Liu Yuanju's chronicle of China's compressed modernization offers a sobering framework for Western societies grappling with their own unacknowledged systemic failures. His central insight (that recent gains are fragile precisely because they arrived so quickly, without time for society to metabolize them) applies equally to the West's post-war social compact, now visibly fraying. Consider the parallel erosion of public safety in major American and European cities, where organized retail theft rings, open-air drug markets, and "no-go zones" echo the lawlessness of China's pre-2007 motorcycle gangs and hand-chopping crews. Western authorities, however, often treat these as isolated enforcement problems rather than symptoms of a broken social contract, much as China once did before recognizing that public safety fundamentally depends on how development gains are shared. Liu's evolutionary realism (his clear-eyed acknowledgment that what was recently built can be quickly lost) suggests that Western leaders should stop romanticizing the postwar era as a natural equilibrium and instead recognize it as a fragile achievement requiring active maintenance and adaptation to new economic realities.
The article's most valuable contribution lies in its implicit methodology: measuring social progress not by ideological commitment but by tangible freedoms and securities that ordinary people actually experience. Western societies face mounting evidence of institutional breakdown (collapsing mental health systems leaving psychotic individuals untreated on streets, family courts that have become wealth-extraction mechanisms rather than justice forums, and education systems that absorb ever-more resources while delivering diminishing returns) yet policy discourse remains trapped in defending legacy frameworks rather than honestly assessing their current function. Liu's approach suggests asking uncomfortable questions: When did Western cities last feel genuinely safe for all residents? How many years has it actually been since ordinary families could afford housing in major metropolitan areas? Which social institutions still perform their stated functions rather than serving as employment programs for credentialed classes? By adopting Liu's unsentimental inventory of what actually works and when it stopped working, Western reformers might escape the paralysis of defending systems that exist more in nostalgic memory than present reality, focusing instead on the forward-looking reconstruction that improved material conditions make both possible and necessary.
"the Short Age of China's Long Change" - an excellent article, reminding us of how quickly things can change, and how the 'now' becomes the new normal.
Brilliant, valuable explanations of where we come from. The general concept can be expanded to describe all of modern life, worldwide.
This world we inhabit...electricity, telecommunications, food security, indoor plumbing, automobiles, central heating in our homes ...all the stuff we imagine how the world is ordered...are all barely a century old. It's all "recent" and an extreme anomaly in world history, and all remarkably fragile.
I remember growing up in Malaysia being told to be careful about Chinese gangsters, but I never actually came across any (perhaps because I studied at a national school, not a Chinese vernacular school). Also history books tell us Chinese gangsters used to operate in the Malayan colonial economy. Fortunately people are not so desperate today, no need to join gangs to survive.
Outstanding summary! I agree with you that only after GDP was adopted as an official metric in 1992, that officials became genuinely aware of economic performance. However, I would also argue that overall, GDP on a PPP basis remains the most credible, explanatory overall metric. Thankyou.
This was fascinating to read. I am British and in my 60’s. Our collective memory of some the harder times described goes back further than the 20-25 years spoken of here. But my parents certainly knew those times. Little or no healthcare. Uncertainty over the ability to find jobs. Poor education for most. But my worry is that we are now in reverse. We are seeing things getting worse. The relatively supportive world I grew up in, where each generation expected their children to have a better life than we had, is disappearing.
Liu Yuanju's chronicle of China's compressed modernization offers a sobering framework for Western societies grappling with their own unacknowledged systemic failures. His central insight (that recent gains are fragile precisely because they arrived so quickly, without time for society to metabolize them) applies equally to the West's post-war social compact, now visibly fraying. Consider the parallel erosion of public safety in major American and European cities, where organized retail theft rings, open-air drug markets, and "no-go zones" echo the lawlessness of China's pre-2007 motorcycle gangs and hand-chopping crews. Western authorities, however, often treat these as isolated enforcement problems rather than symptoms of a broken social contract, much as China once did before recognizing that public safety fundamentally depends on how development gains are shared. Liu's evolutionary realism (his clear-eyed acknowledgment that what was recently built can be quickly lost) suggests that Western leaders should stop romanticizing the postwar era as a natural equilibrium and instead recognize it as a fragile achievement requiring active maintenance and adaptation to new economic realities.
The article's most valuable contribution lies in its implicit methodology: measuring social progress not by ideological commitment but by tangible freedoms and securities that ordinary people actually experience. Western societies face mounting evidence of institutional breakdown (collapsing mental health systems leaving psychotic individuals untreated on streets, family courts that have become wealth-extraction mechanisms rather than justice forums, and education systems that absorb ever-more resources while delivering diminishing returns) yet policy discourse remains trapped in defending legacy frameworks rather than honestly assessing their current function. Liu's approach suggests asking uncomfortable questions: When did Western cities last feel genuinely safe for all residents? How many years has it actually been since ordinary families could afford housing in major metropolitan areas? Which social institutions still perform their stated functions rather than serving as employment programs for credentialed classes? By adopting Liu's unsentimental inventory of what actually works and when it stopped working, Western reformers might escape the paralysis of defending systems that exist more in nostalgic memory than present reality, focusing instead on the forward-looking reconstruction that improved material conditions make both possible and necessary.
"the Short Age of China's Long Change" - an excellent article, reminding us of how quickly things can change, and how the 'now' becomes the new normal.
Brilliant, valuable explanations of where we come from. The general concept can be expanded to describe all of modern life, worldwide.
This world we inhabit...electricity, telecommunications, food security, indoor plumbing, automobiles, central heating in our homes ...all the stuff we imagine how the world is ordered...are all barely a century old. It's all "recent" and an extreme anomaly in world history, and all remarkably fragile.
I remember growing up in Malaysia being told to be careful about Chinese gangsters, but I never actually came across any (perhaps because I studied at a national school, not a Chinese vernacular school). Also history books tell us Chinese gangsters used to operate in the Malayan colonial economy. Fortunately people are not so desperate today, no need to join gangs to survive.
Outstanding summary! I agree with you that only after GDP was adopted as an official metric in 1992, that officials became genuinely aware of economic performance. However, I would also argue that overall, GDP on a PPP basis remains the most credible, explanatory overall metric. Thankyou.
This was fascinating to read. I am British and in my 60’s. Our collective memory of some the harder times described goes back further than the 20-25 years spoken of here. But my parents certainly knew those times. Little or no healthcare. Uncertainty over the ability to find jobs. Poor education for most. But my worry is that we are now in reverse. We are seeing things getting worse. The relatively supportive world I grew up in, where each generation expected their children to have a better life than we had, is disappearing.