Senior ex-diplomat suggests fine-tuning China's nuclear weapons policy

Directly from China’s Chief negotiator of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty

Ambassador 沙祖康 Sha Zukang, the former United Nations Under-Secretary-General and China’s chief negotiator of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, made a speech at the Commemoration of the 20th Anniversary of China’s Arms Control Association and the Symposium on China’s Arms Control Work on September 15, 2021, in Beijing.

The speech includes a few pivotal suggestions to China’s standing arms control and nuclear weapons policy and has been circulating on Chinese social media. Your Pekingnologist has since approached Ambassador Sha, who kindly provided an English translation of his speech together with the Chinese original for publication in the Pekingnology newsletter.

Sha served as the United Nations Under-Secretary-General, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, from 2007 to 2012. Before that, from 2001 to 2007 he served as Permanent Representative of the Permanent Mission of China to the United Nations Office at Geneva and Other International Organizations in Switzerland. He established the Department of Arms Control in the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which he headed from 1997 to 2001. In his position as Chinese Ambassador of Disarmament Affairs from 1995 to 1997, Sha was China’s chief negotiator of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and played an important role in bridging between nuclear and non-nuclear-weapons States party in the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), which decided that NPT shall continue in force indefinitely. Sha was one of the designers of China’s major arms control and disarmament initiatives.

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Highlights from Ambassador Sha’s speech:

The global strategic security landscape is undergoing a profound transformation, the competition among major powers is intensifying, with the U.S. and other Western countries pushing desperately to suppress and discredit China with unprecedented ferocity, poisoning the international environment, resulting in the near paralysis of the formerly well-run international arms control system.

……

I am of the view that we could declare that China will surely participate in nuclear disarmament, certainly get involved in nuclear transparency effort, and eventually accept nuclear verification…China's participation in nuclear disarmament is only a matter of time, depending on the progress of the United States in reducing its colossal nuclear arsenals including its means of delivery.

……

In view of this worsening situation, should we in turn review our policy of non-first use of nuclear weapons, and make necessary "minor adjustments"? For example, our policy of unconditional non-first use of nuclear weapons against nuclear states and no use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states and nuclear-free zones could remain unchanged. However, "unconditional non-first use" does not apply to the United States, unless China and the United States reach a mutual agreement on non-first use of nuclear weapons against each other through negotiations; or the United States does not take any more aggressive measures to undermine China's fundamental interest of strategic security.

……

The U.S. has granted itself so many exemptions within the Missile Technology Control Regime by adopting double standards and seriously threatened China’s strategic security interests. Should we continue to accept U.S. domination in this area, or should we reconsider the benefits of remaining in the MTCR and continuing to comply with its rules? Should we set our own missile export standards in accordance with our own security interests?

……

(On DPRK) We could also announce that if the United States does not fully and accurately implement the Security Council resolutions, China will take necessary steps in… and other relevant measures in response. I am afraid that is the only language the United States understands.

Speech by Ambassador Sha Zukang at the Commemoration of the 20th Anniversary of China’s Arms Control Association and the Symposium on China’s Arms Control Work

(15 September 2021)

President Zhang Yan and all colleagues.

In the blink of an eye, the Arms Control Association has gone through a glorious course of two decades. As a veteran who had actively promoted the establishment of the Arms Control Association, I am extremely proud and excited. The recall in memory of the beacons and smoke on the battlefields of arms control negotiations often makes it difficult for me to calm down for a long time. The colleagues whom I had worked with closely in those days when they were in the prime of life, are now covered with silver hair and wrinkles, this is saddening! But when I remembered the time when we worked side by side, braved various difficulties, overcame insurmountable obstacles, and pushed forward the negotiation process toward the direction we expected with satisfactory outcomes for all leaving our counterparts bewildered by our perseverance and achievements, I felt immensely gratified and contented. Whenever I met our PLA colleagues, I used to say that as the army and the people are united as one, we shall be invincible!

