Wang Jisi on U.S. society, foreign policy, & China-U.S. relations

China's leading scholar on America concludes with a call for both countries to create a more open and convenient environment for scholarly visits.

Professor Wang Jisi of Peking University (PKU) is one of the most prominent America watchers in China. Wang is the Founding President of PKU’s Institute of International and Strategic Studies, former Dean of the PKU’s School of International Studies, and honorary president of the Chinese Association for American Studies.

Contemporary American Review, a leading Chinese mainland journal run by the Institute of American Studies(IAS), Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, interviewed Wang for its first issue of 2025, available on April 1. The interviewers are Liu Weidong and Hu Ran, Wang’s long-time aide, both of whom are at the IAS.

Pekingnology is translating the interview into English. The Abstract and Part I, on U.S. domestic politics, have been published.

Wang Jisi on U.S. domestic politics in Trump’s Second Term

The following are Part II, III, and IV of the four-part interview, on U.S. society, U.S. foreign policy, and China-U.S. relations, respectively.

Chen Danmei at PKU’s Institute of International and Strategic Studies graciously reviewed the translation.

特朗普第二任期的美国内政外交前景— — —王缉思教授专访

The Domestic and Foreign Policy Outlook of the United States in Trump’s Second Term —— Interview with Professor Wang Jisi

II. U.S. Society: Ethnic Fragmentation, Enduring Resilience

Q: Some have predicted that by the middle of the 21st century, minority groups in the U.S. could make up a larger share of the population than whites. Do you believe this is likely? And if it happens, what would it mean?

A: In the United States, the birth rate among white Americans is lower than that of minority groups such as Latinos and African Americans. The continued decline in the number of Americans of traditional European descent seems irreversible. According to the U.S. Census in 2020, white American remain the largest racial group, but between 2010 and 2020, the white population declined in absolute terms, and its share of the total U.S. population dropped by 8.6%—an unprecedented decrease. Over the same period, nearly all other racial and ethnic groups experienced growth: the African American population increased by 8.5%, the Latino population by 23%, and the Asian population by 35.5%. Among Americans under the age of 18, non-white population already account for 50%. If these demographic trends continue, the mid-21st century could mark a symbolic turning point—when whites become a minority in the United States.

However, as a multiethnic and multiracial society, the U.S. has widespread patterns of interracial marriage and childbearing, which complicate ethnic classification and demographic statistics. Another important question is: who counts as white? Traditionally, “white” in the U.S. referred to people of European descent (i.e., Caucasians), excluding Latinos. Current Secretary of State Marco Rubio is of Cuban descent, but because of his light skin, many people would still consider him white. Racial identity in America is a complex and sensitive issue. Therefore, determining whether and when white people will become a minority is not a question with a clear, universally accepted answer.

Demographic change inevitably influences political life. The average life expectancy for white males in the U.S. is declining—linked not only to the deteriorating quality of life and relative income among white blue-collar workers, but also to drug abuse and deficiencies in the social welfare system. In recent years, divorce rates among white blue-collar families have risen; the proportion of children raised in single-parent white blue-collar households increased from 22% in 2000 to 36% in 2017. These long-term challenges have deepened resentment among white demographic toward affirmative action policies and lenient immigration laws, fueling the rise of anti-immigrant, anti-globalization right-wing populism.

As to whether a decline in the proportion of the white population means America’s liberal mainstream values will change, this is a question that requires a long-term perspective and a comparison with trends in other countries around the world.. First, identity politics in the U.S. is fundamentally about Americans’ self-identification. Historically, core American values have remained stable. Today’s primary contest over values is between the “woke left,” which advocates diversity, equity, and inclusion (DEI), and the political right, which promotes conservative ideals. While the country’s demographics are shifting, its mainstream value system may not shift as dramatically.

Second, as demographic changes unfold across the West, what is considered “Western” values and faith are bound to evolve. Migration into Europe has introduced new value conflicts and tensions around racial, ethnic, and religious identity. What constitutes the “West” and “Western civilization” can vary depending on the criteria used. During a visit to Costa Rica, I asked local scholars about national identity. They replied, “Of course Costa Rica is a Western country. We’re a democracy, we’re white, and we’re Catholic.”

