain policymakers, academics, and media reports (ABC 2019²; Vanttinen 2022³; Francis 2023⁴; Jakhar 2019⁵; Peterson 2020⁶). The then US Secretary of State, Mike Pompeo, for example, accused Confucius Institutes of recruiting “spies and collaborators” at American universities (Reuters 2020)⁷. Viewing Confucius Institutes as espionage hubs on American campuses, the then Senator Marco Rubio even introduced the so-called “No Federal Funding for CCP (Chinese Communist Party) Spying and Persuasion in Education Settings (SPIES) Act” in 2023 to push for their closure in the US (Rubio 2023)⁸. However, there is no definitive public evidence to substantiate these claims, and many accusations remain speculative—if not outright misinformation or disinformation.

As these narratives continue to spread and are repeated across policy discussions, media coverage, and public discourse, they have contributed to a perception that espionage by Confucius Institutes is an established fact rather than mere speculation. This has significantly contributed to the demonization of Confucius Institutes and their staff in Europe and the US, despite the lack of credible evidence. In the UK, speculation and accusations have intensified alongside growing warnings from British security agencies about the threat of Chinese espionage. In reality, however, such accusations are entirely disconnected from the actual operations and functions of these institutions.

When assessing accusations of Confucius Institute espionage in the UK, it is essential to begin with the broader geopolitical context. The reality is that, in today’s strategic landscape, the UK holds limited intelligence value for China. Once the empire on which the sun never set, Britain has long lost its former political, economic, and military dominance. Its global relevance has diminished, while China’s rise has positioned it as a major global power. In this context, the intelligence dynamics between China and the UK are asymmetrical. China holds significantly greater intelligence value to the UK than vice versa across nearly all levels. Given this reality, it is clear that the UK is not a primary target of China’s espionage efforts.

At the higher education level, espionage narratives primarily focus on science and technology, where concerns about technological intelligence gathering and intellectual property theft are frequently raised as previously discussed. Many have expressed fears that China could gain access to cutting-edge research through academic partnerships with British universities, potentially repurposing these advancements for military or strategic advantage (Devlin 2024⁹; Devlin and Sample 2019¹⁰; Devlin 2023¹¹; Parliament 2023¹²). However, these concerns have largely focused on research partnerships between British and Chinese universities in science and technology, whereas Confucius Institutes have little to no involvement in such collaborations.

When addressing these concerns, it is essential to consider the broader context of UK-China science and technology collaboration. At a macro level, China’s technological rise has positioned it as a global leader, far surpassing the UK in many key areas—if the UK was ever a true competitor in the first place. In the higher education sector, Chinese universities have overtaken their British counterparts in technological capabilities. While British universities remain strong in foundational science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) research and theoretical advancements, many of these developments take decades to translate into applicable technologies with tangible economic, social, or military impacts.

Meanwhile, China has leapfrogged ahead in technological application and innovation, integrating advancements at a pace unmatched by the UK. Thus, while certain British innovations may hold some strategic value to China, it is crucial to keep this bigger picture in mind and avoid exaggerating the intelligence significance of the UK in science and technology collaboration. Overstating British universities’ technological value risks distorting policy decisions and fueling unnecessary alarmism.

Needless to say, scientists of Chinese origin now find it increasingly difficult to pursue their work without facing undue suspicion. A growing media and political narrative portrays them as potential spies or agents of Chinese interests, leading to heightened scrutiny and restrictions (Devlin 2023¹³; Dathan 2021¹⁴; Owen and Ryan 2021¹⁵). Ironically, during the UK–China “Golden Era,” science and technology cooperation was actively encouraged by the same Conservative government that later adopted a hardline stance on such collaboration. As part of this engagement under the then Conservative government, the China-UK Joint Strategy for Science, Technology, and Innovation Cooperation was signed in 2017. This agreement established a framework for collaboration in three strategic areas: basic research, innovation, and global partnerships—marking China’s first joint strategy in technology and innovation with another country (UK 2017)¹⁶.

At the time, scientists’ Chinese origins or research ties with China were once regarded as an asset by many British universities, facilitating deeper collaboration with Chinese institutions. However, in today’s geopolitical climate, what was once an advantage has increasingly become a liability or even something to conceal. The growing political tensions have led to increased scrutiny of Chinese scientists in British universities, with tighter restrictions on research collaborations, funding, and visa approvals under the banner of national security.