Today, our arms control team has become an important builder and contributor to global security governance and the international arms control system. Just now, State Councilor Wang Yi and Deputy Director Huang Xueping of the Military Cooperation Office comprehensively elaborated on the glorious past and important contributions of China's arms control diplomacy in their speeches, therefore, I will not dwell on them anymore.

Dear Colleagues,

Looking back on China and its recent history, China's arms control diplomacy has grown from scratch and weak to full-fledged and strong, embodying the arduous work and sweat of successive generations of arms control people in our country. Through their devoted efforts, an arms control policy has been formed with rich connotations and a practical path laid both reflecting Chinese characteristics. They have effectively safeguarded our national sovereignty, security, and development interests, not only creating the necessary external conditions for our national defense modernization but also establishing a responsible international image of China and its army in contribution to maintaining world peace and security.

At present, the world is experiencing a dramatic change unprecedented in history, and the construction of socialism with Chinese characteristics has entered a new phase. The global strategic security landscape is undergoing a profound transformation, the competition among major powers is intensifying, with the U.S. and other Western countries pushing desperately to suppress and discredit China with unprecedented ferocity, poisoning the international environment, resulting in the near paralysis of the formerly well-run international arms control system. In this context, I believe that in order to maintain peace, security, and development of our country and the world, our efforts in arms control and military diplomacy urgently need to be strengthened. In the following, I would like to share my views.

First, good arms control work must keep in mind the original aspirations and the mission. Undiminished security is the overarching principle of arms control efforts, and it is also a principle unanimously recognized by the international community. Accordingly, China's arms control diplomacy must firmly safeguard China's legitimate interests of strategic security and arms development vis a vis other countries helping the modernization of our national defense. Accordingly, we must actively manage our relations with militarily important countries, create a global strategic security environment favorable to our country, and make dynamic efforts with all parties to build a community with a shared future for humanity.

Arms control is by no means the same as disarmament, and neither more nor fewer troops and arms are better. Whether to reduce or expand the military forces should be determined by the need to maintain peace and security of the country, the region, and the world. Maintaining military forces within the appropriate, necessary, and sufficient range is called "arms control". Beyond this watershed, there should be "disarmament." Maintaining and enhancing security is the original intent of arms control and disarmament, namely, undiminished security.

The well-known INF Treaty, for example, was the product of bilateral negotiations between the United States and the former Soviet Union, however, China actually played a crucial role in the negotiations. At the time, the United States and the former Soviet Union agreed to destroy only the intermediate-range missiles deployed in Europe by both of them and not those stationed elsewhere with ranges covering all Asian countries. For this reason, they were most concerned about China's participation in the negotiations in fear of China's opposition to their deal. For this reason, they spared no effort in conducting a persuasion mission to China, including talks to Deng Xiaoping, in the hope that we would accept the agreement they negotiated and concluded in their interest. After careful considerations and repeated discussions, the Party Central Committee decided to issue a statement emphasizing that Eurasian security was equally important and that intermediate-range missiles deployed in Europe and Asia ought to be destroyed completely, simultaneously, synchronously, and locally.

Under the guidance of Deng Xiaoping, we mobilized all Asian countries, including those that had not yet established or reestablished diplomatic relations with our country to voice their concerns loudly in unison on various occasions and finally succeeded in achieving the goal of having all the intermediate-range missiles deployed by the two countries in both Europe and Asia destroyed, which strongly safeguarded the security of our country and all Asian countries.

This is a typical case of the so-called "arms control" diplomacy in support of and serving national security interests. In addition, in the negotiations on the ban of chemical weapons, China alone withstood the pressure from the outside and insisted that the countries which abandoned chemical weapons in foreign territories must take full responsibility for the destruction of those decaying weapons. We eventually won the diplomatic victory forcing Japan, the invader during WWII, to assume legal responsibility for the destruction of those decaying chemical weapons abandoned in China. In the negotiations on the ban of anti-personnel landmines, we and like-minded countries worked together leading to a protocol successfully concluded, which addressed both the security concerns and humanitarian concerns of the international community.