Q: Trump is expected to further tighten immigration policy during his second term. What impact might this have on America’s future development? Is the United States likely to become increasingly closed off in the coming years?

A: Immigration has long been a contentious issue in the United States. Generally speaking, Republican administrations are more inclined to adopt restrictive immigration policies than Democratic ones. Nevertheless, the U.S. has historically pursued relatively lenient immigration policies, because the country’s development has long depended on the wealth, labor, and consumer base brought in by immigrants. It is not uncommon in U.S. history for undocumented immigrants to enter the country and eventually gain legal status. The majority of immigrants to the U.S. come from Latin America. Given that the religious and cultural background of Latino immigrants does not fundamentally clash with America’s Protestant values and lifestyle, they tend to integrate more easily into American society. Unlike Europe, which faces challenges to social cohesion due to large numbers of Muslim immigrants, the U.S. has relatively lower levels of anti-immigrant sentiment.

During Trump’s first term, the administration implemented a range of strict immigration measures aimed at reducing illegal immigration. These included strengthening border enforcement, expanding deportation efforts, and eliminating protections such as deferred action. In the short term, these policies did produce some results. However, while they reduced the supply of undocumented labor, they failed to provide alternative sources of labor, leading to disruptions in certain industries. After the outbreak of COVID-19 in 2020, the number of illegal border crossings began to rise again. Experience has shown that as long as economic demand remains high and external pressures persist—such as violence and poverty in Central America—tough policies alone are insufficient to curb illegal immigration over the long term.

After being sworn in in 2025, Trump immediately issued a series of executive orders to tighten immigration controls. However, many of these measures may prove more symbolic than substantive, as implementation is likely to be fraught with difficulties. The administration lacks the resources to invest tens of billions of dollars, hire a large number of enforcement personnel, and carry out months or even years of large-scale investigations and deportations. These efforts will also face numerous legal and political challenges. Moreover, how the Trump administration chooses to handle immigrants from the Chinese mainland and Muslim-majority countries in recent years touches on sensitive issues of international relations, making such decisions and enforcement even more complex.

In short, the Trump administration’s renewed immigration crackdown is unlikely to fundamentally weaken the long-term growth potential of the United States. Trump is focused on curbing illegal immigration and remains relatively open to skilled immigrants from around the world. During his second term, undocumented immigrants will continue to enter the U.S., join the workforce, and some will eventually become citizens. Trump’s policies cannot alter the United States’ fundamental nature as a nation of immigrants, nor will tighter immigration policies reduce its engagement and contact with the outside world. The U.S. is therefore unlikely to become a closed society.

Q: Can Trump’s second-term economic agenda effectively address domestic economic challenges and alleviate inequality and social division ?

A: Tax cuts remain a top priority in Trump’s economic agenda. Key measures include making permanent the individual income tax reductions from his first-term Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, as well as further lowering the corporate income tax rate. However, if his comprehensive tax cut plan is fully implemented, it could reduce federal revenues by as much as $6.7 trillion over the next decade, further worsening the national debt situation.

To make up for this fiscal shortfall, Trump is doubling down on tariffs—a sharp, anti-globalization break from decades of U.S. support for free trade. Since returning to office, Trump has moved aggressively to pursue a tariff hike agenda, signing executive orders imposing 25% tariffs on imports from Canada and Mexico (though later delayed), twice slapping 10% tariffs on Chinese goods, and taxing all imported steel and aluminum at 25%. He has also floated “reciprocal tariffs” on critical imports like semiconductors, cars, and pharmaceuticals.

In the short run, this combination of domestic tax cuts and foreign tariff hikes may offer some protection to U.S. manufacturing and boost economic growth. However, its long-term negative effects are significant. Tax cuts primarily benefit corporations and high-income groups, doing little to curb inflation and likely exacerbating fiscal deficits and income inequality—undermining both social stability and sustainable growth. Tariffs, meanwhile, raise consumer prices and inflation, provoke retaliation from trade partners, harm U.S. exports, and are unlikely to revive American manufacturing.

