Wang Jisi on U.S. domestic politics in Trump’s Second Term

From China's leading America watcher

Professor Wang Jisi of Peking University (PKU) is one of the most prominent America watchers in China. Wang is the Founding President of PKU’s Institute of International and Strategic Studies, former Dean of the PKU’s School of International Studies, and honorary president of the Chinese Association for American Studies.

Contemporary American Review, a leading Chinese mainland journal run by the Institute of American Studies(IAS), Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, interviewed Wang for its first issue of 2025, available on April 1.

The interviewers are Liu Weidong and Hu Ran, Wang’s long-time aide, both of whom are at the IAS.

Pekingnology is translating the interview into English. The following is the abstract and Part I of the four-part interview. Chen Danmei at PKU’s Institute of International and Strategic Studies graciously reviewed the translation.

特朗普第二任期的美国内政外交前景— — —王缉思教授专访

The Domestic and Foreign Policy Outlook of the United States in Trump’s Second Term —— Interview with Professor Wang Jisi

Abstract:

Donald Trump won the 2024 U.S. presidential election by a significant margin, largely by tapping into widespread feelings of insecurity and deprivation among American voters. At the same time, he deflected blame onto external targets and promoted a policy agenda centered on trade protectionism and immigration restrictions. While the signature Trump slogan “Make America Great Again” may well be replaced in four years' time by a new iteration of right-wing populism, the underlying domestic conflict over identity politics and values is unlikely to fade in the near term.

Implementing sweeping government reforms and tightening immigration policy during a second term will be anything but straightforward. These efforts are unlikely to alter the foundational features of America’s political system or its character as a nation of immigrants, nor will they play a decisive role in shaping whether the country experiences resurgence or decline. Although Trump prefers to scale back U.S.’s engagement in global affairs, his foreign policy will be constrained by national interests, domestic political elites dynamics, and the broader international environment.

Under his leadership, the United States has taken the lead in challenging the existing international rules and order—an approach that will undoubtedly weaken America’s soft power. Yet thus far, the backlash has been limited. Rather than triggering unified global opposition, Trump’s approach has contributed to a broader global shift to the right.

On China, a second Trump administration is expected to prioritize trade and technology over human rights or military and security issues. While the U.S. remains committed to "winning" the strategic competition with China, there is still both the will and the potential for cooperation. To reduce the risks of miscalculation and conflict, scholars from both countries should pursue more candid, pragmatic exchanges that help foster mutual understanding.

I. US Politics: Trump Returns, but America Far from Great Again

Q: In the 2024 U.S. presidential election, Trump won the Electoral College, the popular vote, and carried all the swing states. Did these results exceed your expectations? Are American polling agencies out of touch with the public, or does it reflect a fundamental shift in American politics? Have judicial, financial, and technological interventions in the election reached an unprecedented level?

A: Trump’s commanding victory in the 2024 U.S. presidential election did in fact exceed my expectations. It is increasingly clear that American politics is undergoing significant changes. This election offered a direct reflection of widespread voter dissatisfaction with the country’s socioeconomic conditions. A significant portion of the electorate also expressed disapproval of the Democratic Party and the Biden administration’s approach to social policies, particularly on issues such as immigration, LGBTQ+ rights, and racial tensions. Although the American economic performance appears to be relatively strong in macroeconomic metrics, and the inflation predated Biden's term in office, the logic of American electoral politics tends to turn elections into a platform for voters to express their discontent for the present situation and desire for a change for the better in the future.

This election was also shaped by several unexpected events. Trump's surviving an assassination attempt and Biden’s sudden withdrawal from the race—followed by Kamala Harris's hurried nomination despite her limited political capabilities and standing—both appear, in hindsight, to have worked in Trump's favour. There were notable inaccuracies in how U.S. polling institutions measured and forecasted the election outcome. Whether these stemmed from flawed survey design or from a 'hidden vote' among certain voters, who are unreachable by ordinary polling methods, remains an open question and warrants further study.

