Chinese report finds broad freedom for military activities in South China Sea
China has not imposed explicit restrictions on foreign military vessels and aircraft activities in waters under its jurisdiction outside its territorial seas and airspace, SCSPI report says.
I am happy to be invited by Hu Bo, Research Professor and Director, Centre for Maritime Strategy Studies, Peking University, to share some excerpts of the Report on the Navigation and Overflight Situation in the South China Sea recently released by the South China Sea Strategic Situation Probing Initiative (SCSPI) which he leads.
The September 26, 2024, report says in its preface (all emphasis is mine)
Apart from provisions concerning marine scientific research and surveys, China has not imposed explicit restrictions on foreign military vessels and aircraft activities in waters under its jurisdiction outside its territorial seas and airspace.
In terms of economic trade, the South China Sea’s openness and freedom are evident: Merchant vessels pass through the South China Sea nearly 500,000 times annually, with around 40% of global trade goods transiting the South China Sea and its surrounding straits and millions of civilian aircraft fly over the South China Sea, making it one of the busiest maritime and aerial passages worldwide.
On the security front, military forces from both regional and external countries conduct over 20,000 ship-days and more than 30,000 aircraft sorties in the South China Sea annually, along with hundreds of large-scale drills and various exercises. Compared to civilian vessel and aircraft activities, the scale of military activities is mainly unknown over the long term. There exists an international misconception that some coastal states of the South China Sea, especially claimant states, unreasonably restrict military activities in the area. In reality, while coastal states generally do not welcome foreign military forces’ activities in their claimed waters, they mainly conduct tracking and surveillance and only resort to measures of a forceful nature in specific areas and circumstances. Overall, countries from both in and outside the region enjoy the freedom to engage in military activities in the South China Sea, as normal under international law.
In recent years, driven by US attempts to “contain China” using maritime disputes, tensions in the South China Sea have escalated. The intensification of certain disputes has attracted significant international attention. However, current frictions mainly exist among some disputing parties, and any relevant disputes have not affected other countries’ navigation and overflight freedoms in the South China Sea. China-US militaries’ interactions and encounters in the area are generally professional and safe. The impact of great power competition on navigation and overflight freedoms in the South China Sea remains manageable. The primary threats to maritime navigation are non-traditional security factors such as geographical obstacles, natural disasters, unbalanced development, piracy, and armed robbery against ships, which have long been overlooked and lack due attention.
Below are some excerpts from the report
Activities of Warships and Military Aircraft
The South China Sea is the most open sea in the world. Countries in and outside the region have surface forces presence of over 20,000 ship-days and around 30,000 sorties of military aircraft in the South China Sea each year, along with hundreds of large-scale drills and thousands of various exercises. Not only are the military activities of coastal countries increasing, but the scale of military activities of extra-regional countries in the South China Sea, particularly the US military, is also significant. Every year, the US Navy maintains approximately 1,600 ship-days of surface vessel presence and an undisclosed number of submarines (combat vessels) in the South China Sea, as well as over 3,000 ship-days of auxiliary vessel activities. Overall, US Air Force, Navy, Marine Corps and Army conduct approximately 8,000 sorties of aircraft annually in the region, including reconnaissance aircraft, transport aircraft, refueling aircraft, fighter jets and bombers.
Incomplete Situation of Warships and Military Aircraft in the South China (2024)
Warship Activities
In 2023, according to incomplete statistics from Mingkun Maritime Domain Awareness System (MK-MDA), more than 400 warships from 16 countries sailed in the South China Sea, with over 20,000 ship-days of surface forces present throughout the year. On average, around 50 warships are active in the South China Sea each day, among which 91 warships from extra-regional countries such as the US, Japan, Australia, South Korea, the UK, France, India and Canada collectively conducted activities totaling 5,030 ship-days in the South China Sea.
Overview of the Presence of Warships from Extra-Regional Countries in the South China Sea in 2023
Military Aircraft Activities
In 2023, nearly 30,000 sorties of military aircraft occurred in the South China Sea, including fighter jets, helicopters, transport aircraft, reconnaissance aircraft, refueling aircraft and bombers, with two-thirds of the activities conducted by coastal states. Among the nearly 10,000 sorties of military aircraft from extra-regional countries, the vast majority were activities of the US military, approximately 7,872 sorties. In contrast, activities from Australia, Japan, South Korea, and India added up to around 1,500 sorties.
