The View from China: Perspectives on the West in the Xi Jinping Era
Professor Jing Men delves into the perspectives of Chinese scholars, experts, and policy advisors concerning China’s interactions with the Western world.
I’m happy to share an excerpt from Chapter 3: The View from China: Perspectives on the West in the Xi Jinping Era of The Transatlantic Community and China in the Age of Disruption: Partners, Competitors, Rivals, a recent 2024 book edited by Daniel S. Hamilton and Joe Renouard, published by Routledge.
Abstract
This volume analyzes what China’s rise means for the transatlantic community in a new age of disruption—an age marked by great power rivalry, technological upheavals, and the diffusion of power.
The book explores how today’s conditions—including heightened Western concerns about Chinese influence operations, Chinese efforts to manipulate critical economic interconnections and dependencies, rapid technological advances, the Russia–China entente, and growing linkages between North Atlantic and Indo-Pacif ic security—have forced Western actors to adopt a more differentiated approach. In this great power competition, they must decide how and where to work with China as an important partner, how to address China’s competitive challenges, and how to address China’s efforts to forge a set of norms and institutions to challenge the open, rules-based international system.
The book will be of key interest to students and scholars of Transatlantic Relations, International Relations, Global Governance, European Politics, Asian Security, US and EU Foreign Policy, and Sino-Western relations. It will also be of interest to think-tank researchers and policy practitioners.
The author of Chapter 3 is Jing MEN, Zijiang Distinguished Professor, School of Politics and International Relations, East China Normal University in Shanghai.
Before joining ECNU, she was Baillet Latour Chair of European Union-China Relations and the Director of EU-China Research Centre in the Department of EU International Relations and Diplomacy Studies, College of Europe. She obtained a PhD in Political Science at the Vrije Universiteit Brussel. Her research and teaching focus on EU-China relations and Chinese foreign policy.
Professor Men’s Chapter 3 is over 8,000 words. I have a license from Taylor & Francis Group, of which the book publisher Routledge is a part, to share up to 3,000 words. As Chinese President Xi Jinping is visiting Europe now, I’m prioritizing the content focusing on China-Europe relations.
From The Transatlantic Community and China in the Age of Disruption: Partners, Competitors, Edn. 1, by Daniel S. Hamilton and Joe Renouard, Copyright 2024 by Imprint. Reproduced by permission of Taylor & Francis Group.Chapter 3
The View from China: Perspectives on the West in the Xi Jinping Era
Jing Men
Abstract
This chapter delves into the perspectives of Chinese scholars, experts, and policy advisors concerning China’s interactions with the Western world. It offers a comprehensive insight into the evolving global landscape from a Chinese viewpoint. To achieve this, the author extensively examined the China National Knowledge Infrastructure (CNKI) database. Specifically, the analysis focused on articles published within the last decade, encompassing topics such as the US hegemony, transatlantic relations, Sino-US and Sino-EU relations, and the repercussions of the Russia-Ukraine war on the international order. The Russia-Ukraine war served as a pivotal event that fractured the global community, amplifying the perception of ideological competition between democratic and authoritarian states. This heightened divergence in norms and values between China and the West has substantially impeded international cooperation. Consequently, China finds itself confronting heightened challenges emanating from both the United States and the European Union.
Keywords: China, the United States, the European Union (EU), the West, Russia-Ukraine war
When Xi Jinping became General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party late in 2012 and Chinese President early in 2013, China had already evolved from an economically backward country to a great power, moving to the center of world affairs. Xi Jinping has expressed great confidence in socialism with Chinese characteristics. Unlike his predecessors, particularly Deng Xiaoping, who stated that China should keep a low profile and never take the lead, Xi leads China to be more assertive in international relations and strives to build China into a great socialist country with power and prosperity. He believes that the Chinese system possesses remarkable advantages and that China should contribute to global development with its own successful experience. As he stated in his 2016 New Year speech, “The world is so big and there are so many problems. The international community expects to hear China’s voice and see China’s solutions. China cannot be absent” (Xi 2016). Since 2019, China has further clarified its core national interests as sovereignty, security, and development (Qin 2020, 5). In its great power diplomacy, China actively promotes a new type of international relations, and it intends to reform the existing international system to make it fairer and more just to better facilitate its national interests.
