Yesterday, we shared a Q&A with Henry Huiyao Wang, founder and president of the Center for China and Globalization (CCG), on Chinese President Xi Jinping’s upcoming visit to the U.S. in the coming week. Over at The East is Read, we have Zhu Feng, Professor and Dean of the School of International Studies at Nanjing University, unpacking the much-touted “Constructive Strategic Stability” between China and the U.S.
Below is a recent interview with Da Wei, Director of the Center for International Security and Strategy (CISS) and Professor in the Department of International Relations at Tsinghua University, on the same subject.
Question: In a meeting closely watched by the world, Chinese President Xi Jinping and U.S. President Donald Trump agreed in Beijing in May this year on a new vision of building what they called “a constructive bilateral relationship of strategic stability.”
According to Xinhua’s readout. China defined “constructive strategic stability” as “a positive stability with cooperation as the mainstay, a sound stability with moderate competition, a constant stability with manageable differences, and an enduring stability with promises of peace.”
Trump said he would work with Xi to strengthen communication and cooperation, properly handle differences, and make bilateral relations better than ever before.
Your recent Foreign Affairs article takes this new formulation as its starting point. You argue that this marks the first time in more than a decade that China and the United States have established a broadly recognized consensus at the leadership level about how to define their relationship.
That makes this new formulation sound particularly important.
Professor, so why do you think “constructive strategic stability” matters? What is different about it from previous ways of describing China-U.S. relations?
Da Wei: Actually, I don’t know which side—China or the U.S.—raised this concept first. Before the two leaders reached their agreement this May, we had heard American leaders, such as Secretary of State Marco Rubio, mention this term. I think he also mentioned it last year in discussions with the media.
But anyway, I think this is the first time the two sides have agreed on the term. So why does it matter? It gives the bilateral relationship a kind of designation. I think this is a very Chinese way of managing foreign policy.
Culturally, we have a holistic perspective on foreign policy. We try to view bilateral relations as a whole, from the top down. We want to give a complicated relationship a definition: Who are we? Are we friends? Are we enemies? Are we partners? Are we competitors?
The Chinese tend to define the issues first. If we are partners, we can discuss our differences. It’s fine to have some differences; we can manage them. But if we are enemies, the Chinese may believe that it’s very hard to work with an enemy. I think this is a Chinese cultural thing.
For that reason, the Chinese side always tries to define bilateral relations with a term. We need to define it together with the American side. If we define it in one way but the American side doesn’t agree, then it’s useless. It’s meaningless.
So for that reason, in history, as I mentioned in my essay, there have been several efforts from both sides to define the relationship, at least since the 1990s. In the late 1990s, we declared our commitment to building a partnership. Later, there was the term “responsible stakeholder,” which was raised by the American side.
Anyway, we used to have some commonly agreed definitions or terms. But for at least the past 15 years, I would say, the Chinese and American sides have not reached a consensus on a term. The Chinese side put forward some suggestions. About 10 years ago, for example, China started talking about a “new type of major-power relationship.” But the U.S. side didn’t like at least part of it, because one of its elements was “mutual respect.” For whatever reason, the American side didn’t like that term.
It’s not easy, after 10 or perhaps 15 years without a common definition, and after 10 years of very high tension between the two countries, to have a constructive or positive term agreed by both sides to guide the whole relationship.
This is a very, very complicated relationship. Without a guiding principle or an overarching term, it can easily drift somewhere nobody knows. We need a term to guide the overall relationship. For that reason, I think the Chinese side believes this term is quite important and is a major development in bilateral relations.
Question: Since this is a term both sides agree on, have you seen concrete evidence since the May summit that the idea of strategic stability is actually shaping the behavior of the two countries?
Da Wei: I don’t think I can give you a clear causal analysis showing that this concept has shaped their behavior. There have still been many bad things happened since the May summit. But I think the behavior of the two sides has been consistent with this concept.
I wouldn’t say that, because we have this concept, they have changed their behavior. I’m a scholar; I don’t think I have the causal evidence to support that. But at least these things have happened together.
For instance, very soon after May, the U.S. side, the Department of War, put more than 10 Chinese companies on a new list, right? The Chinese side retaliated, but I don’t think the two sides escalated that issue. It was a bad development, but they didn’t escalate it.
Another interesting example is that, following its so-called Section 301 investigation, the U.S. decided to impose tariffs on China to replace the Section 122 tariffs. The Section 301 investigation used forced labor as its justification.
I noticed something very interesting in a statement from China’s Ministry of Commerce. The ministry criticized this, saying that we don’t have this problem in China and that it wasn’t fair to impose tariffs on that basis. But after saying that, it referred to the agreement reached with the U.S. side in Busan.