Revitalizing U.S. manufacturing has been a shared objective across several administrations. The manufacturing sector’s decline is one of the fundamental factors contributing to growing social division, yet multiple obstacles continue to hinder a manufacturing resurgence.

First, globalization has made U.S. supply chains heavily reliant on other countries, especially China, and restructuring them would be costly and time-consuming. Second, many U.S. factories have long closed, and the current workforce lacks the technology and skills needed for advanced manufacturing. Third, although the government has provided incentives such as tax breaks and subsidies, it remains unclear whether firms are willing to commit the massive capital required to rebuild facilities and supply networks. Fourth, environmental regulations in the U.S. are relatively strict, making foreign production environments more attractive for many businesses. Fifth, international competition is fierce, particularly from developing countries like China that enjoy cost and scale advantages. Some of Trump’s current initiatives—such as promoting cryptocurrency—may not help redirect national focus toward long-term manufacturing revival.

On his first day back in office, Trump signed a flurry of executive orders on energy, including repealing the Biden administration’s Green New Deal, expanding fossil fuel exploration and exports, cutting subsidies for solar, wind, and electric vehicles, and withdrawing from the Paris Agreement on climate change. His energy agenda, driven by traditional fossil fuel interest groups, may stimulate short-term growth but will likely hinder the development of America’s clean energy sector and run counter to the global trend toward clean energy and climate change mitigation. These moves will also face strong domestic pushback from pro-renewable energy stakeholders and value-based coalitions.

Meanwhile, Trump is pushing for sweeping deregulation in tech, particularly artificial intelligence. His flagship initiative—the “Stargate” project—aims to build out national AI infrastructure on a scale comparable to the Manhattan or Apollo projects. On one hand, this could unleash a wave of innovation and keep the U.S. at the forefront of global tech. On the other, unchecked development of artificial intelligence may spark ethical crises, disrupt job markets, and escalate the international arms race.

Q: American society has changed dramatically in recent years. As someone who visits the U.S. annually, what changes have left the deepest impression on you?

A: In recent years, one of the most notable changes I’ve observed in American society is that inflation has intensified, crimes like theft and robbery are on the rise, and there’s been a perceptible decline in public ethics. The crime rate among the Black community is relatively higher than among other ethnic groups—a longstanding issue in the U.S. This phenomenon is not related to race or skin color, but rather to the socioeconomic conditions faced by this particular group. The disadvantaged status of many black Americans is largely the result of unequal distribution of social resources. Those who do enter America’s mainstream elite circles often display the traits of the elite class rather than characteristics typically associated with the broader Black community.

Another striking change I’ve noticed is a rise in anti-foreign sentiment among Americans—though not to the extent of xenophobia. During the COVID-19 pandemic, I visited the U.S. in February 2022 and for the first time felt a strong sense of exclusion toward Asians. This was closely tied to the rhetoric of Trump and other American politicians who stigmatized the virus as the “China virus” or “Wuhan virus,” and it also reflected the deteriorating China-U.S. relationship. If bilateral relations continue to worsen—and if American politicians escalate accusations that China is engaged in cyberattacks, political interference, or espionage—this will likely further deepen negative public perceptions of China and the Chinese people. Such sentiment could negatively affect the livelihoods of Chinese Americans, as well as dampen the willingness of Chinese citizens who study or work in the United States to stay in the country.

III. U.S. Foreign Policy: Shaky Hegemony, Lingering Power

Q: Trump’s MAGA movement champions “peace through strength” and calls for scaling back America’s global commitments, while the Republican establishment remains committed to preserving U.S. dominance abroad. What principles are likely to shape Trump’s second-term foreign policy?

A: “America First” is Trump’s slogan. He sees unrivaled U.S. power as a precondition for global leadership. However, he has made it clear that he opposes excessive American intervention in external affairs. In the early part of his second term, Trump is expected to prioritize domestic economic development and livelihoods over international engagement. That said, the U.S. will not retreat entirely from the global stage, as many American political and economic elites are immigrants or descendants of immigrants. Their ties to their countries of origin give them both the desire and capacity to influence U.S. foreign policy. Figures such as Melania Trump, Vice President J.D. Vance’s wife (who practices Hinduism), Elon Musk, and Marco Rubio all have foreign backgrounds.

