Shi Yinhong's Sino-Japanese Rapprochement and "Diplomatic Revolution" that never materialized

Unheeded advice from 2003 by the Renmin University of China professor.

As the attack and killing of a Japanese 10-year-old schoolboy in southern Shenzhen again tests China-Japan relations to the limit, I can’t help but think of a well-known media storm two decades ago. Ma Licheng of the People’s Daily newspaper and Shi Yinhong, a grand strategist at the Renmin University of China, advocated for “new thinking” toward Japan in 2002 and 2003 with two articles in the bimonthly Strategy and Management magazine.

Needless to say, they lost the debate. And they paid a public price by being called traitors to the Chinese nation by an online mob.

Below is a translation of Shi Yinghong’s ignored counsel from 2003. Its full text in Chinese can be found in Douban.

时殷弘：中日接近与“外交革命”

Shi Yinhong: Sino-Japanese Rapprochement and the "Diplomatic Revolution"

No. 2, 2003, Strategy and Management

I.

In recent years, the prolonged, widespread, and deep tensions in Sino-Japanese relations have become one of the few particularly troubling and thought-provoking aspects of China’s foreign relations. What makes these tensions especially concerning is that their most prominent and dangerously far-reaching characteristic lies in the rapidly increasing mutual resentment and hostility between large segments of the populations in both countries (or, to slightly exaggerate, between the Chinese and Japanese peoples) in recent years. This is what a Chinese author recently referred to in the subtitle of an important article as the "worries of Sino-Japanese civil relations."¹

The article, written in a vividly powerful style reminiscent of literary reportage, combined with calm rational reflection, lists, warns, and discusses various phenomena—matters most of us are generally quite familiar with, but often too hesitant to confront and deeply reflect upon.

Here, it is only necessary to cite a single survey from well-established opinion poll data to demonstrate the gravity of the situation. The Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, in cooperation with Japan's Asahi Shimbun, conducted a nationwide public opinion survey in both China and Japan from late August to mid-September 2002. The results showed: (1) 50% of Chinese respondents and 45% of Japanese respondents believed the state of Sino-Japanese relations was poor, while only 22% of Chinese and 41% of Japanese respondents held the opposite view. Compared with a similar survey conducted in 1997, the number of respondents from both countries who believed relations were poor had increased by 21% and 5%, respectively. (2) 80% of Chinese respondents listed “perception of history” as the top negative factor affecting Sino-Japanese relations, while 40% of Japanese respondents cited "lack of mutual understanding" and "differences in political systems" as the primary negative factors.

In short, as Asahi Shimbun, which reported the survey, stated, "Most Japanese and Chinese feel that relations between their two countries are poor," and compared to previous years, "Sino-Japanese relations are worsening."²

Due to the anti-Japanese sentiments and public opinion climate in China in recent years, coupled with significant deficiencies in media reports and research on related issues, the average Chinese person has almost no understanding of Japanese public sentiments and perspectives on China, or the political impact of such sentiments within Japan.

In this regard, reading an article from The Economist in early 2001 would certainly be helpful. It wrote: "These days, a more accurate description is that, despite official assurances, relations are bad and getting worse. For this, the Japanese blame Chinese aggressiveness, in trade and in foreign policy. Yet a good part of the reason can be found in Japan. There, old policies of “engaging” the Middle Kingdom are under sustained attack from an assertive new generation of politicians, academics and journalists. Even foreign-ministry officials have begun to pay attention. Official China policy has suddenly begun to harden." Among the Japanese public and various sectors, "The China hawks have an attentive audience: as happens the world over, Japan's sick economy and persistent high unemployment are fanning the flames of chauvinism."

Additionally, China’s accusations and demands on Japan, the widespread anti-Japanese public sentiment in China, trade frictions and territorial disputes between the two countries, illegal immigration from China, and criminal activities by some Chinese in Japan, according to the article, all contribute to the fact that “Japanese nationalists of various hues”, with some public sympathy and response, " are starting to call for a more assertive foreign policy towards China," and extreme right-wing hawks like Shintaro Ishihara "are finding growing favour, especially among younger Japanese." ³The reasons for this situation, as the article suggests, are pretty complex, and Japan’s internal economic, political, and psychological factors are likely primary.