Actually, I think it was referring to the agreement between Vice Premier He Lifeng and Treasury Secretary Bessent, who met in Seoul before the Busan meeting.
Under that agreement, the U.S. would keep its tariffs on China below 20 percent. The Ministry of Commerce recalled that 20 percent tariff cap and noted that the U.S. was using Section 301 tariffs to replace the Section 122 tariffs. The overall tariff level had not exceeded the level agreed in Busan.
I think this statement was extremely interesting. China opposed and criticized the Section 301 tariffs. But the ministry was also saying, in effect: We oppose this, but we understand that the tariffs are still below the level they promised, so we won’t take action. We will keep an eye on it and observe the situation further.
China didn’t retaliate, which showed a very restrained attitude. These cases show that the two sides—or at least, I can say, the Chinese side—have been quite restrained in responding to negative developments from the American side, trying to avoid escalation. I think that has maintained the overall framework of strategic stability.
Leaders’ meetings
Question: If Xi and Trump have further opportunities to meet later this year, including around APEC and the G20, do you think the frequency of leader-level contact matters? Can repeated meetings help create a more durable floor under the relationship?
Da Wei: Definitely, I think that matters. I believe there was a similar case about 20 years ago, when the Chinese and U.S. presidents met four times in a single year.
I would say the more the leaders talk, the better the outcome could be. We would never say, “We’ve had too many meetings.” I hope they can even meet regularly every month.
Another thing I feel sorry about in the current situation is that, so far this year, the two teams—the two governments—haven’t been able to work out many deliverables or concrete outcomes through these meetings and summits.
I think that is mainly because the Trump administration’s decision-making process is very unusual. It’s tightly controlled and top-down, which makes the working level not very effective, I would say.
If the outcome is limited each time, then we need more summits, right? I would also be very happy if they met only twice a year but their teams could solve everything. That would be great. But that’s not the case now.
Given today’s decision-making process and environment in the United States, if the two leaders met only once or twice a year, the positive part of bilateral relations would be too limited. Imagine that they met twice a year: there could be six months between meetings. During those six months, many bad things could happen, with only a very limited positive agenda being implemented.
Each summit may not produce a lot, but if we have four, taken together they could yield a certain amount of progress on the positive agenda. And the leaders know they’re going to meet again very soon: in September, then November, then December.
That’s a very high frequency. In that way, they can try to control negative issues as they arise and make more progress on the positive agenda.
I hope they can have a quarterly meeting arrangement—four times a year, basically once every quarter. Of course, this year they started pretty late, in May. I don’t know the plan for next year, but I hope they can meet every quarter: in winter, spring, summer and fall. I think that would be pretty good.
Whose perspective does the article represent?
Question: Regarding the reception of your Foreign Affairs article, given your background and current position, some China watchers may read what you write as reflecting an authoritative view in Beijing. Is that a fair reading? How would you characterize the perspective you’re presenting in this article?
Da Wei: First and foremost, I only write what I believe. This is my own personal view.
Some of my American friends believe that the Chinese government approved my writing or authorized me to write something. This is totally wrong. I’ve told some of my friends that. I don’t know whether they believe me, but in my entire life, nobody has approved a single word I’ve published in the media or in an academic journal.
I used to work in a government think tank. At that time, I wrote some internal analyses, and for those I needed my boss’s approval. But even then, when I published something in the media or in academic journals, that was my own writing. Nobody approved it, or even encouraged or discouraged me from writing it.
I’m not sure whether mine is a mainstream view or, as you said, an authoritative view. Maybe you’re in a better position to judge. To be honest, I’m not sure that the views in this article are in the mainstream of Chinese thinking.
Chinese people are very polite. Nobody tells me, “You’re wrong.” Sometimes they’re too polite. But I guess many of my colleagues may think Da Wei is too optimistic, or perhaps too naive, to believe that we’re going to have this kind of détente between the two countries.
Again, this is my view. I welcome comments, criticism and discussion. So far, most of the feedback has been quite positive, and I’m happy about that. But this is my personal view. I’m not sure I can represent all Chinese scholars, and I’m 100 percent sure I cannot represent the Chinese government.
Naturally, I’m Chinese, and I’m always talking and working with my colleagues here in China. Although I don’t know whether I can represent a mainstream view, I may be able to convey the views of at least some Chinese scholars. Those views could differ from the Washington mindset.
I’m not saying that I’m correct and they’re wrong. I want to provide a perspective that can stimulate discussion and debate. If that happens, I think it will be great.