In the context of U.S. presidential elections, the long-standing influence of money politics, the extent of judicial intervention in the electoral process, and the role of technological advances—particularly social media and algorithmic targeting—in shaping public opinion are all important issues that merit deeper examination. My preliminary assessment is that, as of now, there is no clear evidence to suggest that money, the judiciary, or technology exerted an unprecedented level of influence in the 2024 election. However, a more objective evaluation of their actual impact and historical significance requires rigorous data analysis and empirical research. Only through such inquiry can we assess whether these forms of influence are becoming the new norm—and whether they are likely to have lasting effects on the nature of American electoral politics.

Q: In the 2024 U.S. presidential election, minority voters appeared increasingly divided. Do you see this as a temporary shift or the beginning of a broader trend?

A: Traditionally in the U.S., male voters have tended to support the Republican Party, while female voters have leaned toward the Democrats. In 2024, Trump saw increased support not only from white men but also from minority men—particularly African American and Latino voters. This is a noteworthy development. At its core, it reflects the worsening economic conditions many of these voters have faced in recent years, along with a stronger desire for change. For many, support for Trump was more about dissatisfaction with the previous administration’s performance. These voters hoped that, if re-elected, Trump would be able to improve livelihoods, curb inflation, reduce inequality, combat the spread of drugs, and lower crime rates. Yet these problems are deeply entrenched and unlikely to be resolved within a short period. Overall, this shift in voter alignment seems more like a temporary reaction to economic hardship and political stagnation, rather than a lasting change in political orientation.

In recent years, racial tensions and social divisions in the U.S. have deepened. At the root of these developments lie two interwoven, long-term forces: widening economic inequality and increasingly fragmented social identities. But these are not uniquely American problems—they are part of a broader global pattern. Whether across or within countries, economic inequality has reached new heights, while global population movements have disrupted established racial, religious, cultural, and value identities. As a result, many countries are experiencing growing political polarization. In the 21st century, public anxiety is less driven by war or terrorism and more by declining relative income, job and social welfare insecurity, uneven access to education and healthcare, and environmental degradation—issues closely tied to daily life. In both the U.S. and other countries, dissatisfaction with globalization and the political establishment is rising.

This fragmenting global context has given rise to parallel surges in populism and nationalism. In many ways, the United States has been at the forefront of this shift. Against such a backdrop, there is a growing popular demand for strong, decisive political leaders to restore a sense of national identity and act forcefully to correct social injustices. Leaders who adopt a tougher posture on foreign policy and express stronger nationalist or anti-foreign sentiments often find such posture rewarding with the support of domestic audiences. Trump’s return to office is closely tied to his ability to tap into Americans' feelings of insecurity and deprivation. By shifting blame outward and advancing policies such as trade protectionism and immigration restriction, he has appealed to voters who feel discontented and anxious about the status quo.

Q: “Make America Great Again” has become a powerful vehicle for affirming, or reconstructing, the dominant values in America. How do you expect this movement to evolve after Trump leaves office in four years?

A: In the United States, populism and nationalism have risen in tandem. But it is important to distinguish carefully between different strands of populism. Since the 2008 financial crisis, American populism has surged in successive waves, coming from both the right and the left. Right-wing populism initially emerged through the Tea Party movement, dominated by white conservatives, opposing the Obama administration's tax policies and healthcare reform, and often carrying racial and anti-immigrant overtones. On the other hand, the short-lived Occupy Wall Street movement of 2011 represented the left-wing variant—driven by anger over economic inequality, the corruption of the financial system, and the concentration of power. Its supporters were mostly pro the Democratic Party.