---

More importantly, and directly relevant to the focus of this book, language and culture centers like Confucius Institutes—staffed primarily by language teachers—have become innocent victims of the broader geopolitical tensions surrounding UK-China science and technology partnerships in the university sector. Science and technology are highly specialized fields that require extensive knowledge, expertise, and experience, as does technological espionage. It is absurd to associate Confucius Institute teachers—who are typically high school or primary school language instructors, or occasionally humanities and social science scholars in Lancaster’s case—with any form of scientific research, let alone tech espionage. Their role is entirely unrelated to advanced research in AI, biotechnology, or other sensitive fields, making the accusations against them both misguided and misplaced. This mischaracterization reflects a broader climate of suspicion, where geopolitical anxieties have led to indiscriminate allegations against innocent academics, educators, and cultural institutions that have no connection to the actual areas of concern.

At Lancaster University, the closest link between the Confucius Institute and a foreign intelligence agency is, perhaps, the abbreviation of its financial account: “CIA”—which, regrettably, stands not for the Central Intelligence Agency, but for Confucius Institute Account. Internal project codes such as CIA1006, CIA1014, and CIA6001 refer to specific academic projects, not covert agents imagined by misinformation and conspiracy theories.

For many Chinese students, including myself when I studied in the UK, the immediate image of espionage is shaped by 007—James Bond— with his famous introduction: “Bond, James Bond.” This cinematic portrayal paints an exciting picture of spies as charming, highly skilled operatives, often seen driving luxury cars, wearing tailored suits, using high-tech gadgets, and accompanied by glamorous companions. It is an image I would never associate with our Confucius Institute teachers—or myself. Though I must admit, the thrilling world of espionage as depicted in movies sometimes seems far more exciting than my lectures on great power politics and the rise of China—at least to some of my students and even my wife and daughters.

Of course, this cinematic stereotype is far from the reality of intelligence work—but it is precisely the version most Chinese people, including our Confucius Institute teachers, have in mind. As ordinary Chinese citizens, their understanding of espionage is shaped more by British films than by real-world intelligence operations. The notion that these ordinary language teachers are actually highly trained Chinese spies on secret missions in the UK is utterly absurd.

It would also be highly irrational for Chinese intelligence agencies to use Confucius Institutes as a platform for espionage, given the intense scrutiny these institutes face in the West. Even if those language teachers were on so-called secret missions, the level of intelligence in most university and primary school contexts is far too low and basic to be of any real significance—unless the UK now considers access to information on Shakespearean literature a matter of espionage and a threat to British national security. This narrative of Confucius Institutes as espionage hubs is not just misguided—it is laughable. It reflects how geopolitical anxieties have created imaginary threats, turning innocent academics and teachers into the villains of a real-life spy thriller that simply does not exist.

In addition, the Confucius Institute at Lancaster University is located in the central campus, with its rooms integrated into the university’s central booking system, which operates independently of the Confucius Institute’s control. This means that all students—regardless of whether they study Chinese—freely enter and use the building. Any student or staff member can book a room, access the social areas for studying or relaxation, or simply pass through— all without requiring approval from the Confucius Institute. During graduation ceremonies, it even serves as the collection point for academic gowns, welcoming hundreds of students and their families. Its high visibility, open access, and complete lack of privacy make it the least suitable place for a secret foreign intelligence operation.

Likewise, Lancaster itself is far from an ideal hub for foreign intelligence interests. Unlike major global cities with cutting-edge technology industries, Lancaster is a small city with no significant technological or strategic assets that would attract espionage. While Lancaster University ranks among the top 150 institutions globally in the QS rankings, it is a mid-sized university that is not particularly known for large-scale technological innovation. Its recent developments in cybersecurity research—in collaboration with the UK’s Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ)—may have increased its relevance, but these are recent advancements that postdate the establishment of the Confucius Institute and are entirely unrelated to it. Furthermore, many Confucius Institutes in the UK, like Lancaster’s, are located in small cities or rural areas—places that are hardly comparable to London, Cambridge, or Oxford, where espionage concerns might seem more plausible. The generalized accusation that Confucius Institutes function as intelligence hubs lacks any local basis and does not hold up to scrutiny.

From a Chinese perspective, being falsely labeled as a spy is not only deeply offensive but also raises serious concerns about why such disinformation has become normalized or even acceptable in British society. In the broader context of UK-China scientific and technological collaboration in higher education, there are legitimate national security concerns, but the inclusion of Confucius Institutes in this narrative is often based solely on their Chinese affiliation rather than any substantive evidence of wrongdoing.

