I agree with the critique of "discarding half the evidence", but I think the authors go too far in taking China's peaceful rhetoric at face value. e.g.: “It is also clear what China does not want: There is little mention in Chinese discourse of expansive goals or ambitions for global leadership and hegemony.”
Surely it's historically rare for any country to say "we want to become regional or global hegemons" in official discourse before attempting to do so!
Someone with better historical knowledge than me can provide a better set of comparisons here, but my sense is that when the UK, US, Soviet Union, Napoleonic France and Imperial Japan etc. took on hegemonic roles, this was mostly preceded with non-hegemonic (we need to protect our global trade) or anti-hegemonic (we need a "co-prosperity sphere" to counter western imperialism) rhetoric. Even more openly aggressive powers seem to focus a lot of their pre-aggression rhetoric on "reuniting the e.g. German/Russian people", and "reclaiming lost territory" rather than "ambitions for global leadership".
I'm not saying that China has secret aspirations of global or regional hegemony, but I suspect that official discourse would look very similar whether they do or don't.
The best answer to the claim that "China wants to replace the US" is that no nation in its right mind would want to replace the US. That overbearing hegemony and arrogance makes the US hated not just among its self-created "adversaries" but even among the peoples of allied nations. There is nothing to suggest that China would want to follow the US down that path.
If peaceful cooperation is the message that China is consistently sending to its own people and to the outside world, then, as the article suggests, it becomes a solidly established truth: "that narrative becomes a constraint as well as a message: it shapes expectations and raises the political cost of visibly contradicting it later". That quote perfectly expresses a fundamental truth of politics and of human psychology. Every expression or repetition of a moral principle gives it added weight. Added to that, we have seen much evidence of duplicity from the US in world affairs, but not from China. Whether we not we agree with Chinese policies, we have no reason to distrust China's word.
I agree the anti-Chinese hysteria in Washington is way overblown. And yet, from a European perspective, there is an unsettling aspect which you didn't mention: That's the constantly re-affirmed friendship with Russia. Unlike China, Russia has clearly stated its intention to conquer neighbouring countries and re-establish its former empire by force. That's a real existential threat to Europe, nothing imagined. A Russian-Chinese alliance is a nightmare for European democracies. And as long as China continues its support for the Kremlin's aggression, that will always remain an obstacle to better relations with Europe, in spite of all frustration with Mr. Trump and his antics. I am afraid neither the Chinese leadership nor ordinary Chinese really understand the seriousness of this matter.
I don’t think it’s much about what the CPC wants the Chinese people to believe, it more the CPC believes non-hegemony is the right policy and telling its people what they believe is the right policy. We want to look at the world objectively, and the CPC is helping us (including those outside China) to do that. It’s not that the CPC is acting strategically and trying to manipulate public opinion.
A major problem with this line of thinking is that China has been repeatedly caught setting up police forces in democratic nations and using them to repress dissidents saying things that are entirely legal under the laws of the nation's in question.
China's internal regime insecurity is leading to them taking actions in the internal affairs of other nations in direct violation of the laws of those nations. This will only continue and increase because the logic of dictatorial regimes like China's is that freedom of speech in foreign countries can impact domestic politics in China because speech can easily flow across borders.
The article What Does China Want? can be situated within a Western ontological basis that reaches back to the founding of International Relations itself. The London School of Economics, established by the Webbs and Bernard Shaw, was designed to promote incremental change for the betterment of society—security, adequacy, and human flourishing—through gradual reform, a tradition known as Fabianism. If the West could recognize that what China seeks is Fabianism with Chinese Characteristics, it would see that China is not a revisionist power but one committed to sustaining the public commons and steadily improving the condition of its own people, with shared prosperity extending outward to humanity at large. By the agreed definitions in International Security Studies, it is in fact the United States in 2025 that fits the profile of a revisionist power: it has undermined the liberal order it once created by violating GATT/WTO principles through coercive tariffs, coercing allies economically, and engaging in military interventions without UN authorization. Seen through this prism, China’s intent is evolutionary and stabilizing, while America’s actions are disruptive and revisionist.
I agree with the critique of "discarding half the evidence", but I think the authors go too far in taking China's peaceful rhetoric at face value. e.g.: “It is also clear what China does not want: There is little mention in Chinese discourse of expansive goals or ambitions for global leadership and hegemony.”
Surely it's historically rare for any country to say "we want to become regional or global hegemons" in official discourse before attempting to do so!