Second, good arms control work must be made by united and coordinated efforts by all domestic stakeholders concerned. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is the main department responsible for implementing the country's foreign policy in the interest of the Chinese people; the People's Liberation Army is the armed force responsible for maintaining national security, sovereignty, and territorial integrity. Arms control diplomacy is an important part of China's overall diplomacy. Arms control work involves diplomacy, national defense, science and technology, legislation, public information outreach, and other fields. It is complex and sensitive, highly specialized and technical. Diplomats engaged in arms control diplomacy are recognized by the international community as the elite of each country. People engaged in China's arms control and arms control diplomacy must love our beloved country and our heroic army, should aspire to be "open-minded, down-to-earth, pioneering, and dedicated" in conducting the mission.

From our historical experience, every important arms control negotiation we have participated in cannot be won without the wise decision of the Party Central Committee and the sincere cooperation among various domestic stakeholders.

For example, in the negotiation of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), colleagues from all relevant ministries and research institutes worked together, day and night, in coordination like different moving parts of a machine. They conducted in-depth research on a series of technical and legal issues involved in the treaty in a tireless effort to develop our negotiation plan on the basis of thorough argumentation.

During the negotiation process, we were able to maintain our national image and safeguard our national interests by keeping a balance between the internal and external exigencies. The negotiations gained the necessary time for our nuclear testing program to be completed, and the near-perfect CTBT contributed to world peace and security.

The then British Ambassador for Disarmament, Sir Michael, explicitly stated that China was the biggest winner of the CTBT negotiations, and he even proposed that the Chinese and U.S. delegations should be awarded the Nobel Peace Prize.

With China's efforts, the treaty has properly addressed the thorny issues of the scope of the ban, the mechanism for initiating "on-site inspections" and the entry into force of the treaty and was highly praised by all countries except India.

I believe that members of the arms control team must "dare to fight and win", strengthen communication skills, form a united force, and face up external challenges.

Third, to do an excellent job of arms control work requires someone to size up the situation sagaciously and dare to be a pioneer and an innovator. The current international strategic security environment is undergoing a major transformation, and multilateral arms control diplomacy is becoming more complex and challenging. I believe that on the basis of our traditional arms control policy, we should keep pace with the times, take bold steps to free our minds, take the initiative to seek changes, and nurture more innovative ideas.

For example, the U.S. is trying to force China to participate in nuclear disarmament with no mention of Britain and France, its two nuclear allies. Many non-nuclear countries lured and pressured by the U.S. are humming a marching tune.

Based on our consistent and principled position that we have always advocated the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons and the "two super-power firsts", I am of the view that we could declare that China will surely participate in nuclear disarmament, certainly get involved in nuclear transparency effort, and eventually accept nuclear verification. The very reason that China developed nuclear weapons is to counter the nuclear blackmail of the nuclear bullies and break their nuclear monopoly. China declared from the very first day it possessed nuclear weapons that it is in favor of a complete prohibition and thorough destruction of all nuclear weapons in the world. China's participation in nuclear disarmament is only a matter of time, depending on the progress of the United States in reducing its colossal nuclear arsenals including its means of delivery.

The policy on unconditional non-first use of nuclear weapons has given China the international moral high ground. However, as evidenced at present and for a considerable period of time in the future, the United States regards and will regard China as its main competitor, even adversary. It is vigorously developing various emerging military technologies, beefing up strategic nuclear and non-nuclear forces, constructing new military alliances, and increasing its military presence in our neighboring countries in order to tighten its strategic encirclement against China.

In view of this worsening situation, should we in turn review our policy of non-first use of nuclear weapons, and make necessary "minor adjustments"? For example, our policy of unconditional non-first use of nuclear weapons against nuclear states and no use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states and nuclear-free zones could remain unchanged. However, "unconditional non-first use" does not apply to the United States, unless China and the United States reach a mutual agreement on non-first use of nuclear weapons against each other through negotiations; or the United States does not take any more aggressive measures to undermine China's fundamental interests of strategic security.