U.S. foreign policy is shaped by a degree of historical inertia. Isolationism tends to resurface during periods of domestic economic and social difficulty. For instance, isolationism was prominent during the Great Depression of the 1930s and re-emerged as “neo-isolationism” in the early 1990s following economic slowdowns. When President George W. Bush took office in 2001, he too exhibited isolationist leanings, which were upended by the 9/11 attacks that triggered the U.S.-led global “War on Terror.” Bush himself transitioned from branding himself the “education president” to becoming a “wartime president.”

Based on his published statements and policy documents, Trump’s “America First” foreign policy in his second term will carry stronger elements of protectionism, unilateralism, and coercion. The U.S. will not return to the pre–World War I style of isolationism. Upon returning to power, Trump will be confronted with several foreign policy issues that he cannot avoid or defer. For instance, in the Russia–Ukraine conflict, Trump is reluctant to continue large-scale military aid or invest substantial diplomatic capital. However, Trump’s stated desire for a swift resolution to the crisis does not mean that the U.S. would withdraw its support for Ukraine entirely.

Influenced by Trump’s “transactional” worldview, his administration’s foreign policy is likely to prioritize short-term economic returns and tie foreign strategy to domestic electoral politics under the principle that “economic security is national security.” Transactional diplomacy is replacing values-based diplomacy. From the outset of his new term, Trump was eager to resolve the Ukraine crisis and Middle East conflicts, a characteristic that was evident throughout his decision-making process. However, traditional diplomatic thinking remains deeply entrenched in the U.S. policymaking system, and the military-industrial complex holds considerable sway, making any strategic shift a difficult undertaking. Moreover, the unpredictable course of global conflicts and regional instability may ultimately reverse the Trump administration’s intentions and push it back toward the traditional “national security first” strategic agenda.

Q: How would you evaluate Trump’s foreign policy team? If Trump places more emphasis on loyalty and obedience than on professional competence, how does he plan to rely on his team to implement his foreign policy agenda?

A: Trump indeed places a high value on personal loyalty, but his policy team includes individuals with diverse styles. His foreign policy and national security team largely consists of hawkish figures, while his international economic team—in the economic and trade sector that Trump cares most about—is composed of pragmatic individuals representing traditional business interests. Coordination between these two camps is often difficult. Divergent voices have already emerged within each team. Trump is likely to maintain a balancing act between his diplomatic and economic teams to preserve final decision-making authority for himself. However, his approach to foreign policy is expected to be marked by frequent policy reversals and inconsistent messaging across various agencies, often leaving subordinates uncertain about what to do.

Q: Although it is commonly believed that foreign affairs may not be the central focus of Trump’s new administration, it’s clear he has some concrete plans in the diplomatic realm and intends to advance them in a methodical manner. What do you think are his key foreign policy goals for the second term?

A: So far, I have not seen evidence that Trump has laid out and systematically advanced a well-thought-out foreign policy plan. Many of his recent pronouncements and territorial assertions appear more like bluster meant to obscure his real goals, though some do reflect his genuine thinking. It’s more important to focus on what Trump does rather than what he says. His diplomatic style resembles that of a real estate negotiator: “open with an outrageous offer, then bargain down.” His statements about annexing Canada and Greenland or reclaiming the Panama Canal are all examples of issuing bold threats before negotiating. Such tactics are inexpensive and often gain domestic approval. As for the damage to America’s international reputation and soft power—that’s not something he concerns himself with.

Trump’s foreign policy moves since taking office have been dizzying, revealing his lack of global perspective and diplomatic experience. His strategic direction is fragmented, lacking long-term planning or coherent policy thinking, and often displaying a reactive approach based on short-term developments. On most diplomatic issues, he will have to rely on his policy team for day-to-day management. But the greater problem is: the world today is filled with crises—and they do not bend to the will of the United States.

Q: On the Ukraine crisis, can Trump’s pressure on NATO allies deliver real results? Is he likely to bring the Russia–Ukraine conflict to a swift end?