In the 2016 election, Trump and the Republican Party harnessed right-wing populism and fused it with the rising tide of nationalism and white identity politics. “Make America Great Again” (MAGA) became the defining slogan of this new alignment. The MAGA movement that Trump came to represent is grounded in right-wing populism: it emphasizes traditional culture, Christian values, and national identity, often marked—explicitly or implicitly—by racial undertones. In contrast, the left-wing populism promoted by Democratic leaders has shifted its emphasis from economic redistribution to social justice and the interests of marginalized groups. These include racial minorities, immigrants, refugees, women, and LGBTQ+ communities. Its focus has increasingly shifted toward political correctness within the realm of identity politics, promoting "woke" movements such as #MeToo and Black Lives Matter.

These two populist currents have deepened America's political polarization and made partisan conflict ever so intense. In recent years, the rise of left-wing populism has challenged the traditional values associated with the WASP (White Anglo-Saxon Protestant) establishment, provoking a strong backlash—particularly among white male voters. This reaction has fueled the resurgence of right-wing populism and further eroded the tacit consensus that once underpinned American political life.

The rise of the MAGA movement reflects the continued dominance of WASP values in American political culture. But the struggle over how to reassert American values will be long-lasting. For a long time in the past, American identity was grounded in liberal ideals. When asked about the nation’s core value, Americans would most often answer freedom or liberty. That may still be the answer today. But there is now an ongoing debate over who that freedom or liberty belongs to, and who qualifies as part of the American “us.”

In fact, identity-related tensions in the U.S. have been growing since the end of the Cold War. Political scientist Samuel Huntington’s Who Are We? was an early attempt to grapple with these questions. More recently, the 2019 film Knives Out offered a sharp satire of race and immigration in America, dramatizing the conflicts at the heart of contemporary identity politics. It is a movie worth watching. The story's central question—why earlier immigrants should enjoy greater entitlement than the newer arrivals—warrants in-depth reflections.

Even after the second Trump term, the broader issues of identity politics and value-based conflict will persist. However, MAGA—as a personal political slogan—may not be inherited by the future right wing populists. In U.S. electoral politics, presidential candidates often adopt new slogans to distinguish themselves from their predecessors and establish their uniqueness and irreplaceability. For instance: Bill Clinton ran in 1992 with "It's the economy, stupid"; Barack Obama's 2008 campaign revolved around "Change" and "Yes We Can"; Hillary Clinton used "Stronger Together" in 2016; and Joe Biden’s 2020 slogan was “Build Back Better.” Even if a future Republican nominee adopts a political platform and campaign strategy similar to Trump's and continues the MAGA movement in substance, they will likely introduce a new slogan.

Q: During his first term, Trump pledged to "drain the swamp" in Washington but achieved limited results. In his second term, he has proposed a far more ambitious plan for government reform. In your view, will this agenda lead to America's "rebirth from the ashes," or could it become a catalyst for further decline?

A: Trump has always carried a strong anti-establishment sentiment and, at his core, rejects the authority of traditional party structures and the bureaucratic apparatus often dubbed as the “deep state.” Following his re-election, he appointed Elon Musk, CEO of Tesla, to lead the newly created Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE), with the aim of reducing the federal workforce by 70 percent and cutting $2 trillion from federal spending. So far, Trump and Musk have begun targeting institutions like the FBI, CIA, Department of Education, and USAID for downsizing, encouraging early retirements among civil servants. However, these efforts have been curbed by the judicial department, and their long-term prospects remain uncertain.

Historically, new administrations often propose grand reforms upon taking office to boost voter confidence. Yet such plans frequently fall short of expectations. The so-called "honeymoon period" between a new president and the electorate typically lasts only a few months. Trump’s open confrontation with the "deep state" has deeply unsettled the federal bureaucracy. Career federal civil servants whose interests are threatened, beneficiaries of social welfare programs, and the military-industrial complex that enjoys a colossal defense budget are all likely to actively push back against efforts for reform. Even if Trump aims to promote a "small government, big society" model based on free-market principles, he will still have to grapple with practical challenges—such as layoffs, compensations, and reassignments—which may even trigger violence or even unrest. Further complicating matters, many of the loyalists Trump has placed in senior roles lack extensive experience in federal governance. Many are relatively young (often from the post-1980 generation) and entered office hastily, without meaningful political networks in Washington. Given these constraints, it is impossible to expect the DOGE under Musk to achieve major breakthroughs in a short span of time.