However, it is undeniable that certain basic attitudes and actions toward Japan from both the Chinese public and government are also part of the cause, regardless of how justified they may be. What China can do, above all, is to optimize its relevant strategies and attitudes to promote a significant improvement in Sino-Japanese relations, which is of vital interest to China.

II.

Japan is geographically close to China, with a population exceeding 100 million, and its economic power and technological level are among the world’s most advanced, providing it with many of the objective conditions to become a major military power. Therefore, it can be argued that if the rapid growth of mutual resentment and hostility between most Chinese and Japanese people is not curbed, it poses considerable danger to China's long-term future. To put it plainly, one of the dangers is that if this negative trend continues unchecked, extreme right-wing forces like Shintaro Ishihara, who advocate anti-China, xenophobia, and extreme nationalist political/military expansionism, could one day control Japan’s political and foreign policy direction.

Chinese leaders have repeatedly and correctly emphasized the need to "take a long-term perspective" in handling Sino-Japanese relations, and this point likely holds great significance. In light of this danger, and given the relatively severe external security environment facing China in East Asia, making big efforts to approach Japan and avoid or mitigate the "security dilemma" between the two countries is crucial.

The Chinese mainland cannot afford to face a hostile Japan in addition to a hostile U.S., Taiwan, and potentially India. From a broad strategic perspective, the fundamental principle of strategic concentration requires China to make significant efforts to improve Sino-Japanese relations and achieve rapprochement so that it can focus its resources and energy on dealing with the real and potential containment, pressure, and threats posed by the U.S., as well as its crucial task of preventing Taiwan independence and promoting reunification.

In the past two or three years, especially since the 9/11 attacks, the enormous power advantage and hegemonic position of the United States in global politics have reached an unprecedented level. Its wariness of China’s true rise, and its efforts to hinder China's development of strong military capabilities and international political influence, have also grown to an unprecedented degree. This is despite the possibility of significant positive changes in specific aspects of the U.S. administration's intentions, posture, and policy actions toward China, and despite the genuine long-term hope for the formation of an overall peaceful, cooperative, and coordinated relationship between the U.S. and China.

At the same time, although the basic policy of prioritizing U.S.-China relations and maintaining a positive relationship with the U.S.—sometimes even at considerable cost to China's pride—has been essential for China's national interests and has generally produced crucially beneficial outcomes for China, relying solely on this policy is clearly insufficient to substantially improve the U.S.’s fundamental views, policies, and strategic posture toward China, as well as China's medium- to long-term external security environment (at least during the current Republican administration).

Moreover, China has already begun to feel strongly that this approach has two significant costs. First, the space for maneuver in U.S. diplomacy has been significantly limited, and as a result, China’s room for maneuver on several major international (and even some domestic) issues has also been constrained. Secondly, the perception of a supposedly “weak” or “soft” stance towards the U.S. has at times hurt the broader domestic support for foreign policy in China, which has become increasingly important as “mass politics” has grown in the wake of reform and social development.

In this context, the crucial principle of strategic flexibility requires China to adjust its diplomatic strategy to mitigate certain disadvantages in its relations with the U.S., significantly enhance diplomatic leverage with the U.S., and create an international environment conducive to pushing the U.S. government and public opinion towards more positive reflections and improvements in their stance towards China. Sino-Japanese rapprochement is a diplomatic move that can carry substantial weight in achieving this, perhaps even the only one in the foreseeable future.

However, it must also be recognized that Japan is the U.S.’s primary ally in East Asia and lacks a tradition of diplomatic independence. It is unrealistic to expect any contradictions between Japan and the U.S. to develop to the extent that they would shake the U.S.-Japan military and political alliance. Moreover, many factors make Japan inclined to benefit from China’s external challenges, and many factors lead it to view China’s rising power and the "power transition" between China and Japan with suspicion. This makes Japan reluctant to accept or support any strategic cooperation between China and Japan to counterbalance the U.S. diplomatically. This situation is somewhat akin to Austria after 1890, where it was nearly impossible for Austria to become a partner of France or Russia in counterbalancing Germany.