Taiwan and the expected summit
Question: You devote a substantial part of the article to the topic of Taiwan. Sinocism also highlighted that section when discussing your piece.
Do you expect Taiwan to be one of the central issues if Xi and Trump meet later this month? How might the discussion differ from what we saw during their May meeting in Beijing?
We know that after returning from China in May, Trump told Fox News that he didn’t want to see Taiwan move toward independence. He also questioned the idea of the United States traveling 9,500 miles to fight a war over the island, adding that he didn’t want such an outcome.
You write in your article that, as long as Beijing believes cross-Strait integration remains achievable, it has no reason to resort to military force. You then go further and discuss ways Washington could reassure Beijing that the prospect of peaceful reunification remains viable. How realistic do you think it is that Washington would move in that direction?
Da Wei: To be honest, I think that’s difficult. I offered my suggestions in the article, but I don’t expect the American government to do what I wrote.
After the May summit, there was a lot of debate and speculation about what would happen on the Taiwan question at the September summit. Some people are asking whether President Trump will do or say more along the same lines as in May. You’ve already introduced what he said after that meeting.
First, I don’t know what will happen. But my view is that I doubt there will be a new development in that regard.
I think there’s a misunderstanding of the Chinese side and the interaction between China and the U.S. on the Taiwan question. At the May summit—and also in an earlier phone call between the two leaders—President Xi spent quite a long time explaining China’s position to President Trump, including the history and the logic of the Chinese side.
President Trump also said that President Xi had spent a long time explaining it. He said he understood the Chinese side’s logic and the history, or at least the historical narrative from the mainland side.
I wasn’t there, but my understanding is that Xi spent a long time explaining China’s position and telling Trump how important and sensitive this issue is.
Then, after the meeting—not during it—President Trump made some remarks on Air Force One and later in interviews. I think this was a decision he made himself after listening to President Xi’s elaboration of the Chinese position. It wasn’t a request from Beijing saying, “You need to say this; you need to say that.” I don’t think that’s what happened. I think President Trump made his own decision.
One possibility is that he really believed Beijing was correct and that the position needed to change. Another is that he wanted to use it as a bargaining chip, because he understood how much importance Beijing attaches to this issue.
He might have thought: This is a good bargaining chip. Give Beijing something it wants to hear, and maybe it will bite—like fishing. This is my speculation about the May summit.
I guess the Chinese side will do the same thing in September. I don’t think China would put the Taiwan question on the negotiating table in the sense of, “I’ll do this, and you do that.” I don’t think that happened in May, and I don’t think it will happen in September.
I guess President Xi will repeat our position. I think it will be a core issue for the Chinese side. But again, I don’t think the Chinese side will raise very concrete suggestions that the U.S. should do this or that.
It really depends on President Trump’s judgment. Does he want to change the policy further? Or does he think, “The Chinese side didn’t take my message and didn’t give me anything in return, so I’ll stop doing that”? Both are possible. Again, it depends on President Trump’s own judgment.
Being a scholar and keeping dialogue going
Question: Before joining Tsinghua, you spent more than two decades at CICIR, and from 2013 to 2017 you were Director of its Institute of American Studies. You now lead the Center for International Security and Strategy at Tsinghua University.
How do you define your role today? Has moving from a policy-oriented research institute to a university changed the questions you focus on or the way you participate in policy debates?
Da Wei: I’ve always viewed myself as a scholar. When I worked in a government think tank, I was a scholar. Now I’m at a university, and I’m also a scholar.
There are some differences between the jobs. I need to teach now, and I have a lot of student activities to attend. That’s a very enjoyable part of my job. But the work is very similar. Whether I’m at a university or a think tank, I do research and talk to my American colleagues.
My task is still the same. I want to offer my analysis to Chinese readers, whether they’re my students, my colleagues or my government. I want to give them my own assessment of China-U.S. relations.
I’ve also had the privilege of traveling a lot in the past three or four years, after the pandemic—more than before the pandemic. That’s because it’s more convenient to travel from a university than it was in my previous job. When I don’t need to teach, I can travel. I try my best because I feel a kind of duty.
Travel between the two countries has become more difficult. For various reasons, many people cannot travel. For me, in-person, face-to-face interaction is key to an accurate understanding.
If nobody wants to take the risk, if everybody studies the other side only in their own study, in their own room, I really worry about China-U.S. relations.
That’s part of the reason I left my previous job and joined Tsinghua. I don’t want to keep rising through a system only to end up sitting in an office doing more administrative work. That work is important, but we’re at a crucial moment. The two countries need to talk to each other.