It is even more troubling to hear claims that China’s political system is so pervasive that all Chinese nationals and organizations must, by default, be seen as extensions of the Chinese state and therefore inherently suspect. Under this logic, Chinese scientists, teachers, and students are automatically regarded as potential threats to British national security—a sweeping generalization that is both irrational and discriminatory.

This anti-Chinese narrative is, bluntly put, a form of racism that too often goes unchallenged. By the time the political climate and anti-China narratives swept from the US to the UK, many researchers of Chinese origin had already been driven to leave—an experience that, frankly, influenced my own decision as well—making the UK increasingly unappealing to Chinese staff and students. Ultimately, this harms the very institutions that claim to champion academic freedom and international collaboration. It often makes me wonder whether the US and UK I once recognized—and chose to cross continents to study in—are still the same today.

From a managerial perspective, I feel deeply sorry for our teachers who have been misrepresented in the UK. They are qualified Mandarin educators with a passion for cultural exchange, eager to experience Western life—one of the main reasons they volunteer for these roles. Unlike Chinese ultranationalists who oppose engagement with the West or view it as a Western attempt to overthrow the Chinese government, these teachers are individuals who appreciate the English language and literature, uphold British values, often admire Shakespeare, and respect Western education. Indeed, many of them aspire to provide their children with a British education and fluency in English. Their dedication, especially during the pandemic—when they worked tirelessly to support local children in Blackpool, as discussed in Chapter 2—makes the baseless accusations against them even more shameful. Their efforts deserve recognition and respect, not discredit and suspicion. This is one of the key reasons I feel strongly about writing this book—to challenge the disinformation surrounding them.

Leaders of British universities hosting Confucius Institutes should take a principled stand against discriminatory narratives that racially profile not only Confucius Institute teachers but also Chinese students and staff more broadly. In an academic environment that prides itself on diversity, inclusion, and intellectual rigor, remaining silent in the face of such narratives is not just an abdication of responsibility but a betrayal of the very values that universities claim to uphold.

True leadership in academia demands more than passive neutrality or quiet avoidance; it requires actively challenging misinformation, fostering an environment where individuals are judged by their contributions rather than their ethnicity, and ensuring that policy decisions are based on evidence rather than geopolitical anxieties. If university leaders genuinely uphold the principles of academic integrity and fairness, they must not allow these narratives to shape institutional perceptions and decisions unchecked. Instead, they should publicly reaffirm their commitment to diversity, academic freedom, and international collaboration, sending a clear message that universities should be spaces of open inquiry, not arenas for politicized fear-mongering.

It is precisely the failure to challenge the rise of anti-China racism in the UK, coupled with insufficient attention to the experiences of Chinese students, that has contributed to the financial struggles of the British higher education sector. By allowing discriminatory narratives to go unchallenged and neglecting the well-being of one of if not the largest international student community cohorts, universities have inadvertently undermined their own financial sustainability. A more proactive and inclusive approach—one that actively counters racism, reassures Chinese students and scholars, and fosters a welcoming academic environment— would not only align with the principles of fairness and integrity but also help safeguard the sector’s long-term stability and global reputation.

From an operational standpoint, managing the Confucius Institute is no different from running any other academic or cultural organization. One of the most frequent discussions revolves around workload and holiday schedules. A common complaint from new arrivals is the intensity of work during Michaelmas Term and the Chinese New Year period, when many events and teaching responsibilities peak. Additionally, due to our engagement with local primary schools and weekend language programs, some teachers are occasionally required to work beyond core university hours or on weekends. It is, after all, a full-time job that keeps everyone busy.

Given these realities, it is laughable to imagine how ‘spying’ could fit into our job allocation system. How would it even be managed from a practical standpoint? Like any workplace, we monitor working hours to ensure fairness and prevent overburdening staff—how would espionage tasks be assigned without triggering resistance from our staff? And if Confucius Institutes were truly intelligence-gathering hubs, where would directors like me receive training? Would there be a manual on how to manage an espionage operation? If so, I clearly missed my induction session.

Get a copy - from Palgrave Macmillan or Amazon!

1. Jakhar, Pratik. 2019. “Confucius Institutes: The Growth of China’s Controversial Cultural Branch.” BBC. Available at https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/ world-asia-china-49511231. Accessed on 15 Feburary 2025.

