Zhou Bo on Should the World Fear China? (Book Excerpt)

The retired Senior Colonel of the PLA and prolific opinion leader revisits his op-eds spanning a decade and offers advice for the country and the military.

Mar 29, 2025

Senior Colonel Zhou Bo (retired) started his military service in 1979. He served in different posts in Guangzhou Air Force Regional Command. From 1993 he worked successively as staff officer, Deputy Director General of West Asia and Africa Bureau and then Deputy Director General of General Planning Bureau of the Foreign Affairs Office of the Ministry of National Defense of China, Chinese Defense Attaché to the Republic of Namibia and Director of the Centre for Security Cooperation in the Office for International Military Cooperation, Ministry of National Defense.

Zhou is now a senior fellow of the Center for International Security and Strategy (CISS) at Tsinghua University.

Zhou is an under-graduate of Air Force Engineering College and a postgraduate of St Edmund College of Cambridge University (Mphill in International Relations). He was a visiting fellow to the Land Warfare Studies Centre of the Australian Army in 1999. He has attended various courses at Harvard University, Westminster University, PLA National Defense University, PLA University of Science and Technology for the National Defense, and PLA Army Command College (Shijiazhuang).

Zhou just published Should the World Fear China? at Hurst Publishers, an independent publisher in London. Oxford University Press distributes the book in the Western hemisphere.

You can now pre-order the book on Amazon.

Introduction
1. Managing China-US Relations
2. Living in Amity with Neighbours
3. Safeguarding China's Interests
4. Shouldering China's International Responsibilities
5. The Future of the International Order
Acknowledgements
Index

Reviews

‘China is now shaking the world. What is sorely needed is cold-blooded analysis, which means understanding China’s history and reality. As a retired Senior Colonel in the PLA, Zhou Bo writes as an insider with a deep understanding of the foreign mind, and offers a Chinese perspective shorn of propaganda. An important book for those who are seriously interested in China’s rise and what it means for the world.’ — George Yeo, Singaporean Minister for Foreign Affairs (2004–11)

‘Essential reading for Westerners who want to understand China’s military and strategic aims. Zhou Bo is deeply informed, refreshingly frank and often original and surprising in his analysis. Agree or disagree, this is crucial for anyone who wants to know how a top Chinese thinker sees geopolitics.’ — Rana Mitter, ST Lee Chair in US–Asia Relations, Harvard Kennedy School, and author of China’s Good War: How World War II Is Shaping a New Nationalism

‘Political divisions, rising protectionism, diminished trust, and fears for the future abound. Top among these is the superpower tension between the US and China, ranging from trade war to cold war to hot war, with the EU and the UK facing complex positioning choices. Zhou Bo, an articulate insider, and one of the leading voices of soft Chinese diplomacy in the field of global security and defence policy, presents a timely collection of essays.’ — Pat Cox, President of the European Parliament (2002–4)

‘Zhou Bo offers important insights on topics of major global concern involving China. While we might not always agree with his arguments, it is valuable to have his perspective, and to ponder his advocacy of a China that is confident but humble and loved, rather than feared.’ — Rosemary Foot, Professor Emeritus, Department of Politics and International Relations, University of Oxford

First published in the United Kingdom in 2025 by C. Hurst & Co. (Publishers) Ltd., New Wing, Somerset House, Strand, London, WC2R 1LA

Distributed in the United States, Canada, and Latin America by Oxford University Press, 198 Madison Avenue, New York, NY 10016, United States of America.

Below is an excerpt from the book, authorized by Zhou Bo and Hurst Publishers. All emphasis is mine—Zichen.

INTRODUCTION

The title of the book "Should the World Fear China?" was not my idea. It’s the first question I was asked in an interview with the German newspaper Die Zeit in 2023. I have been unable to forget this question since. For me, it best represents the uncertainty of the West towards China, which has brought twitches of anxiety and even fear.

Today, China wears many hats; it is the largest trading nation; the largest exporter; the largest industrial nation; and the largest economy by purchasing power parity. However, China describes itself as a developing country. This is certainly right in terms of China’s per capita income. But it is also baffling: can a developing country be the largest economy in the world at the same time? And if so, what is the point of making a distinction between developed countries and developing countries?

China’s image depends on where its beholders are standing. For the United States, it is a strategic competitor and “pacing threat”—“the only country with both the intent to reshape the international order and, increasingly, the economic, diplomatic, military, and technological power to do it.” For Europe, it is a “partner for cooperation, an economic competitor and a systemic rival,” a conclusion that seems to tell us more about Europe’s confusion about China than what China really is. For NATO, China is a “decisive enabler” of Russia’s war against Ukraine. But China has a different yet far more positive image in the Global South in which China considers itself a “natural member.” It is not rare to hear people describing China already as a superpower. Some China-centred organisations like the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and BRICS are thriving with expansion.