Another example is the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), which is a multilateral export control regime controlled by the United States and other Western countries. For years, despite not being a member of the MTCR, China out of its strategical considerations has maintained a corresponding control over the export of missiles and missile technologies in strict compliance with the MTCR regulations. We also made self-encouragement by saying publicly how positive we have been on the issue.

On the contrary, in recent years, the U.S. has continued to relax restrictions on missile development to countries such as South Korea, upgrade the anti-missile systems deployed in Japan and South Korea, increase sales of offensive weapons to Taiwan, plan to deploy land-based intermediate-range missiles in our neighbors, strengthen its military alliances around our country, and increase its strategic containment against China.

The U.S. has granted itself so many exemptions within the MTCR regime by adopting double standards and seriously threatening China’s strategic security interests. Should we continue to accept U.S. domination in this area, or should we reconsider the benefits of remaining in the MTCR and continuing to comply with its rules? Should we set our own missile export standards in accordance with our own security interests?

In addition to the MTCR, the international community should not give in to the claim of "U.S. exceptionalism" and "America first" with regard to other multilateral arms control treaties.

For example, the United States withdrew from the Iran nuclear agreement, while China, Russia, and Europe are still in compliance with it. Is that tantamount to acknowledging U.S. exceptionalism? Since the United States has withdrawn from the agreement, we should all withdraw as well without nurturing U.S. exceptionalism.

Similarly, on the DPRK nuclear issue, only lip service was paid to a balanced implementation of the relevant Security Council resolutions, also known as "reversible provisions." The United States must strictly adhere to the principle of "simultaneous reciprocity." The DPRK has already taken measures such as blowing up the Punggye-ri Nuclear Test Site, while the United States has so far taken no practical actions in response to the DPRK's concerns. In order to promote a proper resolution of the nuclear issue on the peninsula, as a matter of course, the United States should abolish its hostile policy toward the DPRK, lift its sanctions against the country, and provide security guarantees to the DPRK.

On this issue, we should not just verbally reiterate this position. We could also announce that if the United States does not fully and accurately implement the Security Council resolutions, China will take necessary steps in… and other relevant measures in response. I am afraid that is the only language the United States understands.

Finally, I would like to say that to do a job of arms control, we must enhance the mechanism for and attach importance to the training of a professional team. Our country should have an arms control team that is "able to fight and combat ready". For a long time, we have established a number of effective arms control mechanisms, such as the Office-703, which has trained a large number of professionals and experts. This is a valuable asset for safeguarding our national strategic security interests and an important foundation for the future development of our arms control undertakings.

The international situation is changing rapidly, it can be predicted that in the post-pandemic era, the arms control endeavor will undoubtedly face even more difficult challenges. As China is gaining international status and influence and moves closer and closer to the center of the world stage, we ought to have an arms control team that is politically devoted, professionally dedicated, and hardworking to participate in international arms control negotiations fully, and better safeguard our national interests.

President Xi Jinping pointed out that participation in global governance requires a large number of professionals who are familiar with the Party and national policies, understand our national conditions, have a global perspective, and are proficient in foreign languages, knowledgeable of international rules, and skillful in international negotiations. I would like to stress the need for professionals!

In the field of arms control, the modernization of our institutions and mechanisms and the modernization of our national defense are the two wheels that support each other in building a strong country and its military force. The good or bad outcome of the current and future arms control treaties will inevitably affect and impact the development of our military forces. We should follow President Xi's important instructions, strengthen our proven working mechanisms, enhance our team training, and building up a quality reserve, ensuring that our mechanisms and teams are sustainable and growing.

We should raise this issue to a strategic level. I once had the pleasure to discuss this issue with the relevant senior leader of the Central Organization Department by asking him whether the policy that "our cadres must be revolutionary, young, knowledgeable, and professional" as proposed by Deng Xiaoping back then, has changed today.

He answered that it has not changed. Therefore, I believe that our diplomats should be professional, knowledgeable, revolutionary (goes without saying), and rejuvenated for sure.