A: For Trump personally, if the United States can facilitate some kind of ceasefire agreement between Russia and Ukraine—or if he himself can reach a strategic deal with Russian President Vladimir Putin to end the crisis—he would declare it a diplomatic victory for America. This line of thinking is, in fact, consistent with Putin’s own approach. Putin wants to bypass Zelensky and strike a deal directly with Trump, but Zelensky does not agree, and neither would other NATO members. I do not quite agree with the characterization of the war as a “proxy war,” since Russia is directly involved in combat. Calling Ukraine a mere proxy of the U.S. or Europe would be a stretch.

Whether and how the United States can quickly resolve the Russia–Ukraine conflict does not depend solely on Trump’s personal views—it also hinges on the positions of the American political elite, public opinion, and the responses of major European countries. Over the past three years, the U.S. has consistently provided Ukraine with diplomatic support and military aid. It is unlikely that Trump would make a 180-degree turn, nor could he easily persuade EU countries to stand by and watch. From the U.S.–Soviet rivalry in the Cold War-era to today’s U.S.–Russia confrontation, the antagonism has deep historical roots and is not something that can be resolved by a deal between Trump and Putin.

European countries such as the United Kingdom, France, Germany, the four Nordic states, Poland, and the Baltic states see the Russia–Ukraine conflict as a matter of core national security and strongly support Ukraine. However, they are reluctant to send troops due to concerns about direct confrontation with Russia and potential casualties. As Ukraine’s chances of reclaiming lost territory appear increasingly slim, Russia’s strength will also be significantly depleted and its economy will likely face long-term challenges. A temporary ceasefire remains possible, but a lasting solution is nowhere in sight for now.

Q: Trump has been pressuring U.S. allies to raise their defense budgets. How might this hardline approach reshape America’s relationships with these countries?

A: Under Trump’s second term, transatlantic relations are poised for more turbulence than under Biden, particularly over issues such as international trade, defense obligations, and climate policy. At the same time, European countries themselves differ in their views toward Washington, and while Trump may try to drive wedges between them, it would be premature to declare the end of Western cohesion. Calls to raise defense spending as a share of GDP reflect both a new demand from the Trump administration toward NATO allies and a decision that some major European powers are making independently out of concern for Europe’s future security landscape. In Asia, despite subtle domestic political shifts in Japan and South Korea, America’s alliance system in East Asia remains firmly intact. Meanwhile, India’s foreign policy has become increasingly independent, striving to avoid making enemies and showing reluctance to take sides between China and the United States.

Q: To what extent will Trump’s decision to withdraw the U.S. from key international institutions affect the country’s soft power? How might this shift influence America’s power and international standing?

A: In recent years, U.S. soft power has been in steady decline, and this appears to be a long-term trend. American soft power traditionally stems from two sources: first, the appeal of its political system, values, and way of life; second, the reputation and influence of its behavior in international affairs. Domestically, American democracy is facing serious challenges—so much so that few countries today still view the U.S. political model as a template for their own. That said, this does not mean contrary political systems are necessarily gaining more appeal. The U.S.’s handling of the Middle East conflict, particularly its overt favoritism toward Israel, has been widely unpopular. Trump’s recent proclamation to “taker over the Gaza Strip” has only further stirred global outrage.

The Trump administration’s withdrawal from international institutions such as the World Health Organization and the Paris Agreement, along with Trump’s territorial assertions over Canada, the Panama Canal, and Greenland—in blatant disregard for international law and national sovereignty—clear undermine U.S. soft power. Still, despite America’s open challenge to global rules and norms under Trump, there has yet been a coordinated global backlash. Most countries remain fragmented in their responses, and there’s little prospect of an “anti-America alliance.”

When U.S. hegemony casts aside moral restraint and domestic checks, it’s capable of shocking audacity. In my 2003 article “The Logic of American Hegemony,” I cited historian Arthur Schlesinger Jr., who sharply criticized America’s cultural tendency toward violence—so much so that he called Americans “the most frightening people on this planet,” because neither domestic nor international atrocities had ever awakened the moral conscience of U.S. leaders. The America I know has never been particularly benevolent in its foreign conduct. While American elites are sometimes capable of profound self-critique, they are highly united, nationalistic, and often domineering in foreign relations. The U.S. under Trump appears more eager to instill fear through its hard power than to earn respect through soft power.

