Zheng Yongnian calls for mainland's unilateral opening-up to Taiwan after Ching-te Lai's inauguration speech

The influential public intellectual also calls on Beijing to strive for peaceful unification, espect Taiwan residents' public opinion, and explore new forms of communication with Lai's administration.

William Ching-te Lai was inaugurated as the new leader of Taiwan on Monday, May 20, and gave an inaugural speech on the same day.

The Chinese mainland has responded by saying Lai sent "a dangerous signal" of seeking "Taiwan independence" and making provocations to undermine cross-Strait peace and stability. Chen Binhua, a spokesperson for the State Council Taiwan Affairs Office, described Lai's speech as one that stubbornly followed the "Taiwan independence" stance, wantonly advocated separatism, incited cross-Strait confrontation and sought independence by relying on foreign support and by force.

Professor Zheng Yongnian, an influential public intellectual and political scientist in the mainland, has weighed in rapidly via his institute’s WeChat blog. Zheng says the mainland must maintain strategic composure and make rational judgments, striving for a plan for peaceful unification.

“Even if there is only a one in ten thousand chance of peaceful unification, we must strive for it,” Zheng says in the blog, “resolving the Taiwan issue does not mean, as "Taiwan independence" advocates, the West, or some populists claim, that military means are the only option.”

He interprets the attitude of the Taiwanese people, based on Taiwan’s National Chengchi University’s annual public opinion poll, as although they do not seek immediate unification, they also do not wish for independence. Instead, they prefer to maintain the status quo, preserve peace, and avoid conflict. “This attitude deserves our understanding and respect,” he stressed.

Sticking with his long-advocated advice for Beijing to push forward unilateral opening-up over a wide range of subjects, Zheng calls for enabling Taiwanese residents to study, work, settle, or travel on the mainland as they wish.

He also boldly calls for Beijing to explore restoring the "1992 Consensus" in some form, and then discusses how to resume communication with Lai’s administration.

Zheng is X.Q. Deng Presidential Chair Professor, the Founding Director of the Advanced Institute of The Institute for International Affairs, the Chinese University of Hong Kong, Shenzhen. He served as the former Director of the East Asian Institute, National University of Singapore (2008-2019), and the former Research Director and Professor of the China Policy Institute, University of Nottingham (2005-2008).

Below is a translation of the blog.

In his inaugural address on May 20, 2024, Taiwan's leader Lai Ching-te said, "There is already a strong international consensus, that peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait are indispensable to global security and prosperity." He also declared his commitment to promoting Taiwan's democracy, peace, and prosperity. Lai emphasized developing five key trusted industries, including AI and semiconductors, supporting small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), and fostering inclusive growth, pledging to take responsibility and actively contribute to the world. Regarding cross-strait relations, Lai Ching-te proposed a policy stance of "neither yield nor provoke, and maintain the status quo.”

Part I

Although Lai Ching-te largely continues the cross-strait policy framework of Tsai Ing-wen, he shows intentions to surpass her in many respects. In his "5.20" speech, he mentioned "Taiwan" nearly 80 times, attempting to equate Taiwan with the mainland and emphasize the existence of the so-called "Republic of China." This rhetoric straddles between "Two Chinas" and "One China, One Taiwan." As a core figure of the "Taiwan independence" movement, his speech continues to create cross-strait tensions, increasing the risks of "Taiwan independence." Despite Tsai Ing-wen's distancing from the "1992 Consensus," Lai Ching-te is moving even further along this path. We must remain clear-headed about this, as the risk of "Taiwan independence" will remain high in the next four years.

From both domestic and international perspectives, four factors are accelerating the "Taiwan independence" trend:

1. Domestic Political Forces: Despite Lai Ching-te receiving only about 40% of the vote, he still dominates the administration, capable of manipulating public opinion to push for "Taiwan independence." Lai's deputy has closer ties with the U.S., aiming to integrate Taiwan further with the U.S. Considering their leadership is mainly from local factions, their inclination towards "Taiwan independence" is evident.

2. Misjudgments within the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP): The DPP naively believes that despite not recognizing the "1992 Consensus" for years, Taiwan has survived due to support from the U.S. and Japan deterring unification efforts by the mainland. They think with the support of these countries, they can arm Taiwan to the teeth to resist and deter the mainland. They also believe the mainland lacks the ability to resolve the Taiwan question. As Lai's administration strengthens ties with the U.S. and Japan, their illusions of "Taiwan independence" will not only persist but also intensify.