I feel like a soldier traveling across the firing line. I don’t think I should sit back in an armchair in my office. These times require us to go to the front line, to the firing line.
I’m happy I can do that. I’ve encountered many challenges, but with help from both governments and friends on both sides, I’ve made it through. I hope I can continue.
Question: You’ve been very active in Track Two and Track 1.5 dialogues between China and the United States. Could you share one or two stories or encounters from these exchanges that have stayed with you?
Da Wei: On my first trip to the United States after the pandemic, I attended a multilateral workshop. Participants came from four or five countries: some Asian countries, the U.S. and China. There were about 30 or 40 scholars in the conference room, and I was the only Chinese participant.
Something similar happened later that year when I went to South Korea for a forum. Again, I was the only Chinese person in the room.
Particularly at the meeting in the United States, a lot of questions understandably came to me. It was a very interesting experience. I was also extremely tired, because in every session other participants had a lot of questions for me.
Sometimes I wasn’t a scheduled speaker, but the moderator wanted me to say something and give the other participants a perspective from China. It was difficult. Sometimes their questions and views on China were very tough, and I didn’t know how to answer many of the questions.
But I still enjoyed the experience very much. If I hadn’t been there, there would have been no voice from China. That wouldn’t have been good for China, or for the quality of the discussion in the room.
I still remember that experience very vividly: how difficult the situation was, but also how encouraging it was for me.
The following year, I was in another country for a similar workshop. There was a Russian scholar who was the only Russian participant, and he was asked a lot of questions too. During the coffee break, I told him, “There are so many questions. This happened to me last year. This year, you’re in my position. Good job.” I tried to encourage him to interact with the other participants. Those experiences are very memorable.
What face-to-face exchanges can change
Question: Have there been moments when talking directly with Americans changed your understanding of how they see China?
Da Wei: We’re all adults, and we have fairly stable perceptions of the other country. I don’t think a single conversation can change someone’s view of China, unless they lack certain information about the other side and someone provides it. That could change some of their views.
But experts usually know a lot already. We have different values and interests, so even when we know the same facts, our perceptions can be very different.
I don’t think I can really change their minds by participating in one workshop or talking to them face-to-face for an hour or two. That’s unlikely. But I still believe that in-person dialogue and interaction can humanize perceptions of the other side.
If a Chinese scholar never talks to Americans or can hardly ever go to the U.S., their research will be based on reading, analysis and imagination. I can sometimes see this in myself. If I haven’t traveled to the U.S. for a while, I start using my own logic to understand it. The U.S. becomes a more and more abstract object of analysis.
For instance, I sometimes divide American politicians into several groups: A represents one school of thought, B a second school, and C a third. But when I go to the U.S. and talk to people, I suddenly realize that the country is more complicated than that. You can hardly divide them into four or five groups. You realize that your analysis at home is sometimes too abstract and too simple.
I think that applies not just to me, but to all scholars and analysts. I don’t know to what extent I can change my American colleagues’ views of China. But I’m happy to be part of a process that helps them understand China more accurately.
I’m also happy to be part of a process in which my American colleagues, and colleagues from other countries, help me understand the U.S. and other countries more accurately. I would say this is a community, and this is a process.
Young people’s views of the relationship
Question: I noticed that the Center for International Security and Strategy (CISS) has a series on its WeChat account called “China-U.S. Relations Through the Eyes of Young People,” featuring students’ perspectives on the relationship. What made you want to give young people a platform to discuss China-U.S. relations?
I’m sure you also meet American students when you visit the United States. Do you find that younger Chinese and Americans see the relationship differently from people in the policy and academic communities?
Da Wei: I think that’s probably true in the U.S., but I’m not sure it’s true in China. In the U.S., you can see relatively obvious generational differences.
I would say the younger generation has less hawkish views toward China. They don’t buy many of the views held by the establishment or older generations. That’s not limited to China policy. It applies to foreign policy as a whole, economic policy and the U.S. political system. The younger generation has some very different views from their parents. China policy is only part of that.
Sometimes I even see a tendency for younger people to become more skeptical the more the older generation emphasizes China-U.S. competition or confrontation. They don’t want to accept that unconditionally. They want to understand it with their own eyes, ears and minds. I think that’s relatively obvious in the U.S.
In China, the situation is different. Generally speaking, the younger generation’s views of the U.S. are similar to those of the older generation. But because of their age, they haven’t had the same experiences as people like me. I’ve experienced relatively good China-U.S. relations and then bad China-U.S. relations.
I know some of the dark sides of the U.S., and I also know some of the bright sides. So I may be even more open than younger people to thinking beyond short-term tensions or problems.