Even as its soft power wanes, America’s hard power continues to rise. In terms of total output, economic quality, and technological capability, the U.S. far outpaces Europe, Japan, Canada, and Australia. Although the West’s share of global GDP has significantly declined over the past two decades, America’s own share has remained roughly steady at around 25%, suggesting that its economic weight within the Western world is actually increasing.

Only in comparison to China does America’s hard power appear relatively diminished. The gap between China and the United States on one side, and other major powers on the other, is widening. Although India is an exception, it remains far from being able to match China or the U.S. in the short term. It is time to undertake a comprehensive and nuanced reassessment of the China-U.S. power balance. As the world’s two largest economies, the GDP gap between them continues to fluctuate within a certain range. At a more granular level, such as in semiconductors, AI, and robotics, the technological balance between the two countries presents a highly complex landscape. These comparisons demand deep analysis and empirical data. In my view, China and the U.S. are the two most powerful nations in the world, but the balance of power between them has not undergone any transformative shift. There is also no clear indication that the United States’ long-term development potential is weaker than China’s. The full impact of Trump’s domestic overhaul on America’s overall strength remains to be seen.

Q: As the primary architect of the current international order and a former hegemonic power, the United States is increasingly reckless in its global conduct. How do you view its current international behavior?

A: In international society, relations between states used to be governed by a kind of tacit understanding—shared norms, accepted standards of conduct, and implicit boundaries. Most countries generally handled bilateral relations through established procedures. But in recent years, the United States has actively undermined the Westphalian system, disregarding basic principles of sovereignty. As long as something serves its own interests, the U.S. has acted recklessly and unrestrainedly, with little regard for international rules or the needs and interests of other nations. When the world’s most powerful country abandons its principles and loses its moral compass, it becomes deeply dangerous—capable of inflicting great harm globally. Today’s America has increasingly drifted away from the image the world once had of it. Although many countries are still observing and trying to reach compromises with the U.S. where possible, unease and dissatisfaction with its international behavior are clearly on the rise.

Trump’s diplomatic pivot aligns with a broader global trend toward the right. Across the Western world, more and more right-wing populist factions may become mainstream forces in governments or exert stronger political influence. A notable development today is that many right-wing political forces around the world share ideological commonalities with the Trump administration and are seeking its support. In this sense, America’s international influence under Trump may be increasing, and its disruptive, destructive impact on the international order could become more pronounced. To make sense of today’s world, it is essential adopt not only an international relations perspective but also recognize the underlying global political shifts—particularly, growing inequality, the rise of right-wing populism, technological innovation disrupting traditional economic and social structures, and the evolving values and lifestyles of Millennials and Gen Z, etc.

IV. China-U.S. Relations: Ongoing Competition, Room Still Remains

Q: What will Trump’s second-term China strategy focus on? If his administration pushes for decoupling in technology, key supply chains, and people-to-people exchanges, are we headed for two “parallel worlds”? And although Trump is not ideological, how could his administration still target China on ideological grounds?

A: The Trump administration’s strategic competition with China will be more concentrated in trade and technology, rather than human rights, political systems, or traditional national security issues. On the economic front, Trump has threatened during his campaign to revoke China’s Most-Favored-Nation status, impose a 60% tariff on Chinese exports to the U.S., gradually halt imports of all essential goods from China, and eliminate American dependence on China in all critical sectors. Some of these statements are likely exaggerated. If implemented fully, they would harm the U.S. economic interests.

Trump seeks to gain advantages in trade—he is open to Chinese investment in the U.S. in some sectors and welcomes more exports to China. However, Trump’s personal stance toward China does not fully align with the broader strategic orientation of the U.S. government. The extent to which bilateral trade will suffer setbacks depends on the specific measures his administration adopts. Frictions are likely to intensify in areas such as semiconductors, artificial intelligence, electric vehicles, and rare metals, but full decoupling remains unlikely.

In my personal experience, even though Huawei is banned from selling its products in the U.S., I can still use a Huawei phone there, as long as I adjust a few apps. In areas tied to public wellbeing—such as the R&D, regulatory approval, and cross-border circulation of pharmaceuticals and medical device—room for cooperation remains. China will also continue importing large quantities of U.S. agricultural goods. Businesses from both countries still play a stabilizing role in bilateral trade, acting as “pressure valves.”