Dear Colleagues,

Twenty years ago, with the support of all relevant government bodies, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs set up the Association for Arms Control and Disarmament, which has played a significant role in developing Track II arms control diplomacy. As a "veteran" of the arms control team, I expect more new joiners to participate in our arms control endeavor.

This is an undertaking worthy of our endeavors. I look forward to the continued support of all domestic stakeholders including experts and scholars to make new contributions to the development of the arms control undertaking of our country. President Xi once said that one generation is in charge of one generation’s affairs, and I am all for it. I also believe that one generation is better than another. I am an arms control "veteran" in retirement, I should not have spoken much, yet "under instructions" I made some remarks today. Please forgive me if I made wrong remarks, which you can simply ignore.

Thank you all for your attention!

沙祖康大使在军控协会成立20周年纪念大会暨军控工作座谈会上的发言

（2021年9月15日）

张炎会长、各位同事，

转眼间，军控协会已走过了20年的光辉历程。作为当年曾积极推动创建军控协会的一名老兵，心情格外激动。军控战场上的烽火狼烟，常使我心情久久难以平静。当年风华正茂的战友，今天都已满头银丝，满脸皱纹，令人唏嘘不已！但想起当年，我们曾并肩战斗，攻无不克、战无不胜，所向披靡，让我们的对手不得不刮目相看的时候，又觉得格外欣慰。每当我遇到解放军战友的时候，我总情不自禁地说，军民团结如一人，试看天下谁能敌！

今天，我们的军控队伍已经成为全球安全治理和国际军控体系的重要建设者和贡献者。刚才国务委员王毅和军合办黄雪平副主任已经在致辞中已全面阐述了中国军控外交的光辉历程和重要贡献，我就不再啰嗦了。

各位同事，

回顾中国，回顾历史，中国军控外交从无到有，从弱到强，凝聚着新中国历代军控人的心血和汗水，形成了具有中国特色和丰富内涵的军控政策和实践路径，有效地维护了我们国家的国家主权、安全和发展利益，不仅为我国的国防现代化建设营造了必要的外部条件，同时还树立了我国、我军负责任的良好国际形象，维护了世界和平与安全。

当前，世界正面临百年未有之大变局，中国特色社会主义建设也已进入新阶段。全球战略安全格局正在经历深刻演变，大国竞争不断加剧，美等西方国家对我打压、抹黑的力度空前，原来运营良好的国际军控体系几近瘫痪。在这一背景下，我认为，为了维护我国和世界的和平、安全和发展，我国的军控和军事外交工作急待加强。下面，我想谈几点体会。

首先，做好军控工作必须牢记初心和使命。安全不受减损是军控工作至高无上的原则，也是国际社会一致公认的原则。据此，中国的军控外交必须坚定维护我国正当的战略安全和军备发展利益，为我国的国防现代化建设保驾护航、服好务。据此，我们必须积极运筹与军事上重要的国家的关系，营造对我有利的全球战略安全环境，为构建人类命运共同体与各方共同作出积极努力。军控决不等于裁军，军队和装备既不是越多越好，也不是越少越好。是裁军还是扩军，应由维护国家、地区和世界的和平、安全的需要来决定。把军事力量维持在适当、必要和足够的范围内，这才叫“军控”。超越这一需要，则应当“裁军”。维护和增进安全，才是军控和裁军的初心，即安全不受减损。以大家都熟悉的《中导条约》为例，它虽然是美国和苏联双边谈判的产物，但实际上中国对这一谈判发挥了至关重要的作用。当时，美苏商定，只销毁两国部署在欧洲的中程导弹，不销毁射程覆盖所有亚洲国家的中程导弹。为此，它们最担心中国参加，也害怕中国反对，为此不遗余力地做我们的工作，包括做小平同志的工作，希望我们能够接受由美苏两家谈判缔结该条约。经中央反复考虑后决定，发表声明，强调欧亚安全同等重要，部署在欧洲和亚洲的中程导弹应该同时、同步、并就地彻底销毁。在小平同志的指挥下，我们动员了所有亚洲国家，包括当年尚未建交和复交的国家，共同一致发声，最终成功实现了把美苏部署在欧亚两洲的中程导弹全部销毁的目标，有力地维护了我国和所有亚州国家的安全。这是所谓的“军控”外交服从、服务于国家安全利益的典型案例。此外，在禁化武谈判中，中国独家顶住压力，坚持老化武必须由遗弃国全面负责销毁，并取得胜利，迫使日本不得不承担销毁在华遗弃老化武的法律责任。禁止杀伤人员地雷的谈判，我们也取得了“完胜”。

