Ren Xiao: A Chinese Theory of International Relations, on China’s Own Terms

Writing in the Party's top theoretical journal, the IR professor says “international relations theory” should not be treated as synonymous with Western international relations theory.

Building an “autonomous knowledge system” (自主知识体系) has become one of Xi Jinping’s major initiatives for philosophy and the social sciences in China. The agenda can be traced to Xi’s landmark 2016 speech on philosophy and the social sciences, in which he called for developing disciplines with “Chinese characteristics.” He made the objective more explicit during a 2022 visit to Renmin University of China, declaring that accelerating the development of philosophy and the social sciences with Chinese characteristics “ultimately comes down to constructing China’s own autonomous knowledge system.” The goal has since become a major organizing theme for China’s academic and theoretical establishment.

Qiushi (求是)/Seek Truth, the flagship journal of the Communist Party of China Central Committee, has in recent years devoted growing attention to what such autonomy should mean in specific fields. In 2025 alone, the journal carried a run of articles on building autonomous Chinese knowledge in disciplines including Marxist theory, political science, international relations, and history, illustrating an effort to translate the broad political and intellectual agenda into concrete programs of theory-building within individual disciplines.

The following article, “Building an Autonomous Chinese Theory of International Relations,” appeared in the October 1, 2025 issue of Qiushi and is one contribution to that broader effort.

Its author, Ren Xiao, is a professor at Beijing Foreign Studies University’s Academy of Regional and Global Governance whose research covers international political theory, East Asian international relations, and Chinese foreign affairs. He has also taught at Fudan University and previously served as a senior scholar and head of research divisions at the Shanghai Institute for International Studies.

In this essay, Ren argues that “international relations theory” should not be treated as synonymous with Western international relations theory. He surveys several bodies of theory developed by Chinese scholars, including relational theory, moral realism, Tianxia theory, and symbiosis theory, before setting out what he sees as the next steps toward greater intellectual autonomy. These include drawing more systematically on traditional Chinese thought, turning the theory and practice of China’s contemporary diplomacy—including Xi Jinping Thought on Diplomacy—into academic concepts and theoretical frameworks, and resisting the use of publication in English-language journals as the overriding benchmark of scholarly quality. For Ren, the objective is not intellectual isolation from the outside world, but a Chinese international-relations discipline that engages global scholarship while retaining greater theoretical independence and judging its work, in his phrase, “with ourselves as the principal point of reference” (以我为主).

Ren has reviewed the translation before publication.

构建中国自主的国际关系理论

Building an Autonomous Chinese Theory of International Relations

In recent years, the construction of an autonomous knowledge system has become an important issue in the Chinese social sciences and has attracted widespread academic attention. Building an autonomous Chinese knowledge system in the study of international relations is naturally part of this broader undertaking.

Since the beginning of reform and opening up, every field of the Chinese social sciences has gone through a process of opening up, catching up, learning from others, and importing knowledge. This was a necessary and indispensable stage. Through this process, the Chinese social sciences made substantial progress and achieved considerable development. But the purpose of learning from others is to enrich and develop our own knowledge system. More than forty years after the beginning of reform and opening up, it is now necessary to recognise more clearly the importance and urgency of developing autonomous theoretical thought. More Chinese theories should now take their place in the field of international relations theory.

An Inequality

With regard to international relations theory, I believe there is an important inequality: International Relations Theory ≠ Western International Relations Theory.

For several centuries, Western countries have occupied powerful positions in world politics, economics, military affairs, and other domains. Western academia has consequently also enjoyed a dominant position in intellectual life. As a result, when people hear the term “International Relations theory,” they instinctively think of Western international relations theory. This reflects the weakness — and in some cases the absence — of theory-building in the non-Western world.

A related phenomenon is that when Western international relations theory is mentioned, people immediately think of realism, liberalism, constructivism, or their various derivatives. Realism places power and material capabilities at its core and regards relations among states as fundamentally struggles for power. Liberalism places international institutions at the centre and emphasises their role in regulating state behaviour and facilitating cooperation. Constructivism focuses on ideas and on how changes in ideas shape international relations.

There is nothing inherently wrong with classifying the principal schools of Western international relations theory in terms of these “three isms.” The problem arises when some researchers treat them as canonical, as though international relations theory consisted of nothing more than these schools. This easily leads to intellectual rigidity and causes researchers to overlook other important perspectives in theoretical inquiry.

As changes unseen in a century accelerate, Western international relations theory has increasingly struggled to explain many phenomena in contemporary international affairs, and its limitations have become more widely recognised.

Take realism as an example. One of its major branches, neorealism — also known as structural realism — argues that the structural characteristics of the international system are the key determinants of state foreign behaviour and the direction of international relations. But this theory excessively magnifies the stability and constraining power of systemic structure. “Structure” comes to appear almost immutable, with the result that changes occurring at the unit level — that is, at the level of individual states — are neglected.

