Yan Xuetong: an autonomous knowledge system needs more than Chinese characteristics

Leading international-relations scholar stresses original research, internal academic debate, and researchers’ freedom to set their own agendas.

China’s push to build an “autonomous knowledge system” dates to 2016, when President Xi Jinping called for the development of philosophy and the social sciences with Chinese characteristics. In 2022, he stated the goal more explicitly, saying that the effort ultimately came down to building China’s own knowledge system.

Against this backdrop, 外交评论 Foreign Affairs Review, a journal published by China Foreign Affairs University under the supervision of China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, recently invited four leading Chinese international-relations scholars to reflect on the subject. The essay below, by Yan Xuetong, Honorary Dean of Tsinghua University’s Institute of International Relations, is the final installment in the four-part symposium in the 3rd issue of the bimonthly in 2026—and it reads rather differently from the others.

Yan argues that discussions in China have placed too much emphasis on “independence” while paying insufficient attention to the concept’s other two elements: “knowledge” and “system.” Independence, he writes, provides an intellectual and political orientation, but the foundation of any independent knowledge system must be the creation of specific and original knowledge capable of explaining concrete, verifiable problems.

He also argues that Chinese IR theories too often develop in isolation from one another, with limited mutual citation and critique. A coherent knowledge system, in his view, cannot simply be designed from the top down; it must emerge through sustained scholarly debate. That requires both academic capacity—specialized expertise, methodological competence and independent thinking—and the freedom to decide what and how to study.

More provocatively, Yan contends that structuralist and geopolitical theories are often unable to explain rapid changes in international affairs, including sharp shifts in US foreign policy from one president to another. He therefore urges Chinese scholars to pay greater attention to decision-makers and human agency—and to move the discussion of an independent knowledge system away from broad declarations of principle and toward the actual production of new knowledge.

Yan has kindly reviewed and revised the translation.

— Yuxuan Jia

知识创造与国际关系自主体系建设

Knowledge Creation and the Construction of an Independent IR Knowledge System

The concept of an “independent knowledge system” comprises three core elements: “independence,” “knowledge,” and “system.” While constructing such a system has been set as a major objective for Chinese scholars, most discussions on the topic have heavily focused on the notion of “independence” rather than on the substance of “knowledge” or the “knowledge system.”

According to Baidu Baike [Chinese equivalent of Wikipedia], “A Chinese independent knowledge system is rooted in China’s fine traditional culture, grounded in Chinese practice, and constitutes an integrated whole in which knowledge is systematically organized and suitable for guiding Chinese modernization.” This definition imposes numerous stringent criteria for knowledge production, making it exceedingly difficult for scholars to generate knowledge that satisfies all conditions simultaneously. For instance, Chinese academia has produced substantial scholarship on nuclear weapons, artificial intelligence, foreign languages, and the histories of Europe, Africa, and the Americas. Crucially, none of these bodies of knowledge meet the holistic criteria set by Baidu Baike.

This essay argues that knowledge creation constitutes the fundamental baseline for constructing any independent knowledge system. To substantiate this claim, the following sections analyze the structural relationship among the three defining elements: independence, knowledge, and system.

I. Specific Knowledge

Although “independence” outlines the political and ideological orientation of academic development, the primary engine remains substantive knowledge creation, which serves as the bedrock of any independent system. Absent the generation of novel empirical and theoretical insights, the realization of an independent knowledge system remains impossible.

Independent systems vary widely in complexity. While certain personal frameworks—such as individualized entertainment, study, or physical exercise regimes—are easily constructed, establishing a national independent knowledge system within science, technology, or theory of social science is an exponentially more difficult endeavor. This disparity arises because the former requires only limited, subjective coordination, whereas the latter relies on a vast, verified reservoir of epistemic wealth. Consequently, the accumulation of specific and rigorous knowledge is the essential prerequisite for constructing a national independent knowledge system.

Furthermore, international relations (IR) scholars cannot generate genuine knowledge when their research, publications, and speeches fail to address specific, verifiable questions or social problems. Despite the proliferation of academic IR conferences and literature dedicated to the issue of “constructing an independent knowledge system,” few have engaged with concrete academic inquiries or pressing societal issues. Instead, mainstream discourse offers lengthy exegeses on the necessity, political significance, and general principles of this mandate. Because scholarly attention has been co-opted by the rhetoric of independence while actual IR knowledge production is marginalized, these symposia and texts have yielded minimal substantive scholarly IR output.