That is why I have put together 102 of my essays and opinion pieces, written between 2013 and 2024, trying to answer some of the most important questions about China that I believe are still relevant today.

First and foremost, does China really want to reshape the international order, as the US claims? Washington regards the international order after World War II as the “liberal international order.” There is no such order. In my opinion piece, “Why the International Order is Not Falling Apart,” I argued that this is but a Eurocentric view with an apparent air of Western triumphalism. It simplistically takes rules, regimes and institutions such as the IMF, the World Bank and GATT/WTO that are indeed made by the West in the economic field as the international order itself, but these are just parts of the whole. The international order is far more complicated. It should also include different but coexisting religions, cultures, customs, national identities and social systems and above all, civilisations.

Then comes China’s position in the international order. China isn’t a “revisionist power” as the US describes. In the last four decades, no other country than China has benefited more from globalisation, which is rooted in an international system characterised by an open and market-driven world economy. Therefore, it is in China’s own interests to become further integrated with the rest of the world. Of course, China’s growing strength will bring global changes. However, these changes shouldn’t be taken as an erosion of the international order, rather, they could change the world for the better. Take China’s Belt & Road Initiative for example. As it sprawls across continents, it most certainly will spread China’s influence and generate geopolitical implications. Yet it is essentially an economic project that aims at improving the underdeveloped infrastructure across the world.

There is no evidence that the China–Russia partnership has turned the relationship into the most feared alliance in the West. Twenty days before Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022, China and Russia signed a statement proclaiming there were “no limits to Sino-Russian cooperation … no forbidden zones”. I couldn’t understand why such an expression of goodwill for bilateral ties was hyped in the West. As I asked in my op-ed in the Financial Times, if two countries vow to develop their friendship, then how could they place limits on it? Russia is China’s largest neighbour and vice versa. For peaceful coexistence, this relationship must be amicable.

China has almost never voted against or vetoed any of the UN resolutions condemning Russia, but rather only abstained. While the US-led NATO has provided full military support to Ukraine, Beijing has provided no military aid or weapons to Moscow. True, China’s trade with Russia has helped it to skirt Western sanctions, but the trade went on before the war and none of the trading violates international rules or regimes.

Perhaps the best way to describe the relationship is to say they are like two lines in parallel, that is, however close they are, they won’t meet to become an alliance. It is not only that non-alliance allows flexibility, but also because China and Russia’s world views are subtly different even if both talk about a multipolar world order. China is the largest beneficiary of globalisation, which relies on the existing international order; Russia resents that order and considers itself a victim of it. Beijing has at least maintained a plausible relationship with Europe; this appears to be impossible for Moscow now.

Are China and the US destined for war? This should be one of the overriding questions for the twenty-first century. There are two scenarios that might trigger a conflict between the PLA and the US military—the South China Sea and the Taiwan Strait.

Contrary to what most people think, I believe the South China Sea is far more dangerous than the Taiwan Strait. In “War in the Taiwan Strait? It’s the South China Sea, stupid”, I pointed out that a war in the Taiwan Strait between China and the US is very unlikely to be triggered by an accident like we saw in the South China Sea. The Taiwan issue is so flammable, every word from Beijing and Washington would be scrutinised. However, there is no easy way to deconflict in the South China Sea.

American military aircraft regularly conduct close surveillance and reconnaissance in China’s exclusive economic zones. US naval vessels sail through waters off the islands and rocks in the South China Sea over which China claims sovereignty. But an ever-stronger PLA can only become more determined in checking what it believes to be American provocations. Since neither wishes to back down, I assume—and I hope I am wrong—that it is only a matter of time before another deadly collision like the one in 2001 between a Chinese jet fighter and an American spy plane reoccurs.

Although the South China Sea is more dangerous, it is hard to say that a collision at sea or in the air, even deadly, will surely trigger a conflict. The only issue that could drag China and the US into a full-blown conflict is over Taiwan. How likely is that? US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin said at the Shangri-La Dialogue in 2023 and again in 2024 that a conflict with China was neither imminent nor inevitable. Such an assessment is a welcoming denial of the irresponsible remarks made by some American generals and admirals when they predicted when and how mainland China might attack Taiwan.

The conflict in Ukraine also gives people food for thought. If NATO, an alliance of 32 states, hesitates to take on Russia, then what gives the US absolute confidence to fight China far away from its shores with a few half-hearted allies on China’s doorstep? China’s economy is ten times larger than Russia’s while its defence budget is three times bigger. The 2 million-strong PLA is the largest military in the world and the PLA Navy outnumbers the US Navy in ships. The only obvious advantage Russia has over China is its store of nuclear warheads, the biggest in the world. Should China decide to increase its nuclear arsenal, it is only a matter of political decision.