Statistics on the Activities of Major Types of US Military Aircraft in the South China Sea in 2023
Professional Interactions and Confrontational Air and Maritime Encounters
In the South China Sea, air, and maritime encounters between military forces of different countries occur frequently, especially between China and the US. Over ten encounters occur daily and thousands annually. The majority of these encounters are professional and safe.
Despite exaggerated interpretations of China’s claims and policies on the South China Sea by politicians and the media in Western countries like the US, they also acknowledge that interactions with the Chinese military are generally safe and professional. For example, the USS Abraham Lincoln’s Skipper, Capt. Amy Bauernschmidt stated in a press release in August 2022, “We were operating in the vicinity [of] Chinese warships at times, mostly … that shadowed our ship.” She further claimed: “It was safe and professional the entire time that we interacted with them. During some flight operations, our aircraft did interact with some of their aircraft, but again it remained safe and professional each and every time we interacted with them."1
Regarding foreign military vessels and aircraft entering China’s jurisdictional sea areas and surrounding sea and airspace, the Chinese military, follows and monitors the situation based on international practice for safety and security reasons. As sailors aboard the Royal Canadian Navy frigate HMCS Montréal, which had operated in the South China Sea, pointed out, if the Chinese military operated near Canadian shores, the RCN would also shadow them.2
Friction between foreign military forces and the Chinese military in the South China Sea primarily involve three specific areas and one type of specific operation, i.e. the following 4 scenarios:
1) When foreign forces approach the Chinese mainland or Hainan Island territorial waters and airspace, the Chinese military responds vigorously, employing actions including interception and pushing outwards;
2) When the US military enters the territorial waters and airspace of Paracel Islands for so-called “freedom of navigation operations”, the People's Liberation Army (PLA) issues warnings and conducts expulsions;
3) When foreign forces enter within 12 nautical miles of Chinese-controlled features in Spratly Islands and Scarborough Shoal, the PLA issues warnings and expulsions ;
4) When foreign forces excessively approach or intrude into PLA military exercises, including live-fire ones.3
Some foreign militaries often complain about being intercepted by Chinese forces, portraying the South China Sea as restricted and unsafe. However, they conveniently avoid discussing essential information such as the specific locations of encounters and the reasons behind such incidents, clearly indicating a biased narrative. If their roles were reversed, any country facing challenges similar to the scenarios above would take decisive measures, with countries like the US responding even more assertively than China has.
Three Specific Areas Where Foreign and Chinese Military Engage in Confrontational Air and Maritime Encounters
Some foreign militaries often complain about being intercepted by Chinese forces, portraying the South China Sea as restricted and unsafe. However, they conveniently avoid discussing essential information such as the specific locations of encounters and the reasons behind such incidents, clearly indicating a biased narrative. If their roles were reversed, any country facing challenges similar to the scenarios above would take decisive measures, with countries like the US responding even more assertively than China has.
Impact of the South China Sea Disputes on Navigation and Overflight
China, Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei, and Chinese Taiwan are involved in disputes over the sovereignty of some or all of the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea. These five countries and six parties, along with Indonesia, have overlapping maritime claims in the South China Sea to varying degrees.
South China Sea Disputes are Overall Manageable and Have Not Spilled Over
The roots of the South China Sea disputes are complex. Despite frequent flare-ups and maritime incidents since the 1990s, the region has generally maintained peace and stability due to the restraint and efforts of the involved parties. Following the signing of the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC) in 2022, parties have handled related issues calmly and rationally according to the DOC’s consensus, refraining from new occupation of uninhabited features and avoiding sharp confrontations in overlapping areas. Also, various dialogue and cooperation schemes are constructed among relevant parties. Bilateral maritime mechanisms such as building confidence measures (BCM) dialogues between China and Vietnam, the Philippines, and potential talks with Malaysia are vital in managing disputes and stabilizing the region.