In the context of IR studies, new knowledge stems from rigorous empirical research into concrete historical or contemporary phenomena—particularly those anomalies that defy existing IR theory or conventional wisdom. For example, the globalized post-Cold War order has rapidly devolved into counter-globalization over the past decade. While a vast descriptive literature has mapped this historical shift, enhancing our awareness of the treats of the global order, few studies offer a convincing causal mechanism explaining this historical reversal. Disclosing this underlying causal mechanism would constitute a genuine advancement in knowledge. At present, mainstream analyses favor popular geopolitical concepts; however, these frameworks fail to identify any structural factor that drives the changes in global order. Such theories cannot even explain why the Trump administration’s foreign policy diverged so drastically from the Biden administration’s when the underlying international geopolitical landscape remained constant.

From a historical perspective, the contemporary ascendance of populism and the concomitant decline of liberalism represent just one iteration of a recurring historical cycle. Modern history has witnessed successive waves of ideological dominance: imperialism prior to World War I, fascism leading up to World War II, communism in the post-war era, nationalism during the mid-Cold War, and liberalism in the post-Cold War epoch. The current rise of populism constitutes the latest manifestation of ideological fluctuation in modern international history. Crucially, IR theories anchored in structuralist paradigms are structurally unequipped to explain these macro-ideological shifts. Without addressing these concrete international transformations, constructing an independent IR knowledge system in an era of counter-globalization remains unfeasible.

To achieve meaningful theoretical breakthroughs, Chinese scholars must remain cognizant of the constraining influence of Western geopolitical thought. Although these geopolitical frameworks originated in European academia, they have acquired immense influence within Chinese scholarly and public discourse. Numerous textbooks, journals, and university curricula introduce these ideas uncritically, leading many international relations commentators to routinely employ geopolitical logic without recognizing its inherent internal contradictions.

For instance, shifts in national leadership frequently cause dramatic transformations—either rapid improvements or severe deteriorations—in bilateral relations. This phenomenon has recurred throughout diplomatic history. Following Donald Trump’s inauguration, relations between the United States and its traditional allies deteriorated sharply, to the point where the White House openly talked about withdrawing from NATO. No static geopolitical factor can account for this variation. Conversely, a decision-making paradigm focused on leadership agency can effectively analyze these sudden shifts. In this regard, the decision-making paradigm poses a fundamental challenge to traditional geopolitical theory, mirroring the way heliocentrism historically upended geocentric models.

Captivated by geopolitical thinking, American IR scholars constructed highly influential structuralist theories. However, these structural models suffer from the same explanatory failures when confronted with American foreign policy behavior under the Trump administration. By definition, “structure” denotes a durable, stable, and slowly evolving framework; it is therefore inherently unequipped to explain abrupt changes or short-term volatility in international relations. When analyzing international affairs within a given timeframe, structure acts as a constant—and a constant cannot account for variance. If Chinese IR scholars can break free from the constraints of both classical geopolitical thinking and the American structuralist paradigm, they will possess a unique opportunity to achieve critical theoretical breakthroughs and generate authentic and independent IR knowledge.

II. Knowledge Systems

A system is conventionally defined as “a whole formed through the interconnection of a number of related things or forms of consciousness.” However, scholars maintain divergent epistemological standards regarding what specific criteria qualify a body of knowledge to constitute such a unified whole.

If a “knowledge system” is conceptualized as a logically self-consistent body of thought, its constituent elements must be mutually reinforcing and entirely free of internal contradictions. Classical physics, chemistry, formal logic, and mathematics serve as paradigmatic examples of independent knowledge systems under this stringent definition.

Conversely, if a knowledge system is understood more broadly as a repository of competing ideas, its formation does not necessitate internal logical consistency. For instance, Chinese and Western philosophies are routinely treated as distinct independent knowledge systems, despite the fact that both encompass fiercely competing intellectual schools. Within each philosophical system, long-term debates persist regarding polarized foundational assumptions—such as idealism versus materialism, or competing views on whether human nature is inherently good or evil. Concurrently, substantial epistemological overlaps exist between these two overarching traditions. During the Axial Age, for example, ancient Greek and Chinese philosophers independently developed strikingly convergent concepts and insights, despite a complete absence of direct cross-cultural communication.

Scholars likewise contest whether IR theory in its entirety should be categorized as a single independent knowledge system. In the 1970s, Stanley Hoffmann famously characterized modern IR theory as “an American social science.” This assertion implies that he regarded the collective body of IR theoretical literature as a singular, cohesive knowledge system. To accept Hoffmann’s premise is to concede that a knowledge system can encompass epistemological frameworks that conflict fundamentally in their core assumptions, inner logic, and thematic conclusions. In fact, by the 1970s, IR theory had diversified into multiple adversarial schools, most notably realism, liberalism, and neo-Marxism. In the contemporary era, many IR scholars argue that subsequent developments—such as the English School, the Copenhagen School, and the recent Chinese School—operate entirely outside the trajectory of American social science. This modern perspective rejects the notion regarding IR theory as an independent knowledge system, treating them instead as a broader domain composed of several distinct, independent systems of knowledge.