Moreover, despite Trump's electoral victory and the Republican majority in both houses, as well as a conservative-leaning Supreme Court, their institutional advantage is still not overwhelming. Under the bipartisan American political system, the Democratic Party still retains considerable capacity to obstruct Trump's reform agenda and may regain control of the House of Representatives in the 2026 midterm elections. Still, even if Trump’s reform efforts fall short, the lack of a clear blueprint or measurable benchmarks allows him to claim success on rhetorical grounds.

Trump's political project—framed under the banner of "Make America Great Again," with sweeping domestic reforms and an "America First" foreign policy rooted in protectionism and unilateralism—is ultimately less about building a stronger country, a more unified nation, or a fairer and more prosperous society. Rather, his deeper ambition appears to be securing himself as America's greatest president—alongside Washington, Lincoln, and Reagan. Whether the American future will be defined as renewal or decline will depend less on the success or failure of Trump's reform plans but on a range of key domestic challenges: whether political polarization can be eased, whether economic inequality can be reduced, and whether technological innovation can truly drive social progress and economic growth. These are long-term issues that cannot be solved by a single administration.

Q: Democratic Party elites have embraced identity politics and the "woke" movement, pushing through a series of bewildering policies. Are they not aware that this approach could alienate large numbers of voters? Did they not anticipate that the electoral cost might far exceed any potential gains?

A: This is a very interesting question—and one that the Democratic Party is now seriously reflecting on in the aftermath of its major defeat in the 2024 election. In my view, unlike the more pragmatically oriented Republican Party, the Democrats in recent years have increasingly evolved into what might be called a "party of ideas". Party elites have become deeply invested in turning their normative ideals into policy, often without paying sufficient attention to how such policies might affect the party's electoral prospects.

Many of the initiatives pursued during the Biden administration were led by the extreme progressives. Their focus was relatively simplistic: to push forward their ideals as fully and quickly as possible, often overlooking the long-term or downstream consequences of their actions. In fact, many of the issues that ultimately proved damaging to Democratic candidates in this election were not policies introduced by the Biden administration during the election year itself. Rather, it was earlier policies that had a delayed but tangible impact at the ballot box. From this perspective, it’s fair to say that Biden and Harris, as the party's presidential ticket, failed to exhibit sufficient strategic foresight in their preparation for the election. They overly emphasize ideologies while overlooked the practical concerns of voters. This inevitably led to unfavorable consequences to their campaign. In addition, the phenomenon of "echo chambers" likely shielded them from critical feedbacks and cultivated their overconfidence that came at a political cost.

Q: Since taking office, Trump has pursued a consistently conservative agenda, and his crackdown on liberal forces in the U.S. appears likely to intensify. Do you think this could lead to a long-term imbalance between the two parties, with one-party dominance becoming a reality?

A: Trump is working aggressively to shift American politics and society in a more conservative direction as part of his effort to build a lasting political legacy. His goal is to secure Republican victories in the 2026 midterm elections and the 2028 presidential race, laying the groundwork for prolonged GOP rule. His public statement about the possibility of serving a third term reveals his true ambition. If that fails, he is expected to promote close kin as successors, demonstrating little trust in anyone outside his inner circle.

Trump has already seriously undermined America's traditional "rule of law" in favor of a "rule of man" centered around him. With the Supreme Court firmly in conservative hands, the partisan battles over immigration, abortion, guns, LGBTQ+ rights, and race relations are likely—for now—to be adjudicated in ways that favor the conservatives. However, Trump’s efforts to overturn several decades of progress toward a more open, pluralistic society are destined to challenge deeply entrenched liberal values and interests. This ambition to comprehensively reverse what he sees as "radical leftist" policies from previous years is likely to strain relations between the federal government and the blue states, further intensifying political polarization and societal fragmentation in the U.S.