3. Extremist Anti-China Stance in the U.S.: The U.S. is conducting a cognitive war, shaping perceptions of China externally. The administrations in the U.S. and Japan believe the mainland is accelerating its efforts for military unification. Since the Trump administration, the U.S. has strengthened relations with Taiwan, using so-called "balancing" strategies to counteract the mainland's influence in the Taiwan Strait. The U.S. seeks to launch a cognitive war against China from geopolitical, economic, and ideological angles. They fear losing the first island chain if Taiwan unifies with the mainland, especially concerning Japan. They also worry about the mainland dominating global semiconductor production if it acquires Taiwan's technology, given Taiwan’s current domination in semiconductor production globally. The U.S. also aims to portray the Taiwan region as a "democratic sanctuary," creating the perception that global democracy will suffer if Taiwan is unified. This bolsters the determination of "Taiwan independence" advocates and prepares for potential military conflicts. The U.S. portrays a "Global East" narrative, intensifying the democracy versus autocracy struggle, shaping the narrative that China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran forming an “axis of evil” and deepening misjudgments in Taiwan and Japan about China.

4. Populism: Internally in the Chinese mainland, some populist voices suggest that a strong military force can resolve the Taiwan issue once and for all. However, we must remember that Taiwanese people are also Chinese, and we cannot ignore their feelings. Promoting war is akin to the mentality of "Taiwan independence" advocates and the warmongering U.S.

The mainland must maintain strategic composure and make rational judgments, striving for a plan for peaceful unification.

Objectively, time is on our side. The political forces within Taiwan are highly fragmented and not solely dominated by the DPP. Lai Ching-te's 40% vote share does not grant him overwhelming control. Unlike the older generation viewing the mainland ideologically, Taiwan's younger generation (Generation Z) sees a prosperous China while Taiwan's development fails to meet their personal aspirations.

Most Taiwanese do not want Taiwan to become another Ukraine and do not believe the U.S. would genuinely intervene in a Taiwan Strait conflict. It is hard to imagine the U.S. would "save" Taiwan militarily against the world's second-largest economy.

We must see that despite the U.S. provocations, it does everything to avoid direct military intervention. The Biden administration's "guardrail" policy reflects this intent. The U.S.’s appeal to allies has tanked. It failed to open markets to its allies post-TPP withdrawal. The IPEF constructed by the Biden administration is nominal, providing no substantial benefits to allies while the U.S. continues to exploit them. China's rise differs fundamentally from the Soviet Union's. China does not seek external expansion and is willing to negotiate to resolve disputes in areas like the South China Sea, having proposed a Code of Conduct. The U.S. provokes in the Taiwan Strait to portray a "China threat" and exert psychological pressure on China, rather than genuinely preparing for war.

To achieve the historic task of national unification, we must take the initiative and remain steadfast. We must not underestimate the rise of "Taiwan independence" forces, nor be swayed by the U.S.'s cognitive war. Addressing internal issues, we should focus on the real needs of the majority of Taiwanese, particularly their developmental interests. While we do not renounce the use of force for unification, it is not the only option. Even if there is only a one in ten thousand chance of peaceful unification, we must strive for it.

Resolving the Taiwan issue lies within our capabilities. First, accelerate the modernization of national defense, as exemplified by the sea trial of the Fujian aircraft carrier. We will not renounce the use of force to resolve the Taiwan issue; if Taiwan moves towards independence, force will be inevitable. However, resolving the Taiwan issue does not mean, as "Taiwan independence" advocates, the West, or some populists claim, that military means are the only option. We should still regard our compatriots in Taiwan as fellow Chinese.

Since 1994, Taiwan's National Chengchi University has annually polled public opinion on unification vs. independence, using six categories to gauge views on Taiwan's future: immediate unification, immediate independence, maintaining the status quo leaning towards unification, maintaining the status quo then deciding, permanently maintaining the status quo, and maintaining the status quo leaning towards independence. "Maintain the status quo then decide" has usually been the majority view, but "permanently maintaining the status quo" has grown, from 9.8% thirty years ago to 33.2% now, surpassing "maintaining the status quo then deciding" (27.9%), making it the highest proportion temporarily.