These divergent understandings of what constitutes an epistemic system are also mirrored in the ongoing debates surrounding the Chinese IR School. Some scholars contend that any IR theory rooted in traditional Chinese culture should automatically be classified as an integral component of the Chinese School. Others counter that an intellectual school must be defined by shared core theoretical assumptions rather than a shared cultural or geographic lineage.

In short, contemporary academia lacks a universal criterion for defining an independent knowledge system. Achieving an epistemic consensus on these definitions will require time, and will likely only crystallize as we observe how newly generated and interrelated bodies of thoughts are naturally connected.

Nevertheless, defining a knowledge system by a set of shared, foundational assumptions remains highly analytically rigorous. In this view, each individual theory within a same school may present divergent arguments, yet their variations build upon identical assumptions. For example, classical realism, structural realism, offensive realism, neoclassical realism, and moral realism utilize vastly different independent variables; nonetheless, they share a suite of axiomatic assumptions. These include the premises that the international system is structurally anarchic, that state foreign policy is driven by rational self-interest, that national interests are defined in terms of power, and that the nature of state survival is of self-help. These shared ontological commitments provide a valid justification for treating these disparate realist theories as branches of a single knowledge system.

Constructivism, by contrast, radically rejects realism’s foundational axioms. If realism and constructivism are combined into the exact same knowledge system, the analytical boundaries between different systems become infinitely elastic. This boundary dissolution introduces a logical paradox: an independent knowledge system can only exist if there is an exterior body of knowledge left outside its parameters. When a knowledge system becomes so hyper-inclusive that it absorbs completely contradictory paradigms and leaves nothing beyond its borders, it becomes conceptually impossible to determine whether these conflicting ideas belong to the same epistemic system at all.

Ultimately, the formation of a knowledge system is a natural process driven by the spontaneous interaction of related ideas. Scholars generally conduct research to address the immediate empirical or theoretical needs of their specific projects, rather than with the explicit, self-conscious aim of building an independent knowledge system. The insightful knowledge generated by various researchers eventually form systemic interconnections without the need for top-down intellectual intervention. While Chinese scholars have achieved notable advancements in IR theory, their respective theories unfortunately lack strong internal connections between them. A systematic review of citation patterns in major academic journals reveals that Chinese scholars do not cite or critique each other’s work with the same frequency or rigor as American scholars do. Instead, their scholarship engages more extensively with foreign academic literature than with the domestic one.

To enhance the interconnectedness of newly generated knowledge by Chinese scholars, Chinese academia needs to give more attention to domestic scholarly achievements and engage in rigorous mutual critique. Constructive peer-to-peer criticism plays an indispensable role in both generating novel knowledge and fostering a cohesive academic system. By interrogating the validity of peer assumptions, theoretical logic, empirical datasets, and selected case studies, scholars can deepen their collective insights across multiple intellectual layers. Through mutual critiques and sustained debates, separate threads of research will form a cohesive knowledge system.

III. Independent Research

Independent research constitutes the primary vehicle for knowledge production. To successfully generate original insights, a scholar must possess several foundational competencies: specialized disciplinary knowledge, mastery over appropriate research methods, keen empirical observation, and critical independent thinking. Among these prerequisites, independent thinking is unequivocally the decisive factor. Scholars deficient in this cognitive capacity face severe constraints in their ability to create new knowledge in their academic field.

In regards to IR theoretical studies, the generation of novel insights requires scholars to exercise analytical autonomy across three dimensions: ontology, epistemology, and methodology. Independent knowledge production is based on both the scholarly capacity and the institutional right to make autonomous academic choices. Here, independent capacity denotes possessing the requisite specialized expertise to innovate, whereas independent right refers to autonomy for determine the objective, inquiries, and research methods. Both of the two factors exert influence on the viability of original knowledge production.

At the ontological level, the agent-structure debate remains a long-standing issue of IR theoretical discourse. A core component of this debate addresses whether the primary actors within the international system are institutional states or individual decision-makers. Theoretical architects must explicitly designate which entity serves as the primary unit of analysis.