I’ve spoken to many entrepreneurs in both countries. Chinese entrepreneurs, regardless of whether they work in state-owned or private firms, all hope to expand trade ties with the U.S. and avoid decoupling. They genuinely believe this is a win-win situation. Most U.S. businesspeople also want to safeguard their economic interests in China and would expand their investment if given the chance. Due to pressure from hardliners and the prevailing “political correctness” on China, they’re often unable to openly express their support for continued China-U.S. Economic and trade cooperation, but they continue lobbying federal, state, and congressional offices behind the scenes. This mutual interdependence, including the flow of people and societal exchanges, cannot be fully severed. Of course, far-right forces in the U.S. are working to halt scientific, technological, and people-to-people exchanges with China—and there is even a new wave of McCarthyism. However, it is no longer possible for China-U.S. relations to revert to the isolation of the early Cold War era.

The China-U.S. rivalry in social systems and ideologies will persist in Trump’s second term. Although Trump himself does not emphasize ideology, he cannot alter Washington’s mainstream political consensus on China. Across both the Democratic and Republican parties, it is widely believed that China’s political system and ideology stand in direct opposition to those of the U.S. Many of Trump’s advisors and appointees hold Cold War mentalities and serious biases against China. During the 2024 presidential election, Trump fiercely criticized “democratic socialism” and the “radical left” as threats to the United States, accusing Democratic candidate Kamala Harris of leaning toward socialism. His brand of conservative populism reflects profound changes in America’s ideological landscape. As the U.S.’ strategic competition with China deepens, the weaponization of ideology will become more pronounced, shaping the contest between the two countries over both domestic and international order.

Therefore, the U.S. government is likely to continue applying ideological pressure on China—hyping and sanctioning alleged “forced labor” in Xinjiang, engaging with Tibetan separatist forces, and supporting Hong Kong’s so-called “pro-democracy” activists. On Taiwan, I expect Trump’s administration will not formally abandon the One China policy or support “Taiwan independence”, but it will likely back the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) government in upgrading its weapons systems and increasing military spending. Still, these issues will not be the core of Trump’s second-term China policy. Trump does not personally endorse regime-change strategies or frequently invoke liberal democratic rhetoric like many Democrats do. However, he will not stop Congress or executive agencies from continuing ideological pressure on China, and may opportunistically use such tactics to extract concessions in other policy areas.

Q: The U.S. government claims it does not reject cooperation with China, yet in recent years actual cooperation has seemed less than expected. What do you believe has caused this situation? During Trump’s second term, will the room for China-U.S. cooperation expand or contract?

A: The objective reality of China-U.S. relations is that both countries need cooperation in order to achieve development. However, Trump’s goal of “Making America Great Again” fundamentally conflicts with China’s aspiration for national rejuvenation. In the eyes of the American political mainstream, the U.S. cannot be “great again” unless it weakens China’s power. On major issues of principle, there is little room for compromise.

That said, Trump himself is interested in making “deals” with China and is willing to engage in dialogue. This presents tactical opportunities for China. It is both necessary and advisable for China to engage with the Trump team to understand their thinking and intentions. This means that although the space for cooperation in high-tech and trade will continue to shrink, there remains willingness and potential for cooperation in other issue areas. For example, both countries are interested in strengthening military-to-military communication and exploring crisis prevention and management mechanisms. However, internal restrictions and procedural barriers in both countries have hindered meaningful dialogue. If the two governments can reach certain agreements in the coming months—to expand dialogue channels in areas such as trade, military affairs, cybersecurity, artificial intelligence, and counternarcotics—then there may be a path to stabilizing the bilateral relationship and addressing shared concerns in the coming years. Unlike Biden, Trump is more open to “transactions”. This could increase the potential and space for cooperation between China and the U.S. and help avert direct confrontation.

Q: In your ongoing conversations with American officials and scholars, have you observed any notable shifts in their attitudes and positions toward China?