第二，做好军控工作必须要由各部门团结、协同作战。外交部是负责执行国家外交政策的主要部门，是中国人民的外交部，解放军则是中国人民的解放军，是负责国家安全、主权和领土完整的武装力量。军控外交同时也是中国整体外交的重要组成部分。军控工作涉及外交、国防、科技、法律、外宣等多个领域，复杂敏感，专业性和技术性都非常强。从事军控外交的外交官，被国际社会承认，都是各国的精英。从事我国军控和军控外交工作的同志必须要热爱我们伟大的国家，热爱我们伟大的军队，要有一种“胸怀天下、脚踏实地、开拓进取、勇于奉献”的军控精神。从历史经验看，我们参与的每一项重要军控谈判，都离不开党中央的英明决策以及国内各部门之间的精诚合作。例如，在《全面禁止核试验条约》谈判进程中，来自各相关部委和科研院所的同志们群策群力，日以继夜，忘我工作，前后方一盘棋，对条约涉及的技术、法律等一系列问题进行了深入研究，在充分论证的基础上制定了我们的谈判方案。谈判过程中，我们“里子”和“面子”一把抓，两手都很硬，既维护了国家形象，更维护了国家的利益。谈判为完成我核试验计划赢得了时间，几近完美的《全面禁核试条约》同时促进了世界和平与安全。时任英国裁军大使Sir Michael公开称，中国是《全面禁核试条约》谈判的最大的赢家，他甚至提议应给中美两国代表团发诺贝尔和平奖。在中方的努力推动下，条约妥善处理了条约的禁止范围、“现场视察”启动机制、条约生效条款等难点问题，受到除了印度一家的各个国家的的高度评价。我认为军控人必须“敢于斗争、勇于胜利”，加强沟通交流，形成合力，一致对外。

第三，做好军控工作要审时度势，开拓创新。当前国际战略安全环境正发生重大转变，多边军控斗争更趋复杂尖锐。我认为，在发挥我传统军控优势政策的基础上，应与时俱进，大胆地解放思想，主动谋变，多一些创新思路。

比如，美国企图强拉中国参加核裁军，闭口不提英法，许多无核国为美蛊惑，跟在后面哼哼。基于我国历来主张全面禁止并彻底销毁核武器及“两超率先”的一贯原则立场，我觉得我们完全可以宣布，中国一定会参加核裁军、一定会参加核透明、一定会接受核核查。因为中国发展核武器就是为了反对核讹诈、打破核垄断，中国自拥有核武器的第一天起，就宣布中国主张全面禁止并彻底销毁世界上所有的核武器。中国参加核裁军只是个时机问题，具体时间取决于美国在削减其核武器及运载工具等方面的进展。

关于无条件不首先使用核武器政策，使中国占据了国际道义高地。当下，并在今后相当长的一段时期，美国将把中国作为主要竞争对手、甚至敌手，同时将大力发展各种新兴军事技术和非核战略力量，在我周边构筑新的军事同盟、加大军事存在，中国面临的战略压力在不断加剧。对于不首先使用核武器的政策，我们是否可以再审视一下这一政策，作些微调？比如，我们关于对核国家无条件不首先使用和对无核武器国家、无核区不使用核武器的政策不变。但是，无条件不使用不适用于美国，除非中美谈判达成相互不首先使用核武器谅解，或者美不再采取任何损害中国战略力量有效性的消极措施。

