Yan Xuetong on China–U.S. talks, Ukraine, and international order without global leadership

Leading IR scholar at Tsinghua says deal or no deal depends on the U.S. initiative.

On June 3, Yan Xuetong 阎学通, Honorary Dean of the Institute of International Relations at Tsinghua University, gave an interview with The Paper 澎湃新闻, a leading digital news outlet in Shanghai. He recapped his recent trips to Europe, shared his outlook on a potential China-U.S. agreement, discussed the prospects of U.S. involvement in Ukraine, and offered his perspective on the emerging international leadership system.

The renowned international relations scholar also runs the annual World Peace Forum at Tsinghua University, which will take place again this year on July 2-4. At a press briefing on June 26 morning in Beijing, Yan will deliver a keynote lecture titled "International Order without Global Leadership."

Note that this interview was conducted before the most recent phone call between Xi Jinping and Donald Trump on June 5. The transcript of the interview was published on The Paper on June 6.

专访阎学通：建立新型国际领导体系已在讨论中

Interview with Yan Xuetong: The Discussion on Establishing a New International Leadership System is Already Underway

Is a “bigger” China–U.S. deal possible?

The Paper: Recently, there have been signs of a temporary easing in China–U.S. economic and trade tensions. The U.S. has suspended 20% of its previously imposed "reciprocal" tariffs for 90 days. In your view, what facts or interests underlie this consensus between China and the United States?

Yan Xuetong: Whether China and the United States can reach a consensus largely depends on U.S. initiative. After the U.S. imposed a 145% tariff on Chinese goods, bilateral trade effectively ground to a halt. Had the U.S. persisted with this so-called “reciprocal” tariff policy, American retailers would soon have faced widespread shortages. The prospect of supply disruptions sparked panic, as shortages were expected to drive up prices sharply. Under mounting pressure, the U.S. government swiftly agreed—of its own accord—to reduce the tariff from 145% to 30%. China has been steadfast in implementing countermeasures, which exerted decisive pressure on the U.S. and prompted the Trump administration to proactively lower tariffs, ultimately leading to a negotiated settlement.

The Paper: Is it possible for China and the United States to reach a “bigger” deal?

Yan Xuetong: Even though U.S. tariffs on Chinese goods have been reduced to 30%, they continue to have a significant impact on bilateral trade. Certain Chinese products remain excluded from the U.S. market due to high tariffs, placing segments of the U.S. industry at risk of disruption. This has generated both economic and industrial pressure on the U.S. government, spurring an urgent push to resume negotiations with China. Whether the two heads of state will hold the much-anticipated phone call—as suggested by the U.S.—in the coming days remains uncertain. What is clear, however, is Washington’s eagerness for dialogue, to the point of impatience, reflecting the intensity of the pressure it now faces. Should Trump lift all tariffs on Chinese goods, the two countries would undoubtedly be positioned to strike a landmark agreement.

As for what kind of agreement may be reached, the key lies in how much the United States is willing to roll back the additional tariffs it has imposed on China. If Washington can reduce tariffs to the level they were at when Trump first took office in 2017, I believe it is probable that China and the United States could reach a significant agreement. Therefore, the content and scope of any deal will largely depend on the extent to which the U.S. is willing to scale back its additional tariffs.

“Academic decoupling” as a tool of U.S. tech sanctions on China

The Paper: At the same time, U.S. technological containment efforts and China’s countermeasures continue. With the rapid advancement of technologies such as artificial intelligence, competition between China and the United States in emerging tech sectors has grown increasingly intense. You have repeatedly emphasised that “technology lies at the heart of China-U.S. competition.” In your view, how will the differing dynamics of trade and technology competition shape the future framework of China-U.S. competition?

Yan Xuetong: Daily life and industrial production in the United States remain heavily reliant on Chinese exports. Consequently, the U.S. government cannot realistically pursue full-scale decoupling from the Chinese economy. Washington’s recent urgency to reopen negotiations reflects its growing recognition that the earlier ambition of completely severing economic ties with China has prohibitively high stakes in practice.