We can interpret the attitude of the Taiwanese people as follows: although they do not seek immediate unification, they also do not wish for independence. Instead, they prefer to maintain the status quo, preserve peace, and avoid conflict. This attitude deserves our understanding and respect. In recent years, the mainland has demonstrated economic resilience in the face of COVID-19 and the Russia-Ukraine conflict. The Chinese path to modernization provides a solid material foundation for unification. Development remains paramount for the people.

Secondly, under the one-China principle, we should promote non-governmental cross-strait exchanges with an open stance to create favorable social conditions for eventual unification. We can explore new forms of communication with the "Taiwan authorities." We should also learn to employ more flexible strategies, firmly defending national sovereignty while using a "sweeter carrot" approach to win the hearts of the Taiwanese people. For instance, we could implement unilateral opening-up policies in areas such as trade and tourism, allowing the benefits of these policies to reach a broad range of Taiwanese citizens, thereby isolating and combating "Taiwan independence" forces on the island. At the same time, we must pay close attention to engaging with the younger generation in Taiwan, accelerating grassroots and local exchanges, and earning their trust and support through pragmatic actions.

Part II

Q:

The Jinmen fishing boat incident on February 14 directly affected the opening of mainland tourists to Taiwan, with the mainland initially only allowing travel from Fujian to Matsu Island. In handling cross-strait or diplomatic relations, the mainland tends to first create an overall friendly atmosphere, whereas the West or Taiwan prefers to first push for practical exchanges, believing that breakthroughs in these exchanges can drive improvements in relations. The two sides have different views on the steps to improve relations. For the current stage of cross-strait relations, should we first improve the overall environment or push for practical talks? Should we start with the big picture or the details? From February 14 to May 20, spanning two Valentine's Days, the timeframe also matches the "divorce cooling-off period" stipulated by Chinese law. Despite smooth communication between the mainland and the island's opposition parties, there is a lack of dialogue between the ruling parties on both sides. Facing the DPP's third term in office, how should the mainland cautiously explore the possibility of orderly communication between the ruling parties on both sides?

Zheng Yongnian:

This is an important question. On the one hand, we need to consider that Lai Ching-te and his team still emphasize the so-called "Republic of China." Despite the rhetoric resembling "Two Chinas," there is still a certain recognition of the "Republic of China" on the island. Secondly, Taiwan's main issue remains development. For example, on the eve of May 20, the People's Party held a rally protesting the DPP's eight-year governance failures, accusing Tsai Ing-wen's government of not delivering on its promises. In this context, we can explore restoring the "1992 Consensus" in some form, pushing for a similar framework. Based on this, we can discuss how to resume communication with the "Taiwan authorities."

There is a social foundation for cross-strait exchanges. Ma Ying-jeou has visited, and Hung Hsiu-chu has also visited. Why insist on official channels for communication? If official channels cannot be restored, then civil and non-governmental exchanges can play a very important substitute role.

However, if conditions permit, we should still strive to restore the "1992 Consensus" in some form. The overall approach should be "carrot and stick." First, we need to strengthen defense modernization; second, we should implement unilateral openness. The meaning of unilateral openness is to place no restrictions on exchanges—if Taiwanese residents want to study, work, settle, or travel on the mainland, they can achieve their personal goals smoothly. We should also adopt unilateral openness in areas like tourism. Isn't Ma Ying-jeou's visit to the mainland an example of unilateral openness? This concerns people's livelihoods and is crucial for consolidating the social foundation of cross-strait relations.

Q:

Besides opening tourism, there seem to be no other areas for friendly negotiation in current cross-strait relations, appearing to be at a dead end. Lai Ching-te's May 20 speech also mentioned intentions to resume two-way tourism. Another topic worth discussing is if cross-strait tourism opens, allowing mainland residents to visit Taiwan post-pandemic, will this significantly benefit mutual understanding between the peoples of both sides? The general view is that tourism can promote people-to-people exchanges, which should be beneficial for cross-strait relations. There is an assumption that tourism can enhance mutual understanding across the strait. However, past experiences show that local residents often perceive external tourists negatively, seeing them as occupying local resources and causing traffic congestion. If tourism opens, will it impact cross-strait relations positively or negatively?