Both major parties are currently undergoing a generational shift in political elites, and the overall balance of power between them is likely to persist. There is no guarantee that the Republican Party and the conservative movement will enter a prolonged period of dominance. Historically, the president’s party often loses the Congress in the midterms. The GOP could very well face setbacks in 2026. If the political pendulum swings back—as it often does in American politics—Trump may have only a two-year window to advance his legislative agenda relatively unhindered. The Democratic Party, though badly bruised, is far from finished. A shift of just tens of thousands of votes in a few key battleground states could return it to the presidency in 2028. A growing recognition of the political costs of overreliance on identity politics could push the party to refocus on economic concerns and quality-of-life issues and it may begin to cultivate a new generation of leaders.

Q: Elon Musk's growing presence in American politics has drawn significant attention. Do you see his role as an exception or the emergence of a new model of political engagement in the U.S.?

A: Musk is hardly the first technologist to engage with American politics. Benjamin Franklin, one of the Founding Fathers, was a scientist who famously invented the lightning rod. In the 1960s, Robert McNamara brought a background in statistics and systems analysis into his role as Secretary of Defense, applying new methods to military planning and decision-making. Yet none of these figures combined technological prowess with entrepreneurial success and then stepped so deeply into the political arena—as Musk has.

In today's America, the trend of technologists and scientists engaging in politics is becoming increasingly pronounced, primarily driven by the convergence of technology and politics. From R&D, industrial scaling, cross-border trade of goods, to national defense, nearly every aspect intersects with domestic and internationl politics. This blurring of boundaries has incentivized technologists to enter the political sphere. In this sense, Musk is a representative case.

But individuals like Musk, for all their wealth and techonlogy, often lack in political experience. Once in positions of power, they risk succumbing to hubris. The logic of political struggle is fundamentally different from that of technology development or business management. As a "new immigrant," it remains to be seen how much influence Musk will ultimately have on American politics—and whether his close alliance with Trump will endure.

Q: What do you see as the most significant trends shaping the current political landscape in the United States?

A: The United States is witnessing the emergence of new financial and technological oligarchies. On the financial side, senior figures such as White House Deputy Chief of Staff Stephen Miller oppose free trade, immigration, and regulation of technology. Meanwhile, figures inside the Republican mainstream like the U.S. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent and Director of the National Economic Council Kevin Hassett advocate for tax cuts and smaller government. Many of these individuals previously worked at financial institutions such as Goldman Sachs and entered government through the "revolving door" between Wall Street and public office. Robert Lighthizer, the U.S. Trade Representative in Trump’s previous administration, continues to wield considerable influence, while Peter Navarro—long a vocal anti-China hawk—now serves as a trade and manufacturing advisor. Each of these individuals plays a role in shaping the Trump administration's trade policy from different angles.

On the technology front, Silicon Valley elites are now gravitating toward Trump, forming a "tech right." Venture capitalist David Sacks has been appointed as the White House A.I. & Crypto Czar, where he is pushing to ease regulatory restrictions on both sectors. Tech figures like Elon Musk and biotech billionaire Vivek Ramaswamy have taken aim at the traditional conservatives over the issue of highly skilled immigration. While these disagreements appear to center on visa policy, they reflect a deeper rift between financial and technological oligarchies. The Trump–Musk alliance is powerfully symbolic. The convergence of financial capital, technological power, and political authority is now reshaping the structure of America’s political economy.

Outside of the formal institutions of government, another force is gaining traction—namely, the populist wing of the "America First" movement, led by figures like Steve Bannon. This group seeks to fundamentally disrupt the "deep state" using social media and digital platforms. They oppose Wall Street profiteering, pharmaceutical monopolies that inflate drug prices, and the military-industrial complex's role in dragging the U.S. into global conflicts. Their slogans include opposition to money politics and the capture of elected officials by special interest groups. How this force will evolve remains to be seen.