2. ABC. 2019. “China’s Confucius Institutes Have Spy Agencies and Governments Increasingly Alarmed.” ABC News. Available at https://www.abc.net.au/ news/2019-03-10/confucius-influence-around-the-world-in-question/108 75960?utm_source=chatgpt.com Accessed on 12 Feburary 2025.

3. Vanttinen, Pekka. 2022. “Finland Shuts Down Confucius Institute Amid Censorship, Espionage Accusations.” Euractiv. Available at https://www.euractiv.com/short_news/finland-shuts-down-confucius-institute-amid-censorship-espionage-accusations/

4. Francis, Sam. 2023. “Rishi Sunak U-turns on Proposed Ban on Chinese Institutes.” BBC. Available at https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-65624287. Accessed on 12 Feburary 2025.

5. Jakhar, Pratik. 2019. “Confucius Institutes: The Growth of China’s Controversial Cultural Branch.” BBC. Available at https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/ world-asia-china-49511231. Accessed on 15 Feburary 2025.

6. Peterson, Rachelle. 2020. “China is Rebranding Its Confucius Institutes.” National Association of Scholars. Available at https://www.nas.org/blogs/article/china-is-rebranding-its-confucius-institutes. Accessed on 21 February 2025.

7. Pompeo, Michael. 2020. “Designation of the Confucius Institute U.S. Center as a Foreign Mission of the PRC.” US Department of State Press Statement. Available at https://2017-2021.state.gov/designation-of-the-confucius-institute-u-s-center-as-a-foreign-mission-of-the-prc/. Accessed on 20 February 2025.

8. Rubio, Marco. 2023. “Post of Senator Marco Rubio’s X (1:12 AM · Nov 4, 2023).” X. Available at https://x.com/SenMarcoRubio/status/1720609807730688048. Accessed on 16 February 2025.

9. Devlin, Hannah. 2024. “Chinese Firm Sought to Use UK University Links to Access AI for Possible Military Use.” The Guardian. Available at https:// www.theguardian.com/education/article/2024/jun/16/chinese-firm-sou ght-to-use-uk-university-links-to-access-ai-for-possible-military-use. Accessed on 9 Feburary 2025.

10. Devlin, Hannah, and Ian Sample. 2019. “UK Academia’s Links to Chinese Defence Firms ‘Harmful for National Security’.” The Guardian. Available at https://www.theguardian.com/education/2019/nov/25/uk-academias-links-to-chinese-defence-firms-harmful-for-national-security. Accessed on 16 February 2025.

11. Devlin, Hannah. 2023. “1,100 Scientists and Students Barred from UK Amid China Crackdown.” The Guardian. Available at https://www.theguardian.com/education/2023/mar/15/1100-scientists-and-students-barred-fromuk-amid-china-crackdown. Accessed on 9 Feburary 2025.

12. Parliament. 2023. “Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament China.” House of Commons. Available at https://isc.independent.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2023/07/ISC-China.pdf. Accessed on 8 Feburary 2025.

13. Devlin, Hannah. 2023. “1,100 Scientists and Students Barred from UK Amid China Crackdown.” The Guardian. Available at https://www.theguardian.com/education/2023/mar/15/1100-scientists-and-students-barred-fromuk-amid-china-crackdown. Accessed on 9 Feburary 2025.

14. Dathan, Matt. 2021. “Spy Agency Funding Scientists with Links to China’s Intelligence Agencies.” The Sunday Times. Available at https://www.thetimes.com/article/spy-agency-funding-scientists-with-links-to-chinas-intellige nce-agencies-8067ngcck. Accessed on 16 February 2025.

15. Owen, Glen, and Jake Ryan. 2021. “Net Closes in on Chinese ‘Spies’ in UK Universities Where Academics are Suspected of Passing Pioneering British Technology to Beijing.” Daily Mail. Available at https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-9608707/Chinese-spies-UK-universities-academics-suspected-passing-technology-face-arrests.html. Accessed on 16 February 2025.

16. UK. 2017. “Joint UK-China Strategy for Science, Technology and Innovation Cooperation Sets New Horizons for Closer International Collaborations.” Department for Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy (UK) and Ministry of Science and Technology (China). Available at https://www.gov.uk/government/news/joint-uk-china-strategy-for-science-technology-and-innovation-cooperation-sets-new-horizons-for-closer-international-collaborations. Accessed on 16 February 2025.