Given that the features of the Spratly Islands occupied by the various parties in the South China Sea are often located within the same group reefs or lagoon, close proximity and overlapping exist in maritime and aerial domains. Alert or restricted zones have been established within 12 nautical miles surrounding these occupied features, while the restrictions are typically not imposed beyond the 12-nautical-mile scale. Moreover, the main disputed features in Spratly Islands are not situated in major sea lanes in the South China Sea. As a result, intrusion incidents have been frequently reported, but this competition and friction have not affected passing vessels and aircraft. Incidents of crisis occasionally arise due to disparate claims via fishing activities, law enforcement patrols and oil and gas development. However, friction and conflicts mainly occur among the involved parties and have not been reported to impact the passage of the vessels and aircraft from extra-regional countries.
Activities of Law Enforcement and Maritime Rights Protection are not Navigation Issues
The frequently sensationalized claims of “impeding freedom of navigation” and “endangering navigation safety”, in the South China Sea region are, in reality, certain disputing parties and some external countries deliberately interpreting sovereignty disputes over islands and reefs in the area and maritime boundary disputes as navigation issues. For instance, in the South China Sea Arbitration, the Philippines accused China of operating law enforcement vessels in a dangerous manner and leading to “serious collision risks” with Philippine vessels navigating in the vicinity of Scarborough Shoal (Huangyan Island) through intentionally classified China’s maritime rights protection activities as ordinary navigation activities, and requested the arbitral tribunal to judge China’s law enforcement actions as violating relevant navigation rules based on Article 94 of Convention on the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea 1972.4
In the current highly scrutinized China-Philippines friction in the South China Sea, China’s relevant actions are maritime rights protection activities in response to Philippine provocations concerning China’s territorial sovereignty over related features. Whether it is rights protection activities against Philippine government vessels intruding into waters near Scarborough Shoal (Huangyan Island), interception measures taken against Philippine vessels transporting construction materials to the illegally grounded warship to establish a military outpost at Second Thomas Shoal (Ren’ai Jiao), or coercive measures against Philippine Coast Guard vessels attempting to violate China’s sovereignty over Sabina Shoal (Xianbin Jiao), all fall under the nature of sovereignty safeguarding activities. In responding to such provocations, the route controls and other measures taken by China Coast Guard’s vessels do not fall into the realm of regular navigational activities and, therefore, do not apply to collision avoidance rules.
Conclusion
Overall, the freedom of navigation and overflight in the South China Sea are fully guaranteed for both military and civilian vessels and aircraft, and the impact of widely discussed geopolitical factors such as major power competition and maritime disputes is very limited. On the contrary, the influence of some non-traditional security factors is worthy of more attention. For example, the South China Sea is characterized by numerous islands, reefs, and sandbars, as well as scattered shoals and shallow banks, with frequent adverse weather conditions like typhoons, sea fog and tsunamis. Additionally, the unbalanced development of countries and regions surrounding the Sea leads to ununified planning for maritime safety as well as weak capabilities in communication, navigation, and search and rescue. Furthermore, the South China Sea remains a hotspot for piracy and armed robbery cases, especially near the Malacca and Singapore Straits.
The above are just excerpts. Please check the full report if interested.
Gidget Fuentes, “Abraham Lincoln Carrier Strike Group Returns from Indo-Pacific Deployment Highlighted by South China Sea Operations,” USNI, August 11, 2022, https://news.usni.org/2022/08/11/abraham-lincoln-carrier-strike-group-returns-from-indo-pacific-deployment-highlighted-by-south-china-sea-operations.
Mallory Shelbourne, “From the Great White North to the South China Sea,” USNI, August 19, 2024, https://news.usni.org/2024/08/19/from-the-great-white-north-to-the-south-china-sea.
Hu Bo, “The Real Risks of Military Encounters Between China and the U.S. in China’s Surrounding Waters,” South China Sea Strategic Situation Probing Initiative (SCSPI), September 13, 2022, http://www.scspi.org/en/dtfx/real-risks-military-encounters-between-china-and-us-china%E2%80%99s-surrounding-waters.
The South China Sea Arbitration,Award of 12 July 2016, para 1059,para 1109.