Someone with better historical knowledge than me can provide a better set of comparisons here, but my sense is that when the UK, US, Soviet Union, Napoleonic France and Imperial Japan etc. took on hegemonic roles, this was mostly preceded with non-hegemonic (we need to protect our global trade) or anti-hegemonic (we need a "co-prosperity sphere" to counter western imperialism) rhetoric. Even more openly aggressive powers seem to focus a lot of their pre-aggression rhetoric on "reuniting the e.g. German/Russian people", and "reclaiming lost territory" rather than "ambitions for global leadership".
I'm not saying that China has secret aspirations of global or regional hegemony, but I suspect that official discourse would look very similar whether they do or don't.
thanks for the thoughtful reply. a Sinica podcast by Kaiser Kuo interviewing the authors is now available https://www.sinicapodcast.com/p/what-does-china-want-the-authors
Correct.
The best answer to the claim that "China wants to replace the US" is that no nation in its right mind would want to replace the US. That overbearing hegemony and arrogance makes the US hated not just among its self-created "adversaries" but even among the peoples of allied nations. There is nothing to suggest that China would want to follow the US down that path.
If peaceful cooperation is the message that China is consistently sending to its own people and to the outside world, then, as the article suggests, it becomes a solidly established truth: "that narrative becomes a constraint as well as a message: it shapes expectations and raises the political cost of visibly contradicting it later". That quote perfectly expresses a fundamental truth of politics and of human psychology. Every expression or repetition of a moral principle gives it added weight. Added to that, we have seen much evidence of duplicity from the US in world affairs, but not from China. Whether we not we agree with Chinese policies, we have no reason to distrust China's word.
I agree the anti-Chinese hysteria in Washington is way overblown. And yet, from a European perspective, there is an unsettling aspect which you didn't mention: That's the constantly re-affirmed friendship with Russia. Unlike China, Russia has clearly stated its intention to conquer neighbouring countries and re-establish its former empire by force. That's a real existential threat to Europe, nothing imagined. A Russian-Chinese alliance is a nightmare for European democracies. And as long as China continues its support for the Kremlin's aggression, that will always remain an obstacle to better relations with Europe, in spite of all frustration with Mr. Trump and his antics. I am afraid neither the Chinese leadership nor ordinary Chinese really understand the seriousness of this matter.
I don’t think it’s much about what the CPC wants the Chinese people to believe, it more the CPC believes non-hegemony is the right policy and telling its people what they believe is the right policy. We want to look at the world objectively, and the CPC is helping us (including those outside China) to do that. It’s not that the CPC is acting strategically and trying to manipulate public opinion.
How about this one, Zichen: "Access Denied? The Sino-American Contest for Military Primacy in Asia" (https://direct.mit.edu/isec/article/50/1/118/132730/Access-Denied-The-Sino-American-Contest-for)
Highly, highly worth dissecting as well. Particularly with the new U.S administration, and their new... "Department of War".
Occam's razor: Thucydides trap is what's first and foremost driving the U.S-China relationship.
A major problem with this line of thinking is that China has been repeatedly caught setting up police forces in democratic nations and using them to repress dissidents saying things that are entirely legal under the laws of the nation's in question.
China's internal regime insecurity is leading to them taking actions in the internal affairs of other nations in direct violation of the laws of those nations. This will only continue and increase because the logic of dictatorial regimes like China's is that freedom of speech in foreign countries can impact domestic politics in China because speech can easily flow across borders.
http://thechinaproject.com/2023/07/20/transnational-repression-and-chinas-overseas-police-stations/
The article What Does China Want? can be situated within a Western ontological basis that reaches back to the founding of International Relations itself. The London School of Economics, established by the Webbs and Bernard Shaw, was designed to promote incremental change for the betterment of society—security, adequacy, and human flourishing—through gradual reform, a tradition known as Fabianism. If the West could recognize that what China seeks is Fabianism with Chinese Characteristics, it would see that China is not a revisionist power but one committed to sustaining the public commons and steadily improving the condition of its own people, with shared prosperity extending outward to humanity at large. By the agreed definitions in International Security Studies, it is in fact the United States in 2025 that fits the profile of a revisionist power: it has undermined the liberal order it once created by violating GATT/WTO principles through coercive tariffs, coercing allies economically, and engaging in military interventions without UN authorization. Seen through this prism, China’s intent is evolutionary and stabilizing, while America’s actions are disruptive and revisionist.