While individual decision-makers are human beings, states are institutional organizations. This distinction does not only concern the levels of analysis, but it fundamentally concerns whether an international actor is conceptualized as a sentient or non-sentient entity. Human beings are living agents endowed with independent consciousness, whereas states are non-living bodies lacking an autonomous mind. IR paradigms that prioritize individual decision-makers naturally account for the role of human agency, cognitive processing, and purposeful intent in international politics. Conversely, paradigms that treat states as international actors inevitably view state behavior as a mechanical and passive response to the constraints of the material or social environment.

Historically, ancient political thinkers across China, India, and Europe consistently identified rulers and chancellors, rather than institutional states, as interstate actors. Modern IR works also present a significant portion of analysis attributing international phenomena at macro-level to individual policymakers. For instance, causal analyses of World War II invariably center on Adolf Hitler; the institutional architecture of the United Nations system is largely viewed as the product of Franklin Roosevelt’s strategic vision; the onset of the Cold War is traditionally demarcated by Winston Churchill’s “Iron Curtain” speech; and evaluations of the Cold War’s resolution must account for Mikhail Gorbachev’s reform policy. Similarly, any serious analysis of the current counter-globalization trend must address the policy adopted Donald Trump.

Consequently, IR scholars face an inescapable ontological choice: determining whether changes at international system level are driven by state institutions or by decision-makers. Theoretical development is impossible without an explicit commitment to one of these positions. Even analysis of the current war against Iran has to answer the question it was initiated by the United States, a nation state, or by Trump, an individual policy maker? Historical evidence indicates that throughout the post-Cold War era, the Clinton, George W. Bush, Obama, and Biden administrations uniformly pursued diplomatic negotiations in dealing with the Iranian nuclear issue. Trump stood out as the sole American national leader choosing war against Iran.

At the epistemological level, IR scholars must choose among monist, dualist, or multivariate approach of explanation. Monism attributes international transformations to a single independent variable, such as ideas vs material forces, subjective vs objective factors, internal vs external causes, or decision-makers vs the environment they face with. Dualism integrates two primary variables, arguing that they operate interactively and none of them plays decisive role unconditionally. Multivariate approach posits that international phenomena including systemic changes result from interaction between several variables. This approach regards each factor as a necessary condition, while their alignment brings about the sufficient condition for international continuity or change.

Given that all international phenomena are produced by a multitude of variables, univariate approaches inevitably sacrifice empirical accuracy. Although multivariate explanations are close to the objective reality, they suffer from analytical diffusion and are unable to identify the primary driver of international changes. Therefore, dualist explanations strike a pragmatic balance between these two approaches, sacrificing a degree of descriptive authenticity for a deeper, parsimonious conceptual clarity. Because each approach offers distinct epistemic advantages, it requires both the intellectual competence and academic freedom for scholars to decide which of three approaches should be used in their specific research.

At the methodological level, a diverse array of analytical tools is available, such as induction vs deduction, formal vs dialectical logic, and positivist vs speculative methods. Research methods are essentially instruments, and a researcher often deploy different tools to address distinct sub-questions within his research project. In most cases, researchers have the right to choose their methods, yet they may lack the knowledge required to use scientific methods effectively. Scholars unable to operate scientific methods have less chances to produce new knowledge than those who master sophisticated methods of research.

From the perspective of methodology, the efforts of constructing an independent IR knowledge system should focus on improving scholars’ mastery over advanced research methods. For example, if we agree that Chinese experts have successfully established an independent knowledge system of nuclear weapons technology, we have to admitted that that achievement rests entirely on the sophisticate scientific methods mastered by the scientists, engineers, and technicians involved in that program. By extension, Chinese IR scholars must attain a comparable mastery over specialized research methods if they want to successfully construct an independent IR knowledge system.

IV. Conclusion

Since “independent knowledge system” is composed of “independence,” “knowledge” and “systems,” this essay has analyzed the structural relationships among the three components. The core argument advanced here is that “independence” represents merely an aspirational orientation for scholarly effort, whereas the production of specific knowledge is the substance of an independent knowledge system. Therefore, if Chinese scholars decide to realize this objective, they need to focus their attention on substantive knowledge creation. In regarding the goal of developing an independent Chinese IR academic system, IR scholars should strategically consider pivoting toward the decision-maker paradigm from the structuralist paradigm.

The arguments presented in this essay are fully open to peer critique and empirical verification. Beyond clarifying the conceptual boundaries of academic independence, the author hopes to revitalize enthusiasm within the Chinese IR community for genuine, high-quality theoretical innovation. Should these arguments fail to get immediate consensus, this essay will be still helpful to the construction of independent IR knowledge systems if it provides a different view from AI-style arguments on this issue.

Yan Xuetong's criticism & suggestions on China's international relations studies

Yan Xuetong in 2015: Generalization of Diplomatic Concepts Harms the World's Understanding of China