A: There is now a basic strategic consensus within the U.S. policy and academic communities regarding the character of China, the nature of China-U.S. relations, and the extent of the challenge China poses to the United States. A bipartisan and broadly shared view has taken root: for the next decade, and likely beyond, China will be the greatest security threat, the most serious challenge, and the strongest competitor facing the United States. The current characterization of China-U.S. relations as “strategic competition” and the overarching goal to “outcompete” China are the inevitable outcomes of the internal and external strategies under both Trump’s two terms and the Biden administration. Almost no one in Washington still describes China as a friend or a country the U.S. might win over. The greatest source of American suspicion lies in the belief that China’s strategic goal is not only to achieve national rejuvenation but to undermine, and perhaps overthrow, the U.S.-led international order, and to displace or replace U.S. global dominance.

At this point, debating China’s strategic intentions with American officials and scholars has little effect. There is a prevailing and deeply held belief that China’s growing power poses a challenge to the United States, and that this rise will inevitably fuel Beijing’s ambition to compete for global leadership. Many in Washington believe that the only reason China has not yet taken more aggressive actions is that it currently lacks the capacity to do so. Once that capability is acquired, they assume, China will act. The U.S. also places little trust in China’s official denials of such intentions, in part because of anti-American rhetoric found on Chinese social media.

Within the American policy community, current disagreements mostly revolve around the specific strategies for dealing with China. The United States is employing a range of measures to suppress China, aiming to prevent it from acquiring greater capabilities. However, there is also concern that acting too quickly or too forcefully could trigger direct confrontation, cause unacceptable losses to the U.S., and provoke serious international backlash. Thus, the core debate in Washington now centers on how to calibrate a China strategy that impedes China’s rise without crossing the threshold into a hot war.

Q: Is the number of “China experts” in the United States declining? Under current conditions, what can be done to promote people-to-people exchanges between China and the U.S. to strengthen mutual understanding and prevent misjudgment?

A: I don’t believe that the number of China experts in the United States is decreasing; rather, we are simply not engaging with them enough. In the U.S., there are many scholars specializing in China, and a clear generational divide exists among them. Senior experts like David Lampton and Kenneth Lieberthal have broader knowledge and a more comprehensive understanding of China. Meanwhile, younger scholars such as Evan Medeiros, Ryan Hass, Scott Kennedy, Jude Blanchette, and Rush Doshi tend to have stronger Chinese language skills and deep specializations in their research. They also have a good grasp of China’s national conditions, though their political views often diverge significantly from ours. The key issue is not whether there are fewer China experts in the U.S., but how we can strengthen dialogue with them.

Since Trump’s first term—and especially during the COVID-19 pandemic—people-to-people exchanges between China and the U.S. have decreased significantly. Relying solely on books, websites, and video calls is not sufficient to understand the other country; only face-to-face interaction between individuals can truly enhance mutual understanding. In my view, the most effective way to build understanding between the two sides is not just to resolve visa issues or expand visa waivers, but to offer practical support for exchanges between think tanks and academic institutions. It is essential to remove specific obstacles, dispatch more scholars for fieldwork in the other country, and create a more open and convenient environment for scholarly visits. Many scholars in both China and the U.S. are cautious about visiting each other’s countries, partly because of visa difficulties, but more often due to concerns about potential entry barriers, personal safety risks, and limitations on communication or expression. These concerns are not baseless; they are based on real experiences.

Only through substantive, insightful discussions on concrete topics—such as trade, technology, military affairs, cybersecurity, and artificial intelligence—can mutual understanding between China and the U.S. be meaningfully deepened. Chinese scholars must conduct rigorous research, publish original insights, and establish effective channels of communication with policymakers and industry professionals. Only by doing so can the value of exchanges be recognized by their U.S. counterparts. Discussing overly broad or abstract issues will not suffice. In addition to addressing policy issues, Chinese scholars should deepen their engagement with real-world challenges in the country’s rural areas, business sector, national defense, and scientific research. Chinese scholars specializing in American studies should actively seek opportunities to conduct fieldwork in the U.S., and maintain dialogue with professionals in science and technology, industry, finance, and strategic affairs across both countries. This will help accumulate the knowledge and momentum necessary to advance people-to-people exchanges and policy discussions.