The younger generation’s understanding of the U.S. is quite complicated—not naive, I would say. But they basically grew up at a time when China-U.S. relations were turning sour. They tend to see the U.S. as holding negative views of China, and they see many social and political challenges in the U.S.
In theory, on paper, they know we had good times and that the U.S. is a very advanced country. But their own experiences have basically been of the negative developments of the past 10 years.
When I led my students to the U.S. for more face-to-face interaction with their American peers and ordinary Americans, some told me that the biggest takeaway was this process of humanization.
They realized that the U.S. is a country just like China, and that American people are just like Chinese people. Most are very good, warm, polite and open toward them. They had some unpleasant experiences there, too, just as there are good and bad things in China.
They came to understand that it’s a normal country, just like China. We disagree on many things, but we won’t demonize the other side. That’s the change I’ve seen after these interactions, particularly after a trip to the U.S. I’m happy I can play some role in that process.
AI dialogue and the pace of technology
Question: I’ve seen work by your CISS colleagues, such as Xiao Qian, who recently wrote in Foreign Policy about the prospects for renewed China-U.S. dialogue on AI. Xiao Qian is CISS’s Deputy Director. Sun Chenghao, a senior fellow at CISS, was also recently interviewed by Bloomberg about China-U.S. discussions on AI safety and competition.
It seems that CISS pays a lot of attention to AI within its work on China-U.S. relations. Some overseas China watchers have also suggested that AI could be a major topic at the expected September meeting between the two leaders.
What role do you expect AI to play? It may be the hottest topic in the world today, especially in China and the U.S. What are your expectations for it at the coming meeting?
Da Wei: Thank you for reading that. I need to admit that I’m by no means an expert on AI. You’re correct that my colleagues spend more time on it.
As an institute, CISS attaches great importance to AI governance because we think it’s the most important issue for China’s foreign policy and even for Chinese society.
Unfortunately, I’ve been too busy, and I don’t think I should expand my area of study endlessly. So I told colleagues such as Xiao Qian and Chenghao, “You do the work, and I’ll support you, but I really don’t have the time to do it myself.” I read a lot about it with great interest, and I appreciate the efforts of my colleagues and their American and European counterparts on AI governance.
Back to your question: I definitely believe that AI is the most important topic between China and the U.S. I’m happy that the two leaders agreed in May to start a Track One dialogue between the countries.
I don’t know what they’ll announce at the summit. To be honest, I’m not very optimistic about the outcome. The good news is that the two sides are going to talk to each other regularly, because the two presidents have already agreed on this mechanism.
Question: That’s already something to be optimistic about, right?
Da Wei: Exactly. That fact itself is good news: at least we’re talking to each other.
The bad news is that there are several difficulties. First, AI is such an important and sensitive topic. It’s directly related to the competitiveness and future of your economy, the future of your military power, and many other things.
I think a lot of people on both sides have a zero-sum mindset. I’m not just pointing a finger at the American side, but I do believe the American side has an even stronger zero-sum mindset, because the U.S. is leading in this area.
Once you’re leading in a technology, you don’t want the other side to surpass you, right? I’m not blaming the U.S. Understandably, it has a very strong zero-sum mindset. But if you see it as zero-sum, when you talk to the other side you may worry that it’s setting traps for you. You don’t want to fall into them.
The issue is so sensitive and complicated that I think it’s difficult for the two sides to achieve meaningful outcomes.
Another factor is that AI technology is mostly in the hands of the private sector, in those companies. Governments in both China and the U.S. lag behind the technical experts, scientists and entrepreneurs. Without them on board, I don’t think we can achieve very substantial outcomes. So far, they’re not on board. I hope they can join in the future.
For all those reasons, I don’t think it will be easy for the two sides to achieve many meaningful outcomes. They may make announcements or agree on principles. They may reach agreements on social issues, such as how to use AI when publishing on social media—for example, how to label AI-generated content.
That kind of thing is good, but I don’t think it goes deep enough, because the technology is developing so rapidly.
I don’t know what will happen in two or three years, at the end of the Trump administration. What kind of situation will we be in? I’m not sure.
Sometimes I feel that the technology is on a bullet train, but our two governments are still in an ox-drawn cart. They’re moving very slowly, and the technology is developing so fast that they can’t catch up. (Enditem)
Henry Huiyao Wang on Xi Jinping’s Upcoming U.S. Visit
Below is a Q&A with Henry Huiyao Wang, founder and president of the Center for China and Globalization (CCG), on Chinese President Xi Jinping’s upcoming visit to the U.S. in the coming week.