At the same time, there are several significant factors that could lead Japan, like China, to seriously, or even strongly, desire Sino-Japanese rapprochement. These factors include Japan's geographic proximity to China, which raises concerns about potential hostilities between the two; the particularly prominent need for trade and investment with China amid Japan's long-term economic stagnation; the necessity for Japan to maintain its influence in the East Asian economic landscape, which has been reshaped by China’s rapid economic rise—a goal that can only be achieved through coordination and cooperation with China; and the equally important need for political and security cooperation with China in East Asia, especially in terms of Northeast Asian regional security, clearly essential for Japan to maintain a sufficient sense of security and realize its ambitions as a regional political power. Despite some erosion, Japan's quasi-pacifist "trading state" ⁴political culture, which emerged after World War II, still holds a dominant position. There is also Japan’s possible or inevitable concern about the U.S.—the worry that East Asian stability and Japan’s own security might be undermined by the overly hegemonic, unilateral, or even militaristic stance that the U.S. occasionally takes toward China. ⁵Finally, Japan harbors a deep-seated desire to change its uncomfortable situation of being located in East Asia yet psychologically and emotionally distant from its major neighbors, particularly the increasingly powerful China.

As long as Sino-Japanese relations make significant progress, and rapprochement is achieved, a marked improvement in China’s diplomatic and strategic position vis-à-vis the U.S. would almost automatically follow. Sino-Japanese rapprochement could be considered a "diplomatic revolution" of sorts, even if tempered in its scope.

As discussed above, China has significant interests in seeking rapprochement with Japan to improve its security environment and diplomatic position. Additionally, China's actual need for improved Sino-Japanese relations should be seen as greater than Japan’s. However, due to historical, national psychology, and the structure of East Asian international politics, Sino-Japanese relations have always been fraught with difficulties. In recent years, tensions have worsened significantly, influenced by government policies and public opinion in both countries, perhaps especially by public opinion in China. While the interests are great, the difficulties are also considerable. Therefore, the Chinese government, with genuinely innovative national policy thinking and strong strategic determination, must proactively seek rapprochement with Japan, even at seemingly significant cost (or through proactive major adjustments in its stance and policies toward Japan). Furthermore, the relative ineffectiveness of some current policies toward Japan highlights the necessity of doing so. From the perspective of Sino-Japanese relations, and more importantly, from the perspective of improving China’s overall security environment and diplomatic position, it is worth attempting the "indirect approach" strategy ⁶advocated by one of the most famous strategic theorists, Liddell Hart.

III.

What does China mainly need to do to seek rapprochement with Japan? It primarily needs to do the following five things:

1. Over an extended period, be broadly satisfied with the degree of public reflection and apology the Japanese government has reached regarding Japan’s wartime aggression against China, unless there is a significant regression by the Japanese government. In other words, put the "historical issues" between China and Japan on the back burner of the diplomatic agenda for an extended period, and accordingly remove it from official and quasi-official propaganda. For this, China must maintain a historical confidence and patience that the issue can ultimately be resolved and adopt a broad strategic perspective focused on China’s overall environment and interests. This includes recognizing the principle of strategic concentration previously emphasized: concentrating on dealing with the U.S. and concentrating on the Taiwan issue to prevent independence and promote reunification, and mobilizing all possible positive factors to bypass or mitigate obstacles.

2. Based on the principle of balancing strategic needs with economic requirements and coordinating long-term gains with short-term interests, China should rely on proactive and robust government policies to promote and regulate efforts to significantly increase Japan’s exports to China and investment in China, within feasible limits. This would aim to convince the Japanese government, business community, and public that such efforts will greatly help mitigate Japan’s prolonged economic downturn. To this end, China may consider moderately reducing the proportion of trade and foreign investment it conducts with the U.S. and EU countries. Additionally, in light of the strategic importance of pursuing closer Sino-Japanese relations, China should adopt a more accommodating stance and strategy in managing trade frictions with Japan. Moreover, the Chinese government, through its top leader, should express sincere and frequent gratitude for the substantial economic aid Japan has provided to China since its reform and opening-up.