In the continuous development of more than 70 years, Chinese leadership has formed a view of international order with Chinese characteristics, with rules-based multilateralism as an important basis of global governance and the promotion of a new type of international relations. China’s position is not to try to overthrow the existing international system, but to advocate rational reform of unreasonable and inefficient regimes and mechanisms and to strive for systemic improvement, emphasizing the concept of cooperation and sustainable security, and attaching importance to building a new type of relationship between major powers and the democratization of international relations so as to maintain the overall stability and sustainable development of the world (Qin et al. 2020, 2). China adheres to multilateralism, fully supports multilateral mechanisms at the global level, and repeatedly stresses that international affairs cannot be dictated by only a few countries. The universal participation and democratic consultation of countries and various world actors is required. International rules cannot be formulated by a few countries but need to be negotiated together (Qin et al. 2020, 4).
Whether China will be able to realize its goals will depend in part on whether the West will be willing to accept it. The challenge for China’s rise is that many in the West do not believe that China can be successful by taking a different path from that of the West (Zhu 2020, 18-21). Chinese scholars argue that China’s further development depends on whether the Western-style path of hegemonic succession is regarded as the only path of human development or as a special historical experience. Analysts in China generally believe that the era of American hegemony faces major challenges. At present, because the existing international system faces enormous strains and a new world system is forming, China’s future path will receive much more attention (Bai 2015, 36).
In recent years, China is increasingly perceived as a direct challenge to Western democracy and the market economy. The United States keeps a close eye on the rise of China as a peer competitor and is gearing its policy toward a long-term strategic rivalry with Beijing (Ikenberry 2021,14). Under the influence of the United States and annoyed by a number of irritants in EU-China relations, the European Union also focuses more on systemic rivalry with China (Small 2020). The transatlantic partners are both wary of China’s rise and suspicious of China’s intentions. The Chinese government denies a competitive relationship with the US or the EU, emphasizing instead mutually beneficial and win-win cooperation (Guan 2022). Yet, with the Russia-Ukraine war, among other factors, the West is getting more troubled with the ideological differences between democracies and authoritarian systems, and is determined to defend the current international order led by Washington and dominated by the rules made by transatlantic powers.
With a different political system and a different development model, China has made its way up in the current international system to become the second largest economy. China’s success has enhanced the confidence of its leaders and the national pride of its people. While the West views China as a competitor, the Chinese view the US as a declining hegemonic power and the transatlantic relationship as tangled with problems. With China’s rise and the Russia-Ukraine war, the international order is in the process of transformation.
A review of more than one hundred articles found by the author in the China National Knowledge Infrastructure (CNKI) database demonstrates how Chinese scholars, experts, and policy advisors perceive China’s relationship with the West and provides a comprehensive understanding of the changing international system. The West is a traditional concept in China, mainly referring to the United States and Europe. Since most European countries have joined the EU, this chapter explores China’s relations with the US and the EU rather than EU member states.
In the past ten years, authors and publications offering Chinese perspectives on the West have mainly focused on US hegemony, China’s relationship with the West, and the transformation of the international order. Due to the time-consuming and complex review process for publication, only a limited number of journal articles cover the ongoing Russia-Ukraine conflict and its impact on China’s relations with the West. Therefore, the author also consulted such newspapers and web magazines as Global Times, Economic Daily, and China-US Focus.
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Against the increasing competition between the United States and China, the position of the EU is very important. In the face of the Sino-US zero-sum game, the EU contributes to a general consensus that the world is increasingly moving toward geopolitical competition (Lehne 2022). In the meantime, Europe is experiencing a profound reflection on free markets and liberalism. On the one hand, the EU is debating the link between interdependence and vulnerability and the process of globalization; on the other hand, the EU increasingly considers geopolitics, especially the increasing use of economic tools to achieve broader geopolitical and geoeconomic goals (Seaman et al. 2022, 12). In recent years, the European debt crisis, the refugee crisis, the threat of terrorism and populism, as well as Brexit, have exposed the EU’s lack of cohesion and the defects in the EU’s internal mechanisms. The Trump administration’s “America First” policy and unilateral behavior eroded the EU’s trust in the United States and weakened the foundations of the transatlantic relationship. Furthermore, as the international environment has become increasingly complex, international geopolitical competition is intensified, causing huge external pressure on the EU. In particular, the China-US strategic competition has dragged the EU into strategic uncertainty. Driven by a series of internal and external crises, the EU and its member states began to rethink the EU’s internal and external policies and its position on the world stage. Against this background, the EU’s discussions on strategic autonomy emerged and heated up (Yan 2021, 127).