According to neorealist logic, a bipolar system is highly stable, and the end of the Cold War should therefore have resulted from changes in the structure of the international system, particularly shifts in the balance of power between the United States and the Soviet Union. In reality, however, the Cold War did not end because one side acquired an absolute advantage over the other. It ended through the interaction of policy adjustments at the state level, ideological change, domestic political and economic conditions, and other factors. Neorealism therefore neither predicted the end of the Cold War nor provided a convincing explanation for it, exposing important limitations in its explanatory power.

Realism should, in principle, have responded by improving its theory. Yet instead, it moved in a more extreme direction, producing what came to be known as offensive realism, whose representative work is John Mearsheimer’s The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. This theory holds that the international system is fundamentally anarchic, resembling a brutal arena in which great powers are compelled, in the interests of their own security, to maximise their power at virtually any cost. It emphasises the zero-sum character of security competition and the offensive nature of military power. Mearsheimer then applied this theoretical framework to China. Without examining China’s foreign policy or its actual behaviour, he hastily concluded that China’s rise would necessarily be an “unpeaceful rise.” Such a theory and such assertions are mistaken and misleading.

These limitations demonstrate that Western international relations theories are not universally valid truths. We need to move beyond the constraints of Western theoretical frameworks and examine and construct international relations theory from more open and pluralistic perspectives, so that we can better understand and respond to an increasingly complex and changing international environment.

A Growing “Chinese School”

As early as the beginning of this century, Chinese scholars explicitly called for the development of a “Chinese School” of international relations, with the aim of developing original Chinese theories of international relations. In recent years, substantial progress has been made in China in building original scholarship, and a number of distinct theoretical approaches have emerged. These include, principally, relational theory of world politics, moral realism, Tianxia theory, and symbiosis theory, although other Chinese theories may still be in the process of formation and development.

Relational theory introduces “relations/guanxi,” an important concept in Chinese social and cultural thought, into international relations theory. In contrast with Western societies’ emphasis on individual “rationality,” it advances the concept of “relationality” and constructs an ontological framework centred on relations. It argues that the identities and behaviour of international actors are not determined solely by their internal rationality, but are shaped by the relationships among actors. These relationships are dynamic rather than static, processes of becoming rather than fixed conditions, and complex social relations rather than linear causal relationships. This theory breaks with the traditional Western focus on the individual state and extends analysis from individual states to interactions among states, among non-state actors, and among actors operating across different levels. It therefore provides a new way of understanding interaction and changing relationships in international politics.

Moral realism incorporates a moral-ethical dimension into the traditional realist framework. It examines in depth how rising powers acquire the status of leading powers in the international system and argues that a rising state must possess not only substantial material capabilities but also broad recognition and support at the moral level. It emphasises political leadership as a crucial component of national power — one that determines shifts in the balance of power among major states and changes in international norms — and regards morality as an important source of political leadership. In this way, moral realism moves beyond traditional realism’s narrow emphasis on material power and offers a new analytical framework for understanding power transitions in international politics.

Tianxia theory is a framework for understanding what the international political order ought to become, built upon ancient Chinese political ideals and historical experience. The concept of Tianxia implies a world system in which the world itself becomes a political subject and a coexisting order in which the world as a whole constitutes the basic political unit. One branch of Tianxia theory, sometimes described as “New Tianxiaism,” places particular emphasis on critically transforming the traditional Tianxia idea. It advocates a decentralised, non-hierarchical international order characterised by equality and sharing. To understand the world through Tianxia is to take the entire world as the unit of thought and analysis. In doing so, it transcends the narrow nation-state-centred perspective of Western international relations theory and offers a more inclusive and holistic way of thinking about international politics.

Symbiosis theory takes the diversity of existence as a fundamental reality. It recognises that differences are widespread but does not treat difference as a source of conflict. Instead, it regards difference as a source of growth and development. The theory argues that plurality and diversity are not accidental but fundamental, even essential, forms of existence. Homogeneous forms of plurality can coexist symbiotically, but heterogeneous forms can do so as well. It places particular emphasis on open forms of heterogeneous symbiosis, arguing that differences should be approached with tolerance and a willingness to coexist, and that one should go further by appreciating the characteristics and strengths of others and even absorbing and incorporating them. The theory does not deny the existence of individual interests. On the contrary, it begins by recognising such interests and then seeks ways of achieving symbiosis on that basis. It thereby offers approaches and pathways for resolving conflicts and achieving common development in international society.

These major original Chinese approaches to international relations theory have already attracted attention in the global academic community and generated a degree of influence. They demonstrate that the proposal to establish and develop a “Chinese School” of international relations theory has produced results and has gained increasing recognition and support.

Different opinions have naturally arisen in this process. Some scholars, for example, oppose the idea of a “Chinese School” on the grounds that the various international relations theories developed by Chinese scholars differ — and sometimes directly conflict — in their ontologies, epistemologies, and theoretical assumptions. Such debates are entirely normal. Indeed, they demonstrate the emergence of a flourishing and pluralistic intellectual environment.