How can war be avoided in the Taiwan Strait? My answer is simple: let China believe peaceful reunification with the island is still possible. So far there is no indication that Beijing has lost confidence or patience. China has never announced a timetable for reunification. It is still talking about peaceful development of cross-strait relations. But provocations from either Taipei or Washington will be checked with more robust responses from the PLA. They will lead to a new, irreversible status quo that favours the mainland. For example, after former US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s Taiwan visit, the PLA conducted four days of live-fire exercises around the island. Now the median line in the Taiwan Strait that was tacitly observed by both sides no longer exists. Chinese fighter jets regularly fly to the other side of the line in different sorties.

For peace to prevail in the Taiwan Strait, as I have written in Foreign Affairs, the United States should reassure China that it has no intention of straying from its professed commitment to the “One China” policy. US leaders have refused to enter into direct conflict with Russia over Ukraine despite the extent of Russian transgression. Equally, they should consider war with China a red line that cannot be crossed.

For China to fulfil its international responsibilities, it should start at home. First and foremost, it needs to overcome its lingering victimhood. Admittedly, victimhood is not confined to the Chinese. In 2016 and 2024, Donald Trump succeeded in making the majority of American voters believe the strongest nation on earth was in “carnage” and he was the man to “Make America Great Again.”

For China, its victimhood over the “century of humiliation” stems from the Opium War in 1840. But the century of humiliation should have ended with the founding of the People’s Republic of China in 1949 when Chairman Mao Zedong declared that “the Chinese people have stood up.” I wrote for the South China Morning Post that, rather than a victim, China today is the envy of the world. China must leave its past behind and embrace its strength. Victimhood is not the foundation for patriotism. It leads to nationalism, populism, and isolationism. This is the last thing China wants.

As for the PLA, I hope its international responsibilities will be confined exclusively to humanitarian operations. So far, all the military operations of the Chinese military overseas, be it peacekeeping, counter-piracy or disaster relief, are invariably humanitarian in nature. This is not accidental; it is a careful choice. These military operations other than war will help war-stricken nations, reduce casualties to a minimum level, but won’t turn China into a warring party.

In the last four and half decades, China has changed a few defence policies, such as not stationing troops abroad, not establishing military bases overseas and not conducting joint exercises with foreign armed forces. However, some still remain, and I hope they will continue to be upheld in the years to come.

Caution in use of force. After the founding of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, China was involved in wars and conflict virtually every decade until the late 1970s when China started to reform and open up. China’s rise in the last four decades is a miracle in human history in that few, if any, major powers have risen so peacefully. It is made possible thanks in no small way to Beijing’s restraint in use of force in spite of serious challenges such as bombs hitting the Chinese embassy in Belgrade, when NATO was bombing Yugoslavia, and the collision of Chinese and American military planes in the South China Sea.
The China–India clash in the Galwan Valley in 2020 is most unfortunate, yet there are still positives. In this deadly brawl with stones, wooden clubs and fists, neither side attempted to shoot at the other. This shows the confidence-building measures made in a litany of agreements have worked to a certain extent. Some people may point out that the Chinese coast guard used water cannons against Filipino ships in 2024. But that is not exactly use of force. It is an effort to deter the Filipinos from violating their promise by carrying building materials to fortify a rusted Filipino warship into a permanent base in the disputed Ren Ai Jiao/Second Thomas Shoal.
For over four decades, China’s military expenditure has been lower than 2% of its GDP, a NATO standard for its member states. Most probably it will remain at this level short of a war. At a time when NATO members are being pushed by the US to spend 2% of their GDP on defence, and some of China’s neighbours like Japan and India have drastically increased their defence budgets, China’s sustainable and predictable defence budget says a lot about China’s self-control and self-confidence. This is important for the stability of the region.
Don’t seek spheres of influence. Many people confuse two things—influence and spheres of influence. I have argued that precisely because China’s influence, especially in the economic field, is already ubiquitous around the world, it doesn’t need spheres of influence that are costly and difficult to maintain.
Don’t seek military alliances.
Adhere to no-first-use of nuclear weapons.

First published in the United Kingdom in 2025 by C. Hurst & Co. (Publishers) Ltd., New Wing, Somerset House, Strand, London, WC2R 1LA

Distributed in the United States, Canada, and Latin America by Oxford University Press, 198 Madison Avenue, New York, NY 10016, United States of America.

The above is an excerpt from the book, authorized by Zhou Bo and Hurst Publishers. All emphasis is mine—Zichen.

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