又比如，“导弹及其技术控制制度”（MTCR），这是美国等西方国家主导的多边出口管制机制。多年来，中国从战略上考虑，尽管不是MTCR成员，但一直严格按照MTCR有关规定办事，对导弹及其技术出口进行管控。我们还鼓励自己，说自己的表现如何积极。但近年来，美国不断放松对韩国等国的导弹发展限制，升级在日、韩部署的反导系统，加码对台湾的军售，筹划在我周边部署陆基中程导弹，强化周边军事同盟，加大对中国的战略遏制。美国在MTCR机制内大搞豁免，采取双重标准，严重威胁我战略安全利益。我们是否继续接受美国的领导，是否可以重新考虑，有没有必要继续留在MTCR,或者继续遵守MTCR的相关规定？我们是否应该根据自身安全利益，有针对性地制定自己的导弹出口标准？

除了MTCR，对于其他多边军控条约，我们都不应该助长“美国特殊”、“美国优先”的风气。比如伊朗核协议，美国退约，中国、俄罗斯和欧洲三国仍在履约，这等于变相承认了美国的特殊地位吗？我的意见是美国退约，大家都退约，不搞特殊化。同样，在朝核问题上，我们口头上说，要平衡执行安理会相关决议，也就是所谓可逆的条款。美国必须严格遵循同步对等的原则。朝鲜已经采取了炸毁丰溪里核试验场等措施，而美国迄今没有任何实际行动来回应朝方关切。为推动半岛核问题的妥善解决，美国理所应当地应在取消对朝敌视政策、解除对朝制裁、向朝提供安全保障等问题上有所行动。在这个问题上，我们不应只是口头上重申这一立场。我们还可以宣布，如果美国不全面准确地执行安理会决议，中国将采取···等有关措施，这是美国唯一能够听得懂的语言！

最后，我想说，做好军控工作必须要夯实机制保障和重视人才培养。我们国家应该要有一支“打仗和准备打仗”的军控队伍。长期以来，我们已形成了诸多行之有效的军控工作机制，比如703办公室，培养了一大批专业人才和专家力量。这是维护我们国家战略安全利益的宝贵财富，也是我们军控事业未来发展的重要基础。在后疫情时代，国际形势发展瞬息万变，可以预断，军控工作必将面临更为艰巨的任务。随着我国的国际地位和影响力不断上升，越来越走近世界舞台的中央，我们理应拥有一支政治坚定、业务精湛、作风过硬的军控队伍，全面深入参与国际军控博弈，更好地维护国家利益。习近平总书记指出，参与全球治理需要一大批熟悉党和国家方针政策、了解我国国情、具有全球视野、熟练运用外语、通晓国际规则、精通国际谈判的专业人才。我强调，专业人才！在军控领域，机制的现代化和国防现代化是建设一流军事强国的两个轮子，互为支撑。现行的和未来的军控条约的好坏，必然会影响和制约我国军事力量的发展。我们要遵循习近平主席的重要指示精神，强化行之有效的工作机制，加强人才培养和储备，确保我们的机制和队伍可持续发展并不断壮大。我们应当将之提升到战略高度来认识，我曾经有幸和中组部相关高层领导探讨过这个问题，我询问他，小平同志当年提出的我们干部必须革命化、年轻化、知识化、专业化的政策，今天是否有变化？他说，没有变。因此，我认为，干部还是要专业化、知识化，革命化就不用说了，年轻化当然应该。

各位同事，

20年前，在各相关单位大力支持下，外交部成立了中国军控与裁军协会，为开拓二轨军控外交发挥了重要作用。作为军控队伍的一名“老兵”，我期待更多新同志投身军控工作。这是因为，这是一项值得我们付出的工作。期待各兄弟单位及专家学者继续支持协会工作，共同为我们国家的军控事业发展作出新贡献。习近平主席曾经说过，一代人管一代人的事，我举双手赞成。我还相信，一代人比一代人强。我是一名转业并已退休的军控“老兵”，本来不应讲话，今天是“奉命”发言，说错了，请原谅，只当我没有说。

谢谢大家！