The EU’s China policy also experienced readjustments. Driven by the changes in the balance of power between China and the EU, especially when facing the continuous improvement of China’s international competitiveness, the EU reassessed the impact of China’s rise on Europe and has become tougher on China in the fields of human rights, rule of law, trade and investment, and technology (Feng 2021, 85-95). Yet, the EU, with 27 member states, always has difficulty achieving unity. In its relationship with China, some Europeans stress principles and rules, whereas others are in favor of practical interests. The definition of China as a partner, a competitor, and a rival demonstrates the difficulties inside the EU in achieving consensus on how to deal with China (Jin 2022, 39).
In the view of Chinese experts, despite enhanced exchanges and cooperation between the EU and the US on their China policy, the EU would not forge a “united front” with the US in dealing with China, mainly because the EU’s perception, position, and interests are different from those of the US. European countries not only believe that China’s rise is unstoppable, but also believe that maintaining extensive economic and trade exchanges with China is crucial for Europe (Song 2021, 84). Furthermore, the strategies of the EU and the US are clearly different. The EU prioritizes Russia and the surrounding areas of Europe while the US focuses on China and the Asia-Pacific region (Feng 2021, 97-98).
Having said that, the US and the EU have indeed strengthened their coordination on China policy. They take more concerted actions on issues such as ideology, economics and trade, investment, technological innovation, and global governance. Transatlantic cooperation on China is more institutionalized and more comprehensive. Nevertheless, Chinese experts still believe that differences exist between Washington and Brussels (Yan 2022, 67). In the view of Chinese analysts, the US-EU Trade and Technology Committee (TTC) is one of the initiatives established to deal with the rise of China. The United States intends to make the TTC a tool for using other countries to achieve its own “power multiplication.” From supply chain security and export controls to labor rights and ICTs, the vast majority of TTC issues reflect the economic and trade agenda favored by the United States. The EU proposed to prevent industrial subsidies from intense competition, but this was not endorsed by the United States. On the other hand, the EU tried to use the TTC as a platform to promote its Digital Markets Act and Digital Services Act, but this was firmly resisted by the United States. In essence, both the US and the EU want to use the TTC to strengthen their influence in international economic, trade, and technological affairs and to deal with external challenges. The TTC is not designed to overcome the differences between the United States and the EU for deeper integration. (Zhang 2022; Shao and Zhang 2022).
For the EU, the relationship with the United States is undoubtedly the most important, but it is increasingly complex. Biden has tried to repair the relationship by putting more emphasis on multilateral cooperation. However, Chinese scholars maintain that the credibility and appeal of the United States has been seriously weakened by the Trump administration, and this reality cannot be resolved with a change of government. Furthermore, if Trump or a successor comes back to power, many of Biden’s promises will not be fulfilled. Therefore, it is not without reservation that the EU works with the US (Han 2021). Chinese analysts believe that the EU will continue its ties to the United States through transatlantic alliances where there are shared interests, but also continue to cooperate with China where interests converge (Feng 2021).
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Conclusion
Chinese analysts evaluate international relations mainly based on its interpretation of intentions and policies of the United States. Chinese analysts understand that the US regards China as a long-term rival. Although the Russia-Ukraine war has marginally influenced US moves in the Asia-Pacific region, the US has not shifted its strategic focus on China. Chinese experts keep a close eye on the steps taken by the US in terms of normative competition, institutional expansion, and alliance-building, on top of a strengthened economic and military presence in Asia.
The EU is rapidly readjusting its policy toward China, not only because of its own reevaluation of China in recent years, but also because of China’s ambiguous attitude toward Russia’s military action against Ukraine. The values-based solidarity between the transatlantic partners creates more problems in EU-China relations. Chinese analysts carefully observe the cooperation mechanisms between the US and the EU and try to exploit transatlantic differences to their own advantage. However, such efforts have not been very successful. Nevertheless, Chinese analysts maintain that the EU does not benefit from following American leadership, and that European interests would be best served by cooperation with China.
Although the Chinese believe that American hegemony is declining, they also realize that the US is still the most powerful state in the world and that China has no way to challenge the leading position of the United States. As a matter of fact, the Chinese have long maintained that they never intend to confront the US and that they do not want to overturn the existing international system. Instead, they want to get more involved and exert more influence in international decision making. Unfortunately, the Russia-Ukraine war has divided the world and strengthened the sense of ideological competition between democratic and authoritarian states. The heightened sense of differences in norms and values between China and the West makes international cooperation between them more difficult. As a result, China faces more challenges from both the United States and the EU.
From The Transatlantic Community and China in the Age of Disruption: Partners, Competitors, Edn. 1, by Daniel S. Hamilton and Joe Renouard, Copyright 2024 by Imprint. Reproduced by permission of Taylor & Francis Group.