In the realm of technology, regardless of the degree of pressure, the Trump administration appears unlikely to alter its current policy of technological decoupling. Unlike trade decoupling, which involves the redistribution of interests, technological decoupling concerns the balance of power between China and the United States. From this perspective, the Trump administration may further intensify its technological decoupling efforts to slow the narrowing of the technological gap between the two countries.

Today’s great-power competition is unfolding in the digital era, with the focus shifting to innovation in digital technology rather than ideological competition. The U.S. government has increasingly recognised that ideological intervention yields little practical value and does not substantively enhance its technological competitiveness. This underscores the fact that technological innovation is the central arena of China-U.S. competition.

What the United States fears most is a shift in the relative balance of power. The extent to which the technological gap narrows between the two nations plays a decisive role in shaping that gap in comprehensive national strength. The smaller the technological gap, the smaller the disparity in overall national power. Therefore, I anticipate that the Trump administration will maintain its current course and continue implementing measures aimed at curbing China’s technological advancement.

The Paper: As you have mentioned, technological innovation lies at the core of China-U.S. competition, and talent is the essential driver of innovation. Recently, following its decision to bar Harvard University from admitting international students, the Trump administration moved to revoke visas for Chinese students, including those “with connections to the Chinese Communist Party or studying in critical fields.” As both an educator and a scholar of international relations, how do you interpret the underlying rationale behind this academic decoupling policy? From the broader perspective of China-U.S. relations, do you see a coherent logic connecting this measure to Washington’s broader strategies in trade, technology, and other domains?

Yan Xuetong: The United States has imposed some of these policies exclusively on Chinese students, rather than on students from Europe, Japan, or Russia. The core motivation lies in Washington’s concern over the narrowing technological gap between China and the U.S. From the American perspective, China’s scientific and technological advancement is, to some extent, attributed to Chinese students acquiring technological knowledge in the United States and subsequently contributing to China’s innovation upon their return. Thus, limiting Chinese students’ access to the U.S. and their subsequent return to China directly serves the U.S. goal of containing China’s technological advancement. The central focus of the U.S. government’s current restrictions on Chinese students is to prevent the narrowing of the technological gap between China and the U.S., which aligns with previous policies designed to hinder China’s technological progress.

This measure is also, to a certain extent, related to U.S. trade policy. The U.S. restriction on high-tech exports to China stems from considerations in the technological realm, whereas the imposition of tariffs on Chinese imports is more based on calculations of economic interests. This is the key difference between the two.

Europe is preparing to take independent leadership in the Russia–Ukraine conflict

The Paper: We noted that you visited several European countries in May. In Brussels, during your meeting with China’s Ambassador to the EU, Mr. Cai Run, you mentioned that “Donald Trump’s re-election as U.S. President presents a strategic opportunity for improving China-EU relations.” Do you believe this assessment is being validated given the EU’s recent adjustments in its trade and technology policies? Moreover, what potential impact might Europe’s stance of not being “a vassal of the United States” have on China–EU cooperation and the reshaping of the European security order?

Yan Xuetong: During my visit to Europe, two points emerged with particular clarity in my conversations with some decision-makers. First, many believe that the traditional foundations of the transatlantic partnership between the United States and Europe have either eroded away or significantly weakened. European countries have realized they can no longer rely entirely on the United States for strategic security guarantees. As a result, they have begun making substantial adjustments—specifically, a move toward strategic autonomy in both security and military affairs and economic and technological domains.

A notable shift is also taking place within Europe: since the end of World War II, there has been a long-standing effort to prevent Germany from becoming too powerful. However, many European countries hope to see a stronger Germany that can serve as a pillar of security for the continent. This transformation is fundamentally rooted in weakening Europe’s strategic dependence on the United States.