3. In response to Japan’s military expansion and certain adjustments to its defense mission, China should maintain a policy of quiet vigilance while outwardly demonstrating magnanimity. China should avoid the frequent public expression of concern over the possibility of Japan becoming a “military power,” a scenario that is often somewhat exaggerated. Our strategic priority should remain undistracted by the “China threat theory,” with the overarching focus on preparations for potential military conflict regarding Taiwan. Under a national grand strategy, we should follow the principle of “speaking less and doing more” to accelerate the comprehensive modernization of China’s military forces. When it comes to Japan’s military power and broader issues concerning Japan, our statements must be measured—overstatements are counterproductive—and our actions should be practical and effective, with unnecessary measures avoided. China should also actively explore various ways to establish mutual military trust and mechanisms between China and Japan and between China and the U.S.-Japan military alliance. While avoiding unrealistic expectations, we should not be without hope or effort in this regard. Concurrently, as China continues to significantly enhance its military capabilities, it should repeatedly reassure the Japanese government, political elites, and public that China’s military modernization has no expansionist intentions, and that as long as Taiwan does not declare independence, China will not resort to force against it.

4. On major multilateral issues related to international security, political cooperation, and economic stability and prosperity in East Asia, China should take concrete actions to welcome, and even proactively invite, Japan to participate as a major power. China should make it clear to both the Japanese government and public that Japan is regarded as a significant power—both as a leading global and regional economic power today and as a future political power in East Asia. Furthermore, China should handle Sino-Japanese relations in East Asian international politics and economics based on the principle of major power coordination and cooperation, rather than engaging in rivalry.

   In the near term, two issues are especially important: first, significantly strengthening bilateral and multilateral consultations and cooperation with Japan on the Korean Peninsula issue to promote peace, stability, and denuclearization on the peninsula, and to prevent a repeat of the tragic history of major power competition and conflict over the peninsula. Second, as China pursues free trade relationships and deeper economic integration with Southeast Asia, it should adopt a policy of coordination with Japan, rather than competition, to avoid what a Japanese political commentator recently described as the “struggle for leadership in Southeast Asian economic integration between Tokyo and Beijing.”⁷ These two issues, along with the third point mentioned earlier, should form the foundation of urgent and gradually deepening high-level strategic talks and systematic departmental consultations between the Chinese and Japanese governments.

5. Regarding the reform of the United Nations Security Council, China should approach Japan’s desire to become a permanent member of the Security Council with fairness in both policy statements and practical attitudes. This means not imposing special conditions on Japan’s bid that China has not applied to other similar candidates (such as India and Egypt). Furthermore, at an appropriate time, China could even actively support Japan’s bid to become a permanent member of the Security Council.

IV.

It is very important to note that for China, Sino-Japanese rapprochement can be considered a “diplomatic revolution” with relatively low costs. Upon calm, pragmatic, and creative consideration, it becomes clear that none of the five areas of action mentioned above entails significant actual costs to China, nor do they harm China’s core interests or require abandoning its fundamental stance on safeguarding national security and pursuing national strength. Of the five measures needed to achieve Sino-Japanese rapprochement, some involve adopting a pragmatic approach, acknowledging and temporarily accepting situations that China cannot change for the time being, in order to bypass obstacles to its grand national strategy. Others aim at seeking “win-win” outcomes for both China and Japan, thereby advancing China’s vital national interests. Additionally, some measures resemble “loss prevention”—there are certain developments that cannot be stopped, and attempting to do so would eventually result in failure, as well as unnecessarily alienating the Japanese public. On the other hand, if these developments are embraced or even promoted, they can become “positive assets” that could yield favorable political and psychological influence now or in the future.

At the same time, these points represent a significant departure from China’s previous attitudes, stances, and policies toward Japan, and far exceed the expectations that the Japanese government and public (as well as other countries and global opinion) might have of China. As such, they indeed constitute a “diplomatic revolution.” While this is not a “diplomatic revolution” in the traditional sense of dramatic shifts in alliances, it does not diminish its great importance as previously noted, nor does it negate the possibility that it could achieve similar effects to traditional “diplomatic revolutions”—that is, restructuring key areas with boldness to create a situation where, as the saying goes - and maybe a bit of exaggeration - “After reaching a dead end, a new village emerges in the shaded grove.”