Zheng Yongnian:

We can implement a unilateral tourism openness policy towards Taiwan. Unilateral openness means allowing Taiwanese residents to freely study, work, settle, and travel on the mainland. "Taiwan independence" advocates will not proactively come to the mainland, so a unilateral tourism openness policy towards Taiwan is feasible.

Q:

If tourism is mutually opened, mainland residents can better understand the current situation in Taiwan, transforming big topics in the news into people-to-people exchanges between compatriots on both sides. Would this help suppress populist voices and forces on the mainland?

Zheng Yongnian:

Unilateral openness is more conducive to suppressing populism and embracing rational Taiwan policy. Populist forces exist on both sides of the strait. Only unilateral openness can suppress populism. In reality, there is no fundamental difference between mainland and Taiwanese youth. Emphasizing the power of the younger generation is crucial. Some pro-American older generations' views are dominated by Cold War thinking, which offers little hope.

Q:

Lai Ching-te's May 20 speech proposed resuming practical cross-strait tourism exchanges. How should the mainland respond from a policy perspective?

Zheng Yongnian:

This proposal aligns with Lai Ching-te's administration's needs. We should still emphasize unilateral openness. The "reciprocal basis" that Taiwan authorities stress is based on the outdated status quo of Cold War-era cross-strait confrontation. During that time, the Western narrative of "Red China" versus so-called "Free China" created a "Two Chinas" atmosphere. This reciprocity thinking is outdated today. For instance, the cross-strait service trade agreement, which Ma Ying-jeou's administration tried but failed to implement, was a product of reciprocity thinking. When such agreements are politicized by reciprocity thinking, they are easily opposed due to formal bureaucratic procedures. Therefore, unilateral openness is a policy lever we can consider.

Q:

Lai Ching-te's inauguration speech proposed developing "five key trusted industries": semiconductors, AI, military, security and surveillance, and next-generation communications

Zheng Yongnian:

Essentially, these align with the mainland's proposed "new quality productive forces."

Q:

Starting this year, part of TSMC's production capacity will be relocated to the United States. Is this relocation plan feasible?

Zheng Yongnian:

It is not feasible. In the U.S., one transactional viewpoint is "just sell Taiwan to the mainland." Taiwan is not the democratic sanctuary the West portrays. These industrial relocation measures are ways for the U.S. to hollow out Taiwan, regardless of their success. The U.S. does not transfer its best technologies to Taiwan but instead lets Taiwan transfer its best technologies to the U.S. For U.S. hardliners, this is the most beneficial measure while also curbing China's rise. Lai Ching-te's team is essentially selling out Taiwan's interests.

Q:

Recent years have seen a stronger mini-multilateral alliance forming between Japan, the US, and South Korea. The Taiwan authorities are now hoping to join such a partnership, seeking protection from the US.

Zheng Yongnian:

Yes, Taiwan has completely become a contemporary colony of the United States, with no real "sovereignty." Japan and South Korea are similarly dependent on the US.

Q:

Both South Korea's Samsung and Taiwan's TSMC plan to relocate part of their production capacity to the US.

Zheng Yongnian:

Indeed. Previously, Samsung had a significant market share in China. One of the methods of American hegemony is to unconditionally push its allies to comply with its needs, including their industries. Taiwan also has to comply with America's needs, and will ultimately barely survive.

Q:

There were many foreign faces at Lai Ching-te's inauguration ceremony. How should this be viewed?

Zheng Yongnian:

Political forces have been shaping the direction of cross-strait relations according to their own will. This is part of the cognitive war, involving academia, politics, and policy research. We need to consciously explore how to engage in a cognitive war with the U.S. It's not a matter of our capability but our willingness, as the mainland still regards Taiwanese people as compatriots.

Q:

From America's perspective, does the U.S. have the willingness but not the capability to push for war in the Taiwan Strait?

Zheng Yongnian:

Yes. Peaceful "independence" for Taiwan serves America's greatest interests, while peaceful unification serves China's greatest interests. We need to find better ways to protect the interests of the Taiwanese people. The recent provocations by the Philippines in the South China Sea are similar; for China, it is a matter of willingness, not capability.