It is precisely because most European decision-makers now recognise the necessity of strategic autonomy that they see clearly the importance of enhancing cooperation with China. While China and Europe may differ on issues such as Ukraine, there remains considerable room for cooperation in other areas. Today, discussions between China and European countries encompass not only bilateral ties but global issues—for instance, both sides have voiced support for upholding the principles of free trade. This kind of cooperation extends beyond bilateral concerns and carries global significance. Taken together, I believe there is considerable potential for China–Europe cooperation in the future.

The Paper: On June 2, the Russian and Ukrainian delegations held a second round of direct talks in Turkey. On the same day, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan proposed a summit involving the leaders of Russia, Ukraine, and the United States. How do you view Trump’s actual influence in the Russia–Ukraine peace process? Do you think Trump will adopt new mediation approaches, or will he choose to withdraw altogether?

Yan Xuetong: Trump’s claim that he could end the Ukraine crisis in a short period not only overestimates the role the United States can play but also reflects a misperception among American decision-makers regarding the causes of the conflict. The U.S. once believed it could determine both the onset and the resolution of the conflict, but the reality is that the conflict could have broken out regardless of U.S. involvement, and its resolution is also not subject to U.S. control. This explains why Trump eventually stated that the end of the Ukraine crisis requires direct negotiations between Russia and Ukraine—the United States has come to realise that its influence throughout the Russia–Ukraine conflict is much smaller than it initially assumed.

European countries have already begun preparing for the possibility that the United States may completely halt its military assistance to Ukraine. Even if the U.S. were to withdraw entirely, Europe intends to continue its support for Ukraine. This indirectly affirms that U.S. involvement has a limited impact on the Ukraine crisis and underscores that Europe’s strategic autonomy process is already underway—Europe is preparing to take independent leadership in managing the conflict.

At the same time, Trump’s enthusiasm for mediating the Ukraine situation has noticeably waned compared to when he first assumed office, and this downward trend is likely to persist until he loses interest altogether. Trump fully understands that the Ukraine issue is unlikely to be resolved according to his expectations, and even if it is, the credit may not be attributed to the United States or to himself personally. With little prospect of achieving any significant accomplishments for the United States, Trump’s motivation to remain actively engaged in mediation will continue to decline. Meanwhile, the U.S. government has also recognised that ongoing involvement is unlikely to enhance the current administration’s reputation or produce substantial benefits, which further reduces America’s willingness to commit resources to the Ukraine issue.

The Paper: If Trump were to completely withdraw due to an inability to profit from the Ukraine peace process, would this reflect isolationism? Or is it a reflection of his mindset as a businessman?

Yan Xuetong: Regarding Trump’s behaviour, I do not consider it a manifestation of traditional isolationism. According to moral realism, there are four types of international leadership: humane authority, hegemony, tyranny, and anemocracy. Anemocratic leadership places an absolute priority on personal interests over national interests.

For Trump, the primary motivation for ending the Ukraine crisis does not lie in resolving the conflict itself, but in the possibility of “winning the Nobel Peace Prize.” He is enthusiastic only if he believes the prize is within reach; otherwise, his interest wanes. Once he senses that the international community views U.S. involvement as having limited influence on the outcome of the crisis, his motivation to remain engaged will sharply decline.

It is a common misconception to attribute Trump’s governing style to his background as a businessman. Including Trump, six U.S. presidents have had business experience, yet the previous five were all distinct from him. Trump seeks a legacy beyond economics; his goal is to become the “greatest president” in U.S. history and secure his place in the history books.

In fact, whether in China, the United States, or other countries, two major misconceptions distort people’s understanding of international relations. The first is economic determinism, which asserts that all actions are driven by money and that behaviour must ultimately serve economic interests, dismissing the existence of non-economic motives. The second is the conspiracy theory, which tends to attribute various events to hidden conspiracies. In reality, the drivers of international relations are neither purely conspiratorial logic nor solely economic interests.

A new type of international leadership system is needed amid the deglobalisation trend

The Paper: At the Winter Sessions of the World Peace Forum held this January, you stated that “the world will head towards more confrontation on the basis of deglobalisation.” Now that 2025 is already halfway through and more than one hundred days have passed since Trump’s return to office, do you have any updated observations regarding that assessment?

Yan Xuetong: At the press conference of the 2024 World Peace Forum, I said that it was likely the Russia-Ukraine conflict would remain unresolved by the time the 2025 Forum takes place. During the 2024 Forum, many believed that if Trump were to win the election, the Ukraine crisis would quickly come to a resolution. However, I regarded that scenario as highly unlikely, as there was little practical basis to expect the Russia-Ukraine conflict to end within a year. Now, with less than a month to go before the 2025 World Peace Forum, the prospect of the conflict coming to an end remains extremely slim.

In fact, the prolonged nature of both the Russia-Ukraine conflict and the Gaza issue reflects the broader trend of deglobalisation. When people discuss deglobalisation, they often focus solely on the economic dimension—such as economic decoupling, technological blockades, and trade wars—elements that fall under the category of economic deglobalisation. However, globalisation also extends to the political sphere, namely, political globalisation.

The ongoing regional conflicts and wars, particularly the blatant disregard for human rights in Gaza, are clear manifestations of political deglobalisation. It is evident that the United States’ support for Benjamin Netanyahu’s military actions in Gaza has significantly accelerated the trend of political deglobalisation. This is consistent with what I stated at the beginning of this year: that deglobalisation would give rise to more conflicts. The reality now confirms that deglobalisation has not only led to heightened economic frictions and disputes, but has also generated increased political and security conflicts.

The Paper: In your 2018 interview with The Paper, you mentioned the theory of moral realism. You noted that when the types of leadership differ between a dominant state and a rising state, such a divergence could have a decisive impact on reshaping the international landscape, the global order, the centre of world affairs, and even the international system as a whole. In light of recent changes in the international situation, do you believe that the disorder in the current international order will continue to intensify in the future?

Yan Xuetong: The international order has shifted from globalisation to deglobalisation. This transformation signifies a marked increase in the disorder of the international system and suggests that global affairs will become more turbulent. Against this backdrop, the mode of great power competition has also shifted—from competition under globalisation to competition under deglobalisation.

During the era of globalisation, great powers competed in terms of their ability to integrate into the international system, seeking to strengthen themselves by gaining advantageous positions in the process of globalisation. In contrast, in the era of deglobalisation, the core of great power competition lies in how to enhance national strength amid the tide of deglobalisation. Therefore, the strategies adopted by major powers under these two environments—globalisation and deglobalisation—differ drastically.

In the context of globalisation, major powers tended to compete through integration and cooperation, striving to achieve faster development and greater gains through collaborative efforts, thereby enhancing their national strength. This, in essence, was a competition strategy focused on “absolute gain.” However, with the trend of deglobalisation, major powers are now placing greater emphasis on self-strengthening and self-reliance. Their competitive strategies have shifted toward enhancing their relative advantage by restricting the development of rivals. Even if their own growth slows, they aim to ensure that their competitors develop at an even slower pace—a strategy that focuses on “relative gain.”

The change in the competitive environment necessitates an adjustment in the strategies of major powers. This shift does not represent a change in the realm of competition, but rather a necessary adaptation driven by transformations in the international environment.

The Paper: What new perspectives does moral realism provide for understanding the current international trend of deglobalisation?

Yan Xuetong: To understand the current trend of deglobalisation from the perspective of moral realism, the first step is to establish a new type of international leadership model, one that is distinct from the U.S.-led hegemonic leadership. To this end, moral realism advocates the establishment of a “humane authority.”

During my recent visit to Europe, I have already heard some European decision-makers raise the question of whether Europe and China can cooperate to provide a new form of collective leadership to promote the restoration and further development of globalisation.

I believe that the insight provided by moral realism is this: if the world is to return to the path of globalisation, it is neither feasible to simply restore the liberal order nor to continue down the current path of populism. Both models are unlikely to be effective. Only by establishing a new type of international leadership system can this be achieved. At present, there is no definitive conclusion on whether China-Europe cooperation to build such a new leadership model is feasible, but related discussions are underway. By trying to offer new international leadership through China-Europe cooperation, there is hope to steer the international community toward a positive and constructive direction.

How to make the world a little more peaceful and how to move toward the restoration of economic growth

The Paper: With the new session of the World Peace Forum about to convene, could you please share some information about the theme of this year’s forum? You visited several European countries, including Belgium, France, and Italy, in May, and also travelled to Kazakhstan in April. Have these series of visits and exchanges played a role in shaping your thinking on the forum’s theme and the setting of relevant topics? What unique value do you believe such “on-the-ground visits” have in enhancing the forum agenda’s practical relevance and its capability of building international consensus?

Yan Xuetong: The work for the World Peace Forum is collectively discussed and jointly formulated by its Secretariat. Based on my recent visits to Europe, the international community has entered a new historical phase, with various parties engaging in discussions on how to respond to deglobalisation. These discussions focus on rebuilding the international order, reducing the risks of war and conflict, and promoting sustainable economic development. Therefore, the theme of this year’s World Peace Forum will centre on “peace” and “prosperity.”

It is precisely because the world is not peaceful that the global economy faces the risk of a widespread recession. Predictions from international organisations suggest that global economic growth in 2025 will be weaker than in 2024. If economic growth continues to decline in 2026 and 2027, the consequences will be concerning. Therefore, this year’s forum will explore how to make the world a little more peaceful and how to move toward the restoration of economic growth.

During academic exchanges in Europe, what impressed me most was that the view emphasised by moral realism—that leadership plays a decisive role—has attracted attention in Europe. With Trump’s clear declaration that the U.S. will no longer provide global leadership, the international community is now facing a leadership vacuum. The focus has shifted toward how to establish regional leadership mechanisms in the absence of global leadership—regional governance must not fall into a void due to the lack of global leadership. Currently, Europe has already begun discussions on constructing regional peace frameworks and the leadership forces required for the region’s future development.

Similarly, during my visit to Kazakhstan, I observed that Central Asian countries are also discussing regional security issues. The four-day conflict between India and Pakistan exposed the limitations of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation’s capacity to maintain regional peace, prompting regional states to consider whether it is necessary to reconstruct a peace mechanism in Central Asia. At the core of establishing a new security mechanism lies the question of who will provide the leadership to drive its formation.

Overall, my impression is that, at least in Europe, an increasing number of countries have begun to reconsider the need for regional governance, both for new leadership and the establishment of new security frameworks.

The Paper: Does this also mean that reform has become a necessary path for states to enhance their own strength under the current international situation?

Yan Xuetong: Any form of international leadership, whether in regional or global affairs, must be predicated on domestic practice. Only by successfully implementing and validating an idea within one’s own country can a state establish a foundation to advocate this leadership model internationally, thereby gaining recognition and acceptance from the international community.

Europe is currently engaged in similar discussions. Confronted with a clear lag behind China and the United States in digital technology, Europe is exploring how to build an independent digital technology system. This is seen as a key component of Europe’s strategic autonomy. The prevailing view in Europe is that, without advancing internal reforms and establishing an independent digital technology system, Europe will be forced to align with one of the two major technological ecosystems—China’s or the United States’—and that such an alignment would be contrary to Europe’s strategic interests. However, whether Europe can successfully develop an autonomous technological system through internal reform remains to be seen, depending on the progress and effectiveness of its reforms.

Yan Xuetong: The World is in Reverse