Compared to the past, the greatest and most notable achievement of the third generation of Communist Party of China (CPC) leadership in diplomacy has been the consistent and creative implementation of good-neighborly diplomacy around China, based on the new diplomatic policies and practices pioneered by Deng Xiaoping. As a result, the surrounding geopolitical environment, with the exception of the Western Pacific arc closely related to the Taiwan issue and U.S. strategy, has reached its best state in modern Chinese history for China’s security and peaceful development. This has left a crucial and remarkable tradition or system of experience in current Chinese diplomacy. However, for various objective and subjective reasons, the current far-from-ideal state of Sino-Japanese relations remains the biggest regret in this regard. The leadership of the CPC and the Chinese government after the 16th National Congress of the CPC must not only inherit the comprehensive good-neighbor diplomacy of their predecessors but also adapt and innovate with the times. Clearly, the most important task in this regard, and one of almost overarching strategic significance, is to vigorously pursue Sino-Japanese rapprochement. During their leadership, this should be one of their highest diplomatic priorities.

(Author affiliation: School of International Studies, Renmin University of China)

Endnote:

The term "diplomatic revolution" used in this article is a specialized term commonly used in the field of international diplomatic history. It originates from the dramatic shifts in alliances among major powers directly related to the War of Austrian Succession in the 18th century, particularly the rapid change from hostility to friendly cooperation. In a broader sense, "diplomatic revolution" refers to a fundamental or near-fundamental and dramatic shift in relations between two previously antagonistic nations, or a dramatic rapprochement. For example, U.S. President Nixon's 1972 visit to China was a "diplomatic revolution" in Sino-American relations, and Mikhail Gorbachev's 1989 visit to China was roughly the same in this regard.

Hu Youping, the woman who lost her life to stop attack that injured Japanese in China

1. 马立诚：“对日关系新思维--中日民间之忧”，《战略与管理》2002年第6期 Ma Licheng, "New Thinking on Sino-Japanese Relations: The Concerns of Sino-Japanese Civil Relations," Strategy and Management, No. 6, 2002.

2. "Polls: China-Japan Relations Worsening," *Asahi Shimbun*, Sept. 28, 2002.

3. “Japan Starts Picking on China,” The Economist, Feb. 8, 2001. Recently, on the 30th anniversary of the normalization of Sino-Japanese relations, The Japan Times published an editorial expressing concern about the “worries of Sino-Japanese civil relations”: “In both countries, the rise of the younger generation has drained the momentum behind ‘Sino-Japanese friendship’ initiatives. As a result, anti-Japanese and anti-Chinese sentiments are growing. In Japan, such sentiments have fueled populist forces.” The editorial further warned: “The psychological equation between Japan and China has reversed, with China’s rising confidence and Japan’s declining confidence. In this sense, the peoples of Japan and China are standing at a potentially dangerous juncture. If emotional conflicts spiral out of control, bilateral relations could plummet.” (Japan and China Need a New Framework, Editorial, Japan Times, Sept. 30, 2002).

4. For the definition of a "Trading State," see Richard Rosecrance, *The Rise of the Trading State: Commerce and Conquest in the Modern World* (New York, 1985). This is a widely influential theoretical work. For the basic forms of "Trading State" political culture in Japanese history since the Meiji Restoration, see Shi Yinhong, "Peaceful Expansion? Military Conquest? Commercial Welfare—Japan's Choices and Fate in the 20th Century," *Japanese Studies*, No. 2, 2000.

5. This is akin to concerns about the "bull in the china shop," a worry that anyone with interests in the china shop would naturally have.

6. B.H. Liddell Hart, *Strategy*, 2nd revised edition (New York, 1967).

7. Keizo Nabeshim, “Strengthen Sino-Japanese Ties,” Japan Times, Sep. 25, 2002．