From “Heteroautonomy” to “Autonomy”

The contemporary world is undergoing a period of profound turbulence and transformation. Different forces are confronting and interacting with one another, while a new world order is in the process of being reshaped.

In such an era, the Chinese social sciences should — and can — make substantial contributions. The construction of an autonomous Chinese theory of international relations can move considerably further on the foundations already established. The key is to transcend “heteroautonomy” (他主) through “autonomy” (自主).

“Heterotonomy” refers to a habitual mode of thinking in which one constantly invokes the West and consciously or unconsciously follows others. It assumes that an advanced and ideal model already exists and needs only to be imported. The first instinct is therefore always to search for an existing model and then follow its path or repeat its language. In social science research, this manifests itself in the uncritical adoption of Western theories, which are treated almost as sacred scriptures. Western theories are rarely questioned. Instead, researchers ask whether events in the real world “ought” to have occurred in accordance with those theories. This obviously reverses ends and means and amounts to cutting one’s feet to fit the shoes.

“Autonomy,” by contrast, means forming an independent judgement on a problem, developing one’s own views and propositions, and adhering to one’s own path of development. In academic research, autonomy means maintaining theoretical subjectivity and independence while continuing to interact and exchange with the outside world. When Chinese academia engages with the West, it should neither look up to it nor look down upon it, but look at it on equal terms. Chinese scholars should engage in dialogue, mutual learning, and mutual exchange with the global social-science community, including the West, in a spirit of equality and autonomy, with each side undertaking genuinely original work. That would represent a healthy intellectual condition.

China is a major country with a long history and distinctive culture. Its practice of international relations has its own clear characteristics, providing a deep foundation for constructing an autonomous theory of international relations. The key is to pursue creative transformation and innovative development. This requires us to explore deeply the wisdom concerning international relations contained within the finest elements of traditional Chinese culture, combine it with the realities of contemporary international relations, give it new contemporary meaning and modern forms of expression, and thereby revitalise it. In this way, our theories can become “water with a source” and “trees with roots.” The idea of “all under heaven as one family” (天下一家), for example, needs to be connected with modern social science and placed in dialogue with comparable ideas from other civilisations, so that it can be transformed into a theoretical formulation that is readily understandable and acceptable to both Chinese and international audiences.

The construction of an autonomous Chinese theory of international relations should also strengthen scholarly research and interpretation of the theoretical and practical innovations associated with great power diplomacy with Chinese characteristics. Since the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, General Secretary Xi Jinping has developed a profound understanding of the major trends shaping China and the world in the new era and has introduced a series of major theoretical and practical innovations in foreign affairs, giving rise to Xi Jinping Thought on Diplomacy. From the proposal to build a community with a shared future for humanity and jointly pursue the Belt and Road Initiative, to the advocacy of the common values of humanity, and subsequently the Global Development Initiative, Global Security Initiative, Global Civilisation Initiative, and Global Governance Initiative, Xi Jinping Thought on Diplomacy has continued to develop and expand. It has guided major-country diplomacy with Chinese characteristics in achieving historic and pioneering accomplishments.

The theoretical and practical innovations of major-country diplomacy with Chinese characteristics possess significant theoretical and contemporary value and provide rich material for constructing an autonomous Chinese theory of international relations. We should more effectively distill the substance and value of these theoretical propositions and successful experiences and transform them into concepts and logical frameworks grounded in academic reasoning. In doing so, we can develop a system of international relations theory that possesses both Chinese characteristics and general explanatory power and further move China from being a recipient and follower of international relations theory towards becoming a creator and contributor.

Moreover, efforts to develop an autonomous Chinese theory of international relations should be evaluated on our own terms. In recent years, there has been a growing tendency to treat publication in English-language journals as the primary measure of the quality of social science research. Of course, it is highly necessary for Chinese social scientists to “go global,” and there should be more articles and voices from Chinese scholars in international English-language journals. But it must also be recognised that English-language journals possess their own standards and “rules of the game,” and these standards inevitably contain ideological inclinations, methodological preferences, and academic orientations. Publishing in these journals therefore often requires accommodating their preferences, positions, and viewpoints. If publication in English-language journals becomes the supreme criterion of academic merit, then Chinese scholars effectively allow others to determine what is right and wrong, and Chinese scholarship may lose its own identity.

Over the years, the quality and academic standards of Chinese social-science journals, including several international relations journals, have improved significantly. We should therefore have confidence in ourselves when evaluating academic work. English-language publication should be encouraged, but it should not become the standard to which everything else is subordinated. Evaluation should instead continue to be conducted with ourselves as the principal point of reference.

One characteristic of the social sciences is that progress is usually not explosive. It requires sustained effort and accumulation over long periods. We therefore have reason to believe that persistent and serious theoretical and scholarly exploration will ultimately bear fruit. The prospects for building an autonomous Chinese theory